Showing posts with label discrimination. Show all posts
Showing posts with label discrimination. Show all posts

Monday 17 April 2017

So the Turnbull Government wants to quarantine your Centrelink income & family assistance payments? Time to read the fine print


A limited compulsory income management scheme was introduced by the Howard Government in 2007.

Its aim was to reduce discretionary disposable income by quarantining 50 per cent of all Australian Government income support and family assistance payments. 

Over time it was expanded to include individuals and/or certain communities in all eight states and territories and the financial vehicle for delivery was the Basics Card.


An est. 20,941 people in the scheme identified as indigenous.

Of the total nation-wide figure 79.93 per cent were persons living in the Northern Territory and only an est. 2,755 (13 per cent) of those Territorians on income management were not classed as indigenous.

In October 2016 Prime Minster Malcolm Bligh Turnbull announced that the Healthy Welfare Card – the latest version of cashless debit card income management being trialled – will probably be introduced for all income support and family assistance recipients across Australia, at this stage with the exception of those on Age and Veterans’ Affairs pensions1.

This version quarantines 80 per cent of fortnightly or other periodic cash transfer payments made to a person receiving income support or family assistance. It also quarantines 100 per cent of any lumpsum payment.

There will be few exemptions available for those who attempt to opt out of the scheme.

Given that there is

significant restriction on how this card can be used2,
inadequate consumer protection for card holders,
poor monthly statement record keeping in comparison with an ordinary bank account,
no monthly interest payable on any balance remaining in a welfare restricted account - unlike an ordinary bank account,
no guarantee that the entire account balance will be fully accessible to a card holder, 
no direct debiting allowed3and
no procedure identified for retrieval/transfer to executor of an account balance on death of a cardholder,

it may be wise to read up on the fine print in advance of full implementation being announced by the Turnbull Government.

Here are the current conditions published by Indue Ltdwhich operates this cashless debit card:

Indue: Debit Card Account Conditions of Use  (PDF 84 pages)

Footnote:

1. According to the DSS Guide to Social Security Law, 8.7.2.30 Trigger Payment (Cashless Debit Card Trial), April 2017:
The trigger payments are:
a payment under the scheme known as ABSTUDY that includes an amount identified as living allowance,
austudy payment,
benefit PP (partnered),
BVA, so long as the recipient has not reached pension age,
carer payment,
disability support pension,
newstart allowance,
PgA (other than non-benefit allowance),
partner allowance,
pension PP (single),
sickness allowance,
special benefit,
widow allowance,
widow B pension,
wife pension,
youth allowance.

2. 8.7.6.40 Welfare Restricted Bank Accounts

3. Existing Centrepay deduction/s appear to be subtracted from a Centrelink fortnightly income support payment before the balance is split between the new welfare restricted bank account (80 per cent) and the original unrestricted bank account (20 percent).

4. Indue has been providing income management services to the federal government since at least 2009. The Department of Human Services awarded an 8.6 million contract to Indue Limited covering 1-Jul-2015 to 30-Jun-2017 for Income Management Card Services and a contract worth $840,000 for the period 1-Jan-2017 to 31-Dec-2017 supplying business administration services in the form of Benefits Cards.

Friday 24 March 2017

Turnbull and Co announce they are taking their ideological razors to the Racial Discrimination Act and Human Rights Commission legislation


During this decade there have been three cases close to the hearts of the far right of the political spectrum in Australia.

The first was Pat Eatock v Andrew Bolt and the Herald and Weekly Times Pty Ltd in the Federal Court of Australia, the second the Cynthia Prior complaint to the Human Rights Commission and, the third was the complaint against Bill Leak lodged with the Human Rights Commission.


The Federal Court found against News Corp journalist Andrew Bolt, the Commission terminated the Prior complaint on the basis it was satisfied that there was no reasonable prospect of the matter being settled by conciliation (the complainant later commencing unsuccessful litigation) and, the complaint against cartoonist Bill Leak was eventually withdrawn by Ms. Dinnison.

