Showing posts with label Australian Bureau of Statistics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Australian Bureau of Statistics. Show all posts

Wednesday, 25 April 2018

Did the Australian Bureau of Statistics spy on Telstra customers at one remove in 2016?

“…with its near-complete coverage of the population, mobile device data is now seen as a feasible way to estimate temporary populations” [Australian Bureau of Statistics Demographer Andrew Howe, quoted in The Australian Bureau of Statistics Tracked People By Their Mobile Device Data at Medium, 23 April 2018]

Cryptoparty founder. Amnesty Australia 'Humanitarian Media Award' recipient 2014 and activist Asher Wolf recently reported that in 2016 the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) without informing or seeking permission from mobile phone users ran a secretive, publicly-funded tracking program via signals emitted by the mobile phones of an unspecified number of people, in order to find out where they travelled over the course of an unspecified number of days and how long they stayed at each location.

A presentation of the basic details of this pilot study was made by the ABS researcher leading the pilot at a Spatial Information Day in Adelaide on 11 August 2017.

second ABS researcher also made a presentation on the day.

Spatial Information Day (which has the ABS as one of its sponsors) is characterised by the organisers as an annual educational and promotional event and was first held just on 18 years ago.

The Australian Bureau of Statistics was swift to reply to Asher Wolf's Medium article, stating that it has only been supplied with hourly agregate data by the telco (Telstra) which did not identify individuals.

However, the aggregated data supplied to the ABS was at the second lowest SA2 Level and some of these statistcal areas have populations of well under 3,000 residents according to 2016 Census data. Which makes the task of matching names to some of the tracked population movements just that much easier for a demographer or determined hacker.

Given recent less than transparent disclosures by data mining corporations concerning data collection/retention practices, readers might forgive me for waiting to see if the other shoe drops in this ABS-Telsta data mining and privacy matter.

One might say that thanks to Ms. Wolf we are all being educated further about big data and the ethics of data collection.

This is the response Ms. Wolf received when she contacted privacy experts concerning the pilot study:

“I find this tracking of people using their telephone location data without their knowledge and consent extremely concerning. The fact that the telecoms company allowed this data to be handed to a third party, and then for that third party to be a government agency compounds the breach of trust for the people whose data was involved,” said Angela Daly, Vice Chancellor’s Senior Research Fellow and Senior Lecturer in Queensland University of Technology’s Faculty of Law, research associate in the Tilburg Institute for Law, Technology and Society and Digital Rights Watch board member.

“After the Cambridge Analytica/Facebook scandal this is yet another example of why we need much tougher restrictions on what companies and the government can do with our data.”

Electronic Frontiers Australia board member Justin Warren also pointed out that while there are beneficial uses for this kind of information, “…the ABS should be treading much more carefully than it is. The ABS damaged its reputation with its bungled management of the 2016 Census, and with its failure to properly consult with civil society about its decision to retain names and addresses. Now we discover that the ABS is running secret tracking experiments on the population?”

“Even if the ABS’ motives are benign, this behaviour — making ethically dubious decisions without consulting the public it is experimenting on — continues to damage the once stellar reputation of the ABS.”

“This kind of population tracking has a dark history. During World War II, the US Census Bureau used this kind of tracking information to round up Japanese-Americans for internment. Census data was used extensively by Nazi Germany to target specific groups of people. The ABS should be acutely aware of these historical abuses, and the current tensions within society that mirror those earlier, dark days all too closely.”

“The ABS must work much harder to ensure that it is conducting itself with the broad support of the Australian populace. Sadly, it appears that the ABS increasingly considers itself above the mundane concerns of those outside its ivory tower. This arrogance must end.”

“For us to continue to trust the ABS with our most intimate details, the ABS must maintain society’s trust. Conducting experiments on citizens without seeming to care about our approval or consent undermines that trust.”

International privacy advocates also raised concerns about the study.

“Data the companies, like telcos, collect inevitably becomes very attractive to government agencies looking to track, monitor, and survey people. Like here, users are rarely informed, let alone consent to these uses. The impact on privacy rights is severe: location information (especially combined with other sensitive data) can reveal startlingly detailed information about your life (where you live, work), connections (who you talk to or visit), preferences (what you buy and when), and health (doctors and pharmacies frequented),” stated Amie Stepanovich, U.S. Policy Manager for digital rights organisation Access Now.

Monday, 2 April 2018

Rate of homelessness is rising across Australia - including in New South Wales

Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), media release, 14 March 2018:

Census reveals a rise in the rate of homelessness in Australia 

The rate of homelessness in Australia has increased 4.6 per cent over the last five years, according to new data from the 2016 Census of Population and Housing.