The Racial Discrimination Act and the Australian Human Rights Commission Act appear to have operated as intended by the original law makers in all three instances.

Yet such was the angst in Liberal Party and ‘flying monkey’ circles that an attempt to significantly alter the Act and neuter the Commission is now underway.

Excerpts from Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Bligh Turnbull statements at a joint press conference on 21 March 2017:

Good afternoon. Today I am here with the Attorney and we are announcing changes to the Racial Discrimination Act and the Human Rights Commission legislation, which will strengthen the protection of Australians from racial vilification and strengthen the protection of free speech, one of the fundamental freedoms upon which our democracy depends.

We are defending the law by making it clearer. We are defending Australians from racial vilification, by replacing language which has been discredited and has lost credibility. It has lost the credibility that a good law needs.

So the changes we are proposing to section 18C will provide the right balance between defending Australians from racial vilification and defending and enabling their right of free speech upon which our democracy, our way of life, depends.

We are also amending the law so as to ensure that the Human Rights Commission will offer procedural fairness, will deal with cases promptly and swiftly and fairly. That's very important too.

We need to restore confidence to the Racial Discrimination Act and to the Human Rights Commissions' administration of it. The changes we're proposing have been supported from all sides of the political spectrum.

Granted, there will be many critics and opponents. But this is an issue of values. Free speech. Free speech is a value at the very core of our party. It should be at the core of every party.
Ensuring Australians are protected from racial vilification, likewise, is part of that mutual respect of which I often speak, which is the foundation of our success as the greatest and most successful multicultural society in the world.

We’ve struck the balance right. We've done this carefully. There's been a scrupulously careful examination of this matter by the Human Rights Committee and we thank the Chairman, Ian Goodenough, and the members for their work.

What we presented today strikes the right balance. Defending freedom of speech, so that cartoonists will not be hauled up and accused of racism. So that university students won't be dragged through the courts and had hundreds of thousands of dollars of legal costs imposed on them over spurious claims of racism.

The time has come to get the balance right, to get the language right, to defend our freedom of speech and defend Australians with effective laws, clear laws, against racial vilification. That's what we're doing today. We're defending Australians with a stronger, fairer law…..

The language, the new language will better and more clearly protect people from racial vilification, in a more generic term, from harassment or intimidation because the language is clearer.

The problem with the language at the moment - using the language insult and offend – the problem is that, of course, on its face, its natural and ordinary meaning, it includes very small slights. So people have said: “Oh, well, you know, there are court cases that say it only means really serious insults.” Well isn't it better that laws actually say what they mean? Isn't it better that laws are clear? Isn't it better when you’re dealing with freedom of speech and you're dealing with protecting people from racial vilification, that the law is clear and in language people can understand? That's what we're doing.

….. you have got to remember that if you have language that does not reflect the object, or the proper object of the legislation, it has a chilling effect on free speech. So let’s be very clear. Ask this question: “What is it we that we are seeking to prohibit”?

We believe that “harassment”, “intimidation” are the better terms. They are clearer and they clearly express the type of conduct that should be prohibited, not mere slights or the taking of offence or hurt feelings. That is not what the law should be about…..

….. We believe that the law has lost its credibility. I mean, all of you have seen the criticism that has come around recent cases, the QUT and the Bill Leak case being classic examples. When a law loses its credibility, it lacks its ability to achieve any of its objectives.

So this is why it’s important to restate the language in terms that better reflect the objects of the legislation. As the Attorney said, right from the outset, if you go back decades, it better reflects the object of the legislation then, and it clearly prohibits conduct of a kind that we condemn, that we abhor, that we do not accept.

We are the most successful multicultural society in the world. It’s built on a foundation of mutual respect, and that mutual respect - that foundation - is strengthened by stronger, clearer, fairer laws.