The latest estimates reveal more than 116,000 people were experiencing homelessness in Australia on Census night, representing 50 homeless persons for every 10,000 people.

Dr Paul Jelfs, General Manager of Population and Social Statistics, said that while there was an overall increase in the estimate of homelessness in Australia, this number is made up of various distinct groups and each tells a different story.

People living in ‘severely’ crowded dwellings, defined as requiring four or more extra bedrooms to accommodate the people who usually live there, was the greatest contributor to the national increase in homelessness.

“In 2016, this group accounted for 51,088 people, up from 41,370 in 2011.

“On Census night, 8,200 people were estimated to be ‘sleeping rough’ in improvised dwellings, tents or sleeping out – an increase from 3.2 persons per 10,000 people in 2011 to 3.5 persons per 10,000 people in 2016,” Dr Jelfs said.

Younger and older Australians have also emerged as groups experiencing increasing homelessness in Australia.

“One quarter of all people experiencing homelessness in 2016 was aged between 20 and 30 years,” Dr Jelfs said.

People aged between 65 and 74 years experiencing homelessness increased to 27 persons per 10,000 people, up from 25 persons per 10,000 people in 2011.

Recent migrants (those who arrived within the five years prior to the 2016 Census) accounted for 15 per cent of the homeless estimate. Almost three quarters of this group were living in ‘severely’ crowded dwellings and the majority came from countries in South-East Asia, North-East Asia and Southern and Central Asia, including India, China and Afghanistan.

The overall number of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people experiencing homelessness in 2016 was 23,437. More than two out of three were living in ‘severely’ crowded dwellings, with just less than 10 per cent ‘sleeping rough’.

Dr Jelfs also acknowledged the support of service providers in enumerating the homeless.

“I would like to thank the service providers and staff who worked with the ABS to tackle the difficult challenge of enumerating this population group and maximise the quality of this important information,” Dr Jelfs said.

Further 2016 Census homelessness data can be found on the ABS website


On Census Night in 2016 the number of people who were listed as homeless in NSW:

37,715 persons in total, of which 22,698 were male and 15,010 were female
1,801 of the men and 981 of the women were 65 years of age and older
3,963 were children under 12 years

On Census Night in 2016 the number of people who were listed as homeless in the NSW Northern Rivers region by Local Government Area:

Tweed – 444 (compared to 308 in 2011)
Tweed Heads 156, Tweed Heads 47, South Murwillumbah 49, Murwillumbah Region 52, Kingscliff-Fingal Head 51, Banora Point 45, Pottsville 42

Byron - 327 (compared to 279 in 2011)
Byron Bay 146, Mullumbimby 121, Bangalow 31, Brunswick Heads-Ocean Shores 29
Lennox Head-Skennars Head 4

Lismore - 309 (compared to 283 in 2011)
Lismore 153, Lismore Region 93, Goonellabah 67

Clarence Valley - 230 (compared to 198 in 2011)
Grafton 89, Grafton Region 103, Maclean-Yamba-Iluka 37

Ballina - 77 (compared to 142 in 2011)
Ballina 52, Ballina Region 22

Richmond Valley - 73 (compared to 69 in 2011)
Casino 44, Casino Region 20, Evans Head 15

Kyogle - 34 (compared to 21 in 2011)
Kyogle 27

Sunday, 8 October 2017

Australian Bureau of Statistics has carriage of the national voluntary same-sex marriage postal survey - a visual answer to the question "What could possibly go wrong?"

Images of just some instances highlighting predictable issues concerning the Turnbull Government’s national same-sex marriage voluntary postal survey……..

But wait, there’s more…….

There were 16.0 million electors on the Commonwealth Electoral Roll as of 30 August 2017,

According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics by 29 September 2017 only est. 9.2 million of these people had returned a completed voluntary same-sex marriage postal survey form.

Another 13.6 million completed and returned forms would see a survey response rate no politician would dare argue with if he or she hoped to keep their seat at the next federal election.

If over 90 per cent of enrolled electors could turn out to vote for a national song in 1977, surely just as many could get their finger out in 2017 and answer one simple question: "Should the law be changed to allow same-sex couples to marry?"

The same-sex marriage survey closes in 30 days time at 6pm local time on Tuesday, 7 November 2017. Survey forms received by the Australian Bureau of Statistics after this will not be counted in official results.