BACKGROUND

Excerpt from a paper by the Chair of Melbourne University Law School Professor Adrienne Stone in Melbourne University Law Review 926 on the judgment in Eatock v Bolt [2011] FCA 1103 (28 September 2011):

In a short judgment following his initial finding, Bromberg J granted two remedies: the Herald Sun (published by the Herald and Weekly Times) was required to publish a ‘corrective notice’ as specified in the judgment, and Bolt and the Herald and Weekly Times were restrained from further publishing or republishing the offending articles.[67]

The remedies are notably insubstantial. They are considerably less onerous than damages, a fact which is especially notable given it seems entirely possible that Eatock could have successfully claimed damages in a defamation action.[68] The lenity of the remedy becomes even clearer in light of an additional order which allowed the Herald Sun to continue to make the offending newspaper articles available ‘for historical or archival purposes’, provided that the publication was accompanied by the required corrective notice.[69] The result of this latter order is that the offending articles remain available online.[70] The ready availability of the offending articles considerably weakens claims that Bolt has been silenced by the action, and more general claims that freedom of speech has been chilled. The ideas in his articles continue to be communicated to those who seek them out.

Indeed, this claim of silencing is at once made and disproved by  Andrew Bolt  himself. In his response to the decision, Bolt wrote ‘Silencing Me Impedes Unity’, a commentary in which he argues that his ideas have been ‘banned’ and yet goes on to repeat, at quite some length, his argument that Aboriginal people of mixed heritage should not claim Aboriginal identity.[71]

This irony deepens when one considers the common refrain amongst critics of 
s 18C (and the respondents in Eatock v Bolt in particular) that the complainants should have responded to the criticisms by defending themselves in public debate.[72] This suggestion taps into an important idea in the political theory of freedom of speech that the victims of harms caused by speech ought to ‘speak back’, and that the ‘fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones’.[73] The irony arises because, in effect, Bolt and the Herald and Weekly Times have themselves been subject to a certain kind of ‘speaking back’.[74] They have not been required to apologise, to pay damages, or — crucially — to remove the material from the internet. The sum total in effect of the measure imposed on them is that the articles are labelled as having infringed the RDA.

In other words, the remedy imposed inEatock v Bolt was predominantly expressive  rather than coercive. It neither required compensation nor imposed any other sanction on the respondents. Rather, the state signals its disapproval of the message conveyed — labelling it as contrary to the RDA — but does not prevent its communication. The state’s action is akin to the ‘speaking back’ that the respondents and their defenders encourage. Moreover, just as the respondents and their defenders encouraged the complainants in this case, if the respondents are troubled by being labelled in this way, they are, of course, able themselves to ‘speak back’. Therefore, one way to understand the effect of Eatock v Bolt is that it makes a contribution to the public debate about racial identity (labelling the particular contribution of Bolt as discriminatory), but does not prevent Bolt’s message from being heard.

This argument will, no doubt, not satisfy those deeply committed to a strong libertarian vision of freedom of speech — in which the role of the state is to be minimised — and who will find even expressive remedies offensive to their underlying conception of liberty.[75] The state is an especially powerful ‘speaker’ and its intervention through expressive remedies might be cast as dangerously distorting.

However, libertarian conceptions of freedom of speech are themselves contested both in theory[76] and exceptional in practice.[77] So those campaigning to amend s 18C cannot simply claim to be defending freedom of speech against those who disregard it or prefer other values or interests. They are defending a particular, rather unusual, and strongly contested version of freedom of speech and they are doing so in the face of alternative conceptions that powerfully defended in theory[78] and widely adopted in practice.[79] By neglecting even to notice the expressive nature of the remedy, the opponents of the law have thus failed to see that it may advance, rather than chill, free speech values.

Legal meaning of 'offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate'

2.21 The Federal Court in Jones v Scully explicitly set out the dictionary definitions of the terms 'offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate' in an attempt to establish the meaning to be given to each word individually.14 The ordinary meaning of the words provided in Jones v Scully provide some guidance, but must also be consistent with the threshold established by Kiefel J,15 in Creek v Cairns Post Pty Ltd,16 that section 18C only applies to conduct having 'profound and serious effects, not to be likened to mere slights'. This standard has been affirmed in the case law.17

2.22 It is worth noting, however, that the Court generally does not consider each term in isolation. Although in McGlade v Lightfoot the relevant conduct was found to be reasonably likely to 'offend' and 'insult', the Court made it very clear that it was not  reasonably likely to humiliate or intimidate.18 This means that the legal meaning of 'offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate' does not wholly correspond with the ordinary or 'common sense' meaning of the terms. In other words, as interpreted by the courts, conduct that is merely offensive or merely insulting will not be captured by section 18C of the RDA, but only more serious forms of conduct on the basis of race. While some submitters suggested that the words used in section 18C created uncertainty, the committee received evidence from other witnesses that the legal meaning and judicial interpretation of section 18C was well settled as applying only to conduct at the more serious end of the range.19
14 [2002] FCA 1080.
15 Kiefel J is now the Chief Justice of the High Court.
16 [2001] FCA 1007, [16].
17 Bropho v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (2004) 135 FCR 105 at 131, [70]
(French J) (Bropho); Jones v Scully (2002) 120 FCR 243, [102]; Eatock v Bolt (2011) 197 FCR 261
at [267]-[268] (Justice Bromberg) (Eatock).
18 McGlade v Lightfoot (2002) 124 FCR 106, 120 at [61]-[62].
19 See, for example: Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 184, 4; Mr Iain Anderson, Deputy
Secretary, Attorney-General's Department, Committee Hansard, 17 February 2017, 21-22.

Sunday 5 February 2017

Trump's fifth executive order is challenged for the sixth time in seven days


On 27 January 2017 U.S. President Donald Trump issued Executive Order: Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States and on the basis of its provisions an est. 60,000-100,000 entry and stay visas were provisionally revoked immediately.

I do not think that Trump thought that resistance to his immigration policies would see at least fifty court filings to date and, in relation to this particular executive order would see six judges issue temporary restraining orders of varying lengths.

This is the latest:

State of Washington vs. Donald J. Trump, et al
Subject Matter: Civil Rights

The State of Washington (State) filed this action challenging the President’s Executive Order on immigration of January 27, 2017. The State seeks a finding that certain sections of the Executive Order are contrary to the Constitution and laws of the United States, and enjoining Defendants from implementing or enforcing those sections. The State further seeks entry of a nationwide temporary restraining order. The hearing on this matter was conducted on February 3, 2017.

Judge James L. Robart presiding

The State of Washington’s complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief is 14 pages long with supporting documentation which included the Donald J. Trump Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration.

The complaint in part alleges that:

President Trump’s actions and that of the U.S. federal government were illegal and violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution;

they were depriving individuals of their liberty interests without due process of law; 

the Immigration and Nationality Act  prohibits discrimination in the issuance of immigrant visas on the basis of race, nationality, place of 18 birth, or place of residence;

in violation of provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act the Executive Order suspends all immigrant and 7 non-immigrant entry into Washington by individuals from seven countries and forecloses their ability to apply for asylum and withholding of removal, as well as foreclosing their ability to apply for relief under the Convention Against Torture;

the Executive order was motivated by animus and a desire to hurt a particular group; and

it was Trump’s intention to ban immigration and/or travel based on an individual’s Islamic faith and prioritise immigration from Middle Eastern countries based on an individual’s Christian faith.

On 3 February federal judge James L. Robart issued a nation-wide restraining order (with no identified end date) which blocks enforcement of Trump’s 27 January 2017 Executive Order effective immediately.
Tro by zerohedge on Scribd

The White House response was typically indiscreet and was later amended to remove the description of the court’s judgment as “outrageous”.

The next court hearing date is yet to be set or Monday, 6 February 2017.

UPDATE

Trump's tweeted reaction to the Robart restraining order - commencing 11:59 PM on 4 Feb 2017:



Tuesday 10 January 2017

Is living in aged care in Australia bad for your mental health?