Wednesday, 13 September 2017

Is the self-inflicted reputational loss suffered by the Australian Bureau of Statistics having a negative impact on the same-sex marriage voluntary postal survey?

 “An Australian Marriage Law Survey Form will be sent by post to every eligible Australian. It will be sent to the address on the Commonwealth Electoral Roll.” [, 8 September 2017]
A reader recently contacted North Coast Voices stating that:

“Two weeks ago I rang the ABS to ask whether I could send my marked postal survey back to them in a plain envelope because as I said to them, I don't trust them. They told me that my survey form would not be counted. I also spoke to my Federal Parliamentarian about this.”

I suspect that this question has been asked a number of times by concerned citizens.

Which raises a question - Is the self-inflicted reputational loss suffered by the Australian Bureau of Statistics in 2016 having a negative impact on the same-sex marriage voluntary postal survey?

The Bureau declares that survey respondents will have their privacy protected and that no-one will be able to identify an individual with their response on the survey form.

However, these survey forms come with a barcode which apparently identifies Commonwealth Electoral Roll eligibility of the recipient and the electoral division in which an individual lives.

So a plain envelope return of the survey form will not hide the survey respondent's identity.

The Bureau has anticipated widespread mistrust in its ability to conduct this national survey without a monumental blunder à la Census 2016. 

Accoding to its website a survey response will be considered invalid if; The printed barcode on the form is missing or altered.
It seems the only individuals with some form of privacy protection are those who are registered as ‘silent voters’ on the electoral roll - they at least will allegedly have their residential address hidden from the ABS and survey forms mailed out by the Australian Electoral Commission in an AEC envelope.

Thursday, 27 July 2017

More Australians live in New South Wales and Queensland than in the other states & territories combined

Australian Bureau of Statistics, media release, excerpt, 12 July 2017:

Queensland and New South Wales home to 52.1 per cent of Australia’s total population according to the 2016 Census of Population and Housing ……

NSW certainly has the numbers on their side, outnumbering Queensland residents by close to three million people (7,480,228 to 4,703,193), but Queensland is making a strong play with a faster growth rate of 8.6 per cent, compared with 8.1 per cent for NSW. …..

The 2016 Census tells us there are 28,864 Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander people in NSW aged 18-35 years, just edging out Queensland with 25,053.

Between the two battling states, it seems the Cockroaches are the bigger earners, with NSW households earning a median income of $1,486 per week compared to $1,402 per week for a household in Cane Toad country. However, Queensland residents gain an edge with household costs – their median monthly mortgage repayment is $253 cheaper than it is south of the border, while the Sunshine State’s median weekly rent is $50 less. 

The Maroon State also tend to work more in the home, with a higher rate of people engaging in unpaid domestic work (71 per cent in Queensland to 68 per cent in NSW) and child care (28 per cent in Queensland to 27 per cent in NSW). However, the Blue State has a higher rate of providing unpaid care for a person with a disability (12 per cent in NSW to 11 per cent in Queensland)……

…..64.9 per cent of persons in NSW embraced the digital Census, completing their Census form online (above national average), just edging Queensland, where 62.9 per cent of persons used the online Census form (below national average). 

Note: All data presented is based on Place of Usual residence data in the 2016 Census

Friday, 14 April 2017

Was there really a typical Australian in 2016? The Australian Bureau of Statistics thinks so

This month the Australian Bureau of Statistics released its first taste of data from the 2016 national census and rather bravely decided it should be a profile of The ‘Typical’ Australian.

I’m just wondering how reliable this profile is, given the number of people who either stated an intention to or admitted on social media platforms that they falsified some or all of the information they entered on the compulsory census form as a privacy safeguard against personal information data retention and the creation of longitudinal data every Australian.

As the exact number of deliberately falsified forms cannot be known this casts some doubt on census data available to statisticians.

Australian Bureau of Statistics, Census 2016, 11 April 2017:
The 'Typical' Australian

Median Age
Sex (Mode)
Country of Birth of Person (Mode)
Country of Birth of Parents (Mode)
Both parents born in Australia
Language Spoken at Home (Mode)
Ancestry 1st Response (Mode)
Social Marital Status (Mode)
Married in a registered marriage
Family Composition (Mode)
Couple family with children
Count of All Children in Family (Mode)
Two children in family
Highest Year of School Completed (Mode)
Year 12 or equivalent
Unpaid Domestic Work: Number of Hours (Mode)
5 to 14 hours
Number of Motor Vehicles (Mode)
Two vehicles
Number of Bedrooms in Private Dwelling (Mode)
Three bedrooms
Tenure Type (Dwelling Count) (Mode)
Owned with a mortgage

Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander people

Median Age
Sex (Mode)

Persons born overseas

Median Age
Sex (Mode)
Country of Birth of Person (Mode)
Language Spoken at Home (Mode)

* The mode is the most commonly occurring value in a distribution.
* Statements of typical age in this release are median values. The median is the middle value 
in distribution when the values are arranged in ascending or descending order.
* The most common response for each data item is calculated independently. For example, i
the 'typical' person is male and the 'typical' person does 5-14 hours of unpaid domestic work per 
week, this does not imply that the 'typical' male does 5-14 hours of unpaid domestic work per week.
* No detailed Census data will be issued with this information. Datasets for the above characteristics 
will be released as part of the main release of 2016 Census data on Tuesday, 27 June 2017.

The Sydney Morning Herald, 11 April 2017:

The census preview showed that NSW has become more culturally diverse over the past decade.

The typical person in the state now has at least one parent born overseas. In 2006 and 2011, the typical person in NSW had both parents born in Australia. This change also suggests NSW is more culturally diverse than the rest of the nation – the "typical Australian" still has both parents born in Australia.

It's a diversity well masked by averages.

"In my social circles, yes, I guess I'd say I feel very typical but my work is a completely different place," Mrs Purvis says.

"Most of the people I work with speak another language. Their parents weren't born in Australia. A lot of them are younger people who don't have children … and are either still living at home with their parents or renting."

The preview also highlighted the shifting ancestry of the state's migrants. In 2016, the state's typical migrant was a Chinese-born female, aged 44. A decade ago, the typical migrant in NSW was a 45-year-old female born in England.

The state's typical Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander person was a female aged 22.

Saturday, 24 December 2016

Australian Bureau of Statistics under Kalisch continues to prove that Census 2016 was expensive as well as a statistical and public relations disaster

Information coming out of the once-proud Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) again proves that it approached the most radical change to the national census of population and housing with an almost complete lack of understanding of the mood of the populace1.

ABC News, 23 December 2016:

Taxpayers spent close to $200,000 to turn the Sydney Opera House green to promote the 2016 census, without any clear reference to the national survey.

The seven sails of the national landmark were lit up for two nights but did not include any information about the census, the website, a hashtag or branding.

Internal documents show it cost taxpayers $192,000 for setup, equipment hire, management and support.

The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) chief statistician David Kalisch described it as a "major public relations opportunity" and said it was likely to attract "social media influencers".

"This will maximise awareness and engagement with the census, and help create a national conversation," Mr Kalisch wrote in the document.

The Opera House turned green for census night and the night before but the social media conversation was dominated by the website's failure.

There was a 40-hour outage caused by four Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks that had been the subject of a blame game between the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and contractors for months.

The Opera House was part of a national campaign to light up landmarks with the colour green.

The Melbourne Arts Centre, Canberra's Telstra Tower, Brisbane's City Hall and the Darwin Convention Centre were some of the 20 sites to "go green" for the census…..

The total census campaign media budget was $12 million.

Currently ABS alleges that the national census response rate exceeds 96 per cent - comprising over 4.9 million online forms and over 3.5 million paper forms representing 8.4 million households/dwellings.
A rather strange statement by the Bureau, given it previously stated in the lead up to the census that it expected to survey close to 10 million dwellings and afterwards that there were exactly 9.8 million dwellings within the survey pool.

The failure to genuinely meet response rate requirements being papered over by the many personal forms in addition to the household ones [Senate Economics References Committee, 24 November 2016, inquiry report, 2016 Census: issues of trust, p.80].  Presumably these personal forms were official census forms which stated the person was in transit (travellers, homeless, & hospital patients) – all est.1.2 million of them if the deliberately vague assertion of the Bureau is to be believed.

The next public confidence hurdle for the failed 9 August 2016 Census comes when preliminary population and dwelling counts are released in April 2017 – given that so many people are aware of friends or acquaintances who deliberately refused to supply name and/or address or filled in their census forms with inaccurate or misleading information in an attempt to avoid having their genuine personal information retained by the federal government indefinitely in a national database for as yet unstated or unexplained purposes.


1. Previous North Coast Voices posts on 2016 Census here.
    Bill McLennan, 2016, Privacy and the 2016 Census.

Sunday, 27 November 2016

Australian #CensusFail 2016 reports by both the Senate and Cybersecurity Special Advisor have been released

Following #CensusFail 2016 Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull ordered a review of events by Cybersecurity Special Advisor, Alastair MacGibbon.