An estimated 10–15% of older Australians who live in the community experience anxiety or depression (Haralambous et al. 2009). However, research has shown that certain sub-groups of the older population are at higher risk of experiencing poor mental health. For example, just over half (52% or 86,736) of all permanent aged care residents at 30 June 2012 had mild, moderate or major symptoms of depression when they were last appraised (AIHW 2013). [Australian Government, Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Australia’s welfare 2015]

The Sydney Morning Herald, 7 January 2017:

Tens of thousands of elderly Australians are being  denied effective public health treatments because they live in nursing homes, with experts labelling it a "disgrace" and "blatantly discriminatory".

A Fairfax Media investigation has revealed the mental health of aged-care residents suffers as a result of widespread neglect that legal and health experts attribute in large part to a   "ridiculous" Medicare rule.

Under the rule almost all nursing home residents are denied GP mental health treatment plans and associated psychological therapies provided to other Australians under the Better Access Medicare program, because the government deems residents not to be patients "in the community".

Despite extreme rates of mental illness in nursing homes – with about 82,000 of 176,000 residents estimated to suffer a mental illness (excluding dementia) or significant mental distress – the Turnbull government reaffirmed the regulatory exclusion late last year.

While the government says its funding mechanism assesses depressed residents' care needs, a Fairfax Media investigation has discovered the homes almost never pay for clinical mental health treatments and experts say the government has neither legally compelled nor adequately funded them to do so.

Audits by Sydney and Deakin universities have repeatedly found that fewer than 2 per cent of residents suffering depression have received psychological treatments, such as cognitive-behavioural therapy,  that are clinically recommended for most depression experienced in the aged-care setting…..

Royal Australian College of GPs president and University of Tasmania clinical professor Bastian Seidel agreed the denial of treatment was "systematic" because "the data is out there" and he called for the removal of the Medicare exclusion.

Researchers have found only about half of all residents with depression receive treatment of any kind, whether from psychologists or other clinicians, and that almost all of those are put on antidepressants by GPs, despite their use in the elderly being linked to serious adverse effects, including falls and fractures.

Stigmatising attitudes and ignorance about mental healthcare have also been found to be widespread among nursing home staff, with unpublished Swinburne University survey data suggesting staff commonly dismiss depressed residents as "attention seeking" and lack basic knowledge about mental illness.

While many residents arrive in homes with depression or other mental disorders, others struggle mentally due to challenges experienced in care, such as chronic pain, disabling and terminal medical conditions, progressive loss of brain function and the loss of social role and sense of identity.

"There are commonly acute adjustment disorders … [involving] bereavement, grief, loss," said Adelaide older persons GP Johanna Kilmartin, who described the Medicare restriction as ridiculous.

"You lose your family home [for] … one tiny little room … so you've lost all your material possessions; you've lost your health, because that's why you've moved in; often you've lost your spouse as well.

"This is when you need [psychological help] … [but] we've got the opposite"……

A spokesman for the Department of Health said while Commonwealth-funded residents – understood to be all or almost all aged-care residents – were not eligible for Better Access services, the government's aged-care funding instrument "assesses residents' care needs, including in relation to depression".

He said approved homes were required to "facilitate … access" for residents to health practitioners of their choosing and gave as an example "arranging transport".

But the dean and head of the University of South Australia's law school Wendy Lacey slammed the "weasel words" of the Aged Care Act's care "principles", saying there was "a complete absence of any positive and mandatory legal obligation on the part of facilities to take proactive measures to promote mental health and wellbeing of their residents".

There was "no legal obligation on the residential care provider to pay" for mental health services, and the "current exemptions" –  arising from the Aged Care Act and Medicare regulation – were "a blatant denial of human rights involving discrimination on the basis of age and infirmity".

Australian Catholic University senior research fellow Tanya Davison, whose research has found that half of all clinical cases of depression received no treatment of any kind, cited funding "that runs out very quickly" as among contributing factors to the "critically low" psychological therapy levels…..