In what the media is characterising as an excoriating report, a mirror was held up to the Australian Bureau of Statistics – sadly one that it is unlikely to avail itself of given its current leadership.

DPM&C, Office of the Cybersecurity Special Advisor, Review of the Events Surrounding the 2016 eCensus (October 2016):

Not just communications, but engagement…

In most respects, the ABS had a well formed and prepared communications strategy and awareness raising campaign; but it was focussed on the wrong things. The communications problem they needed to address was not a low level of awareness of the Census, but rather, the introduction of a ‘digital first’ approach and the associated barriers to participation – concerns over security and

The ABS failed to adapt its media and communications in response to the public relations storm that built up in the weeks prior to the Census regarding privacy and security in both mainstream and social media. Instead, ABS rigidly stuck to its plans, forgoing crucial opportunities to influence and drive the conversation around the Census. Processes for approval of campaigns, and changes to them, may need to be changed to promote agility.

On Census night, the ABS severely underutilised social media as a communications tool to keep the public up to date and informed of the incident. The ABS’s lack of timely and transparent
communications lost it trust because it opened the door to speculation. The continued slow updates and virtual absence from the media meant that ABS struggled to win back the trust of the public in the following days. Ministers must also be supported with clear and accurate advice, and senior executives must be equipped to understand and talk about cyber security as a matter of business

Reacting to public sentiment

…..The ABS announced public consultation regarding privacy via a media release issued on its website, with a submission period of only four weeks – 11 November to 2 December 2015 (just before Christmas).

The ABS received only three public submissions. Not only should this low response rate have indicated to the ABS that its public engagement on the key issue of privacy was inadequate, it also left a huge vacuum with regard to capturing public concerns. So the ABS missed an opportunity to identify how to evolve its communication plans developed following qualitative research in 2014 to address more up to date concerns.

As a result, the ABS was ill-equipped to manage the impact changes in the Census would have on a small but important segment of the population and their willingness to complete the eCensus online.

In January 2016, seven months out from the Census, the first articles raising concerns about privacy and security of data appeared in the media. More substantial rumblings began in March, with two main themes emerging:

• That the Census was intrusive and no longer anonymous
• The Census was vulnerable to hackers.

The ABS prides itself on the constant measuring of public sentiment and awareness using traditional survey techniques (see Figure 4, page 53). The Review concludes that these surveys contributed to a false sense of security and failure – still at time of writing – to grasp the significance and power of social media groundswells.

Major shifts in public statements regarding the security of the Census began the week prior to Census night, culminating in Senator Nick Xenophon and several other parliamentarians issuing warnings about security and privacy concerns and apparent implementation problems leading to a ‘debacle.’

Prior to the closure of the eCensus form, over 11,000 individual mentions (social and mainstream media) were published voicing concerns about the privacy and security of the eCensus. The closure of the eCensus resulted in 17,730 privacy related mentions, far outweighing mentions (1,200 total) of the technical issues experienced – i.e. what happened (see Figure 4).
This coverage created overwhelming ‘noise’ making it difficult for the ABS to remain on message.

The ABS’s planned communications were being drowned out. But rather than trying to adapt its approach to limit the impact the reporting had on the public sentiment toward the Census, the ABS stuck to planned messaging ignoring the public relations storm brewing around them.

The failings of the ABS to address issues of concern in the media extend to its use of social media. Analysis conducted on ABS Twitter and Facebook accounts shows that at no point did the ABS significantly change its planned posting schedule or content as a result of critical media reporting (shown in Figure 5, page 54) and of considerable online chatter around privacy (Figure 4). The ABS did change its social media advertising as well as engage posters directly on social media. But this was not enough.

The ABS’s virtual absence from the privacy and security debate is reflected in its social media crisis escalation matrix – the process designed to monitor, escalate  and handle social conversations. The matrix had two main flaws:

1. The ABS’s ‘qualifiers’ (thresholds that had to be met to raise concern) were too high. A ‘red level scenario,’ the highest categorisation for negative conversation, was enacted only if someone had 10,000 plus followers or a post had over 30 engagements.
2. The ABS’s response/action for a ‘red scenario’ was to hold all social media communications.

The ABS’s social media strategy was too restrictive and didn’t allow enough flexibility to respond to changing trends in media and social media. As a result, the ABS missed crucial opportunities to inform the conversation around privacy and security and the benefits of the digital first approach.