The Conversation, 28 July 2015:

More than half (52%) of aged care residents have symptoms of depression, compared with 10-15% of older people living in the community. As well as feelings of sadness and low mood, aged care residents with depression feel uninterested in activities, hopeless about the future, guilty about the past and may desire death.

Some actively contemplate taking their own lives. The prevalence rate of suicidal thoughts in residential aged care settings can be as high as 46%. This is more than three times the rate found in older adults who are housebound but in the community.

People entering residential aged care facilities are, on average, older than those living in the community. They have more complex care needs due to physical and cognitive difficulties. They may also have difficulties adjusting to their loss of independence and routine. These factors all increase their risk of depression and suicidal ideation.

However, mental illness often remains undetected among aged care residents.

There are several reasons for this. People living in residential aged care usually have complex care needs, making the identification of depression difficult, as the emotional symptoms become confused with those of other conditions. Older people are also less likely than younger people to recognise their own symptoms, often attributing them to normal ageing.

Further, although facility-based carers are in a position to act as informants, they often lack the training to detect symptoms of depression and do not routinely screen for suicide ideation.

Depression is a manageable condition and the symptoms can be improved or managed through therapy and medication. Medications are effective but are often associated with side effects, and for older adults may not be recommended alongside some other medications and conditions.

Yet, when residents are recognised to have symptoms of depression, they are often only prescribed medications (particularly antidepressants) despite the effectiveness of non-medication approaches. Research shows interventions such as cognitive behavioural therapy (a talk therapy that addresses how you think and act) are at least equally effective as anti-depressants for improving late-life depression.

BACKGROUND

National Ageing Research Institute, Depression in older age: A scoping study, Final Report, September 2009:

4.1 Depression and anxiety in older people

It is a common misconception that depression is a normal part of ageing, but the evidence shows that multiple health problems often account for any initial association between depression and older age (Baldwin, 2008; Baldwin, Chiu, Katona, & Graham, 2002). Depression is essentially the same disorder across the lifespan, although certain symptoms are accentuated and others are suppressed in older people. For example, older people with depression typically report more physical symptoms and less sadness compared to younger people with depression (Baldwin, 2008; Chiu, Tam & Chiu, 2008). Additionally, psychotic symptoms, melancholia, insomnia, hypochondriasis, and subjective memory complaints are more likely to occur in older people with depression compared to younger people with depression (Baldwin, 2008; Baldwin et al., 2002). A recent review found that when confounding variables are controlled (for example, age at study entry), remission rates of depression in patients in late-life are not different from those in midlife, although relapse rates appear higher in older people (Mitchell & Subramaniam, 2005).

Anxiety disorders are also common among older people. However, research in this area is less compared to research undertaken in other mental disorders in older people, such as depression (Wetherell, Maser, & van Balkom, 2005). Of the anxiety disorders, phobic disorders and generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) are the two most common in older people (Beyer, 2004; Bryant et al., 2008; Rodda, Boyce, & Walker, 2008). There has been a certain amount of clinical interest in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), because the survivors of the Second World War and the Holocaust are now well into old age. Moreover, Vietnam Veterans are also approaching old age with well-documented high levels of psychopathology (Owens, Baker, Kasckow, Ciesla, & Mohamed, 2005) that can also have serious effects on the mental health of family members (Galovskia & Lyons, 2003). Prevalence data on PTSD, however, are very limited (Sadavoy, 1997). American studies of Holocaust survivors have found that up to 46% meet criteria for PTSD (Sadavoy, 1997). Weintraub and Ruskin (1999)’s review emphasises the similarities between PTSD in older and younger groups. Other authors have disputed this, and further research is required to establish how different the presentation of PTSD is in older adults from that in younger people.

A recent Australian study found that 11.6% of men and 8.6% of women aged over 65 reported re-experiencing symptoms associated with past events (DSM IV criteria), and concluded that quality of life may be significantly affected in this group (Creamer & Parslow, 2008). This study highlights some of the difficulties in the application of the DSM IV criteria to older adults.