When public discourse was rising on the issues, the ABS should have been on the front foot addressing these concerns. Key spokespeople should have been conducting interviews, issuing media releases and engaging on social media to drive the conversation and shape the debate.

While the ABS did eventually start engaging in the mainstream media, it was too little, too late. And on the whole the ABS steadfastly stuck to its communications plans, allowing the media, and subsequently the public, to take the lead role. The ABS failed to insert itself in the conversation and underutilised mainstream and social media as a vehicle to shape the debate around the benefits of a digital first approach.

Recommendations for the Australian Bureau of Statistics

• The ABS should engage an independent security consultant for a wide-ranging examination of all aspects of their information collection and storage relating to Census data – from web application through to infrastructure and policies and procedures.

• The ABS should ensure future significant changes to personal information handling practices are subject to an independently-conducted privacy impact assessment and are supported by broad ranging consultation.

•  The ABS should adopt a privacy management plan to enhance its capability to identify and manage new privacy issues.

• The ABS should assess and enhance existing ABS privacy training for staff.

• The ABS should develop a specific strategy to remove the current state of vendor lock-in.

• The ABS should strengthen its approach to outsourced ICT supplier performance management to ensure greater oversight and accountability.

• The ABS should draw upon the lessons it takes from the Census experience to help to guide and to advocate for the cultural change path it is following.

• The ABS’s decision in August to assemble an independent panel to provide assurance and transparency of Census quality is supported and the resulting report should be made public.

•The ABS should implement a targeted communication strategy to address public perceptions about Census data quality.

The ABS should report monthly to their Minister outlining progress against the above recommendations

Also following #CensusFail the Australian Senate Standing Committees on Economics conducted an inquiry into the preparation, administration and management of the 2016 Census by the Australian Bureau of Statistics.

Its final report 2016 Census: issues of trust made these recommendations:

Recommendation 1
4.81 The committee recommends that all future Privacy Impact Assessments
relating to the census, are conducted externally with the final report published on
the ABS website 12 months in advance of the census to which it relates.

4.82 Following the release of a PIA recommending changes to future censuses,
consultation across the Australian community should be undertaken by the ABS
with the outcomes clearly documented on the ABS website no less than six
months before a future census.

Recommendation 2
4.83 The committee recommends that the ABS update its internal guidelines to
make clear that consultation requires active engagement with the nongovernment
and private sector.

Recommendation 3
5.46 The committee recommends that the ABS publicly commit to reporting
any breach of census related data to the Office of the Australian Information
Commissioner within one week of becoming aware of the breach.

Recommendation 4
6.89 The committee recommends that the Australian Government commit the
necessary funding for the 2021 census in the 2017–18 Budget.

Recommendation 5
6.90 The committee recommends that the ABS conduct open tendering
processes for future census solutions requiring the participation of the private

Recommendation 6
6.91 The committee recommends that the ABS give greater attention to
intellectual property provisions in contracts that include licensing and royalty

Recommendation 7
6.92 The committee recommends that the 2021 eCensus application be subject
to an Information Security Registered Assessors Program Assessment.

Recommendation 8
6.93 The committee recommends that the ABS take a more proactive role in
validating the resilience of the eCensus application for the 2021 census.

Recommendation 9
6.94 The committee recommends that the Department of Finance review its
ICT Investment Approval Process to ensure that projects such as the
2016 Census are covered by the cabinet two-pass process.

Recommendation 10
6.95 The committee recommends that the Australian Government provide
portfolio stability for the ABS.

Recommendation 11
6.96 The committee recommends responsible ministers seek six-monthly
briefings on the progress of census preparations. These briefings should cover
issues including, but not limited to, cyber security, system redundancy,
procurement processes and the capacity of the ABS to manage risks associated
with the census.

Recommendation 12
6.106 The committee recommends that the ABS consider establishing a
dedicated telephone assistance line for people who require special assistance in
completing the census.

Recommendation 13
7.28 The committee recommends that the maximum value of fines and any
other penalties relating to the census be explicitly stated.

Recommendation 14
7.29 The committee recommends that the Australian Bureau of Statistics
develop a clear communications strategy outlining the outcomes for
non-compliance with the census, including resolution processes and the value of
possible penalties.

Recommendation 15
7.57 The committee recommends that the Australian Government provide
sufficient funding for the ABS to undertake its legislated functions to a continued
high standard.

Recommendation 16
7.58 The committee recommends that the responsible minister act as a matter
of urgency to assist the ABS in filling senior positions left vacant for greater than
6 months.