Research on interventions for older people with PTSD is very limited indeed. A recent review of assessment and treatment of PTSD in older combat veterans identified only five studies of psychotherapeutic intervention (Owens et al., 2005). All of these were case studies. A literature search carried out for this review did not identify any randomised controlled trials of psychological intervention for older people diagnosed with PTSD.

Comorbidity of depression and anxiety disorders is highly prevalent (Beekman et al., 2000). A community-based study in the Netherlands found 47.5% of older people with major depressive disorders also met criteria for anxiety disorders, whereas 26.1% of those with anxiety disorders also met criteria for major depressive disorders (Beekman et al., 2000). Mixed anxiety and depressive disorders (where symptoms of both anxiety and depression do not reach diagnostic criteria for either disorder) also frequently occur in older people (Chiu et al., 2008; Rodda et al., 2008). Older people with depression have a 35% lifetime and 23% current prevalence of a co-morbid anxiety disorder (Beyer, 2004). Furthermore, when anxiety symptoms first occur in a person over 60 years of age with no history of anxiety, it generally suggests underlying depression (Baldwin, 2008; Chiu et al., 2008). Indeed, it is quite uncommon that people develop late-onset anxiety disorders for the first time in later life (Chiu et al., 2008), although there are researchers who disagree with this (Wetherell, Maser et al., 2005). Older people with co-morbid depression and anxiety typically have more severe depressive symptoms, an increased likelihood of suicide ideation, lower social functioning (Beyer, 2004; Rodda et al., 2008) and poorer outcome (Schoevers, Beekman, Deeg, Jonker, & van Tilburg, 2003)…..

The 2007 National Survey of Mental Health and Wellbeing found that the 12-month prevalence for depression and anxiety was 2% and 5%, respectively for older people living in private dwellings (Australian Bureau of beyondblue depression in older age: a scoping study. Final Report - National Ageing Research Institute (NARI), September 2009 - 13 - Statistics, 2008). Another Australian study found that the prevalence of depression was 8.2% among a sample of 22,252 community-dwelling older people (Pirkis et al., 2009). However, the prevalence rate is much higher in residential aged care facilities and a recent Australian study found that 34.7% of aged care residents suffered from depression (Snowdon & Fleming, 2008).

Thursday 5 January 2017

Next time a man tells you that there is a level playing field.........


Many older Australian women alive today reached retirement age without any superannuation savings. Some will still do so into the future if they have predominately engaged in unpaid work during most of their working-age life.

Superannuation was first paid in the mid‑1800s as a benefit to certain employees in the public service and larger corporate organisations. Invitation to join what were then a limited number of superannuation schemes was predominately restricted to males at professional/managerial level. Full benefits upon retirement could be taken as a lump sum. By 1915 super earnings were exempt from taxation [taxreview.treasury.com.au].

As recently as the late 1960s women often faced an employment bar on marriage and/or once wed were forced to withdraw from any superannuation scheme they may have had the good fortune to be previously eligible for. [Paxton, JA, July 2014, Women and Superannuation: The Impact of the Family Law Superannuation Regime, p.23]

Superannuation was fairly uncommon in Australia until the 1970s, when it began to be included in industrial awards.

In 1985, only 39 per cent of the workforce had superannuation—24 per cent of women and 50 per cent of men had access to super.
At that stage, superannuation coverage was concentrated in higher paid white collar positions in large corporations and, in the public sector.

Superannuation became a major component of Australia's retirement system following the introduction of the Superannuation Guarantee in 1992. The Superannuation Guarantee requires employers to contribute a percentage of an employee's earnings into a superannuation fund, which the employee cannot access until they reach the superannuation preservation age. For most employees, superannuation coverage expanded following the introduction of compulsory superannuation.

In 1993, 81 per cent of employed Australians were covered by superannuation and the gender gap in superannuation coverage had narrowed, with 82 per cent of employed men and 78 per cent of employed women covered by superannuation. The employer contribution rate has increased over time, from 3 per cent in 1992 to the current rate of 9.5 per cent. 
[Economics References Committee, April 2016, 'A husband is not a retirement plan': Achieving economic security for women in retirement, p.6]

The superannuation industry, including the Commonwealth's defined benefit funds, may prefer to forget past practices. There was a time when women were forced to leave their super fund on marriage and, as a result, were deprived of unvested benefits. The winners then were long-term (usually permanent) employees, predominantly male, who reaped their full entitlements on retirement……
It wasn't too long ago that during a family breakdown, women who sacrificed a career to bring up a family were unable to access their partner's vested super benefits. Family law changes now allow women to access a fair share of their former partner's superannuation.  [The Sydney Morning Herald, 6 March 2016]

The table below shows the disparity between men's and women's superannuation balances over time across all age groups.

[Economics References Committee, April 2016, 'A husband is not a retirement plan': Achieving economic security for women in retirement, p.9]

Saturday 5 November 2016

Facebook allows real estate agents to place online advertisements with undisclosed racial exclusions


ProPublica, 28 October 2016:
Imagine if, during the Jim Crow era, a newspaper offered advertisers the option of placing ads only in copies that went to white readers.
That’s basically what Facebook is doing nowadays.
The ubiquitous social network not only allows advertisers to target users by their interests or background, it also gives advertisers the ability to exclude specific groups it calls “Ethnic Affinities.” Ads that exclude people based on race, gender and other sensitive factors are prohibited by federal law in housing and employment.
Here is a screenshot of a housing ad that we purchased from Facebook’s self-service advertising portal:
The ad we purchased was targeted to Facebook members who were house hunting and excluded anyone with an “affinity” for African-American, Asian-American or Hispanic people. (Here’s the ad itself.)
When we showed Facebook’s racial exclusion options to a prominent civil rights lawyer John Relman, he gasped and said, “This is horrifying. This is massively illegal. This is about as blatant a violation of the federal Fair Housing Act as one can find.”
The Fair Housing Act of 1968 makes it illegal "to make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.” Violators can face tens of thousands of dollars in fines.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 also prohibits the “printing or publication of notices or advertisements indicating prohibited preference, limitation, specification or discrimination” in employment recruitment.
Facebook’s business model is based on allowing advertisers to target specific groups — or, apparently to exclude specific groups — using huge reams of personal data the company has collected about its users. Facebook’s microtargeting is particularly helpful for advertisers looking to reach niche audiences, such as swing-state voters concerned about climate change. ProPublica recently offered a tool allowing users to see how Facebook is categorizing them. We found nearly 50,000 unique categories in which Facebook places its users.
Facebook says its policies prohibit advertisers from using the targeting options for discrimination, harassment, disparagement or predatory advertising practices.
“We take a strong stand against advertisers misusing our platform: Our policies prohibit using our targeting options to discriminate, and they require compliance with the law,” said Steve Satterfield, privacy and public policy manager at Facebook. “We take prompt enforcement action when we determine that ads violate our policies."
Satterfield said it’s important for advertisers to have the ability to both include and exclude groups as they test how their marketing performs. For instance, he said, an advertiser “might run one campaign in English that excludes the Hispanic affinity group to see how well the campaign performs against running that ad campaign in Spanish. This is a common practice in the industry.”
He said Facebook began offering the “Ethnic Affinity” categories within the past two years as part of a “multicultural advertising” effort.
Satterfield added that the “Ethnic Affinity” is not the same as race — which Facebook does not ask its members about. Facebook assigns members an “Ethnic Affinity” based on pages and posts they have liked or engaged with on Facebook.
When we asked why “Ethnic Affinity” was included in the “Demographics” category of its ad-targeting tool if it’s not a representation of demographics, Facebook responded that it plans to move “Ethnic Affinity” to another section.
Facebook declined to answer questions about why our housing ad excluding minority groups was approved 15 minutes after we placed the order.
By comparison, consider the advertising controls that the New York Times has put in place to prevent discriminatory housing ads. After the newspaper was successfully sued under the Fair Housing Act in 1989, it agreed to review ads for potentially discriminatory content before accepting them for publication.