Australia
is well aware it is not at the geopolitical centre of the world but
in the last 125 years it has earned its place — diplomatically,
militarily, economically and by its long time support of rules-based
international law.
Nevertheless,
it is but one of over 200 countries across the globe of which 195 are
currently recognised as sovereign nations.
It
ranks 55 out of 223 countries when it comes to population size.
As
well as being considered an advanced economy, usually ranked in the
global top twenty for national economies and gross domestic product
per capita. While according to International Monetary Fund data,
based on the Purchasing Power Parity weight (PPP) of its own gross
domestic product it contributes 0.95 per cent of the combined gross
domestic product of the World in 2025. Which probably places it in
the top 10 per cent based on PPP weight.
Australia
could be considered one of the Middle Powers and, in these uncertain
times when one of the two Great Powers, an increasingly erratic
United States of America, publishes the following national defence strategy,
everyone in Australia should note its contents.
It
will add much needed context to the decisions made by the Australian
Government over the coming decade.
IMAGE: US 2026 National Defense Strategy (2026USNDS) cover page
Late
on 23 January 2026 in Washington DC the renamed U.S. Dept of War
released its 34 page "2026
National Defense Strategy" (2006NDS).
This strategy document signals that it is U.S. President Donald J. Trump's
intention to review all existing defence and security treaties,
pacts, agreements and partnerships. Perhaps even ripping up some or
all if the mood takes him.
The
bottom line of this 2006NDS
document is;
The
document is quite clear about the American position on specific
topics.
European
interests no longer matter to the United States. Europe must
defend itself & the U.S. will give limited materiel/technical
assistance if its own interests are involved.
To
that end America intends to remain involved with NATO
as one of its member nations via the U.S. Dept. of War to better
account for the Russian threat to American interests. At the same
time the 2026NDS indicates it will scale back
financial support of NATO as it prioritises defending the U.S.
Homeland and deterring China.
Canada
and Mexico as only two nations sharing land borders with the
United States are expected to gear their security strategies to
defend the US homeland.
Israel
will continue to receive unspecified U.S. support as a valuable ally
in the Middle East. It is seen as coming close to the expressed ideal
of a model ally.
South
Korea is to receive more limited support in its region.
The
US
will continue to strike at "Islamic terrorists" in Africa
and aggressively prevent Iran
from
acquiring
nuclear weapons.
The
US 2026NDS also pays particular
attention to
the Indo-Pacific,
which it expects
"will
soon make up more than half of the global economy".
The
focus is on the Western Pacific "First Island Chain"
from
Japan through Okinawa onto Taiwan and the northern
Philippines
before ending in Borneo.
There
is an underlying assumption that America's allies in the Western
Pacific will align themselves with U.S. foreign and defence policies
with regard the Western Pacific because they would also view China as dangerous to their interests.
With
the Trump Administration preferred scenario being the United States
and its allies fortifying and policing this island chain as a way of
restricting China's navy and its sea trade — thus allowing the U.S.
to take the lion's share of future trade growth anticipated in the
Indo-Pacific.
There is no specific mention of Australia in the entire 2026NDS document. This complete lack of reference to Australia in a document, signalling an attitudinal change to alliance per se on the part of the United States and a commitment to review existing alliances, throws a high level of uncertainty across, at last count, 253 bilateral treaties, agreements and conventions in force between the U.S. and Australia.
A level of uncertainty which may become uncomfortable when it comes to the U.S. plan to contain China in the Indo-Pacific.
In this, the 2nd Trump Administration's position departs markedly from the 2022NDS of the Biden Administration which placed value on its relationship with Australia.
Excerpt from the Biden US 2022 National Security Strategy
The United States in this reworking of its national defence strategy states that it "will prioritise addressing the most consequential and grave threats to Americans’ interests. We will revamp our network of allies and partners to meet the threats we face."
So
how is the rest
of the world reacting?
The
World,
Berlin Edition, 26.01.26: "Right
from the introduction written by Defense Secretary Hegseth, it
becomes clear once again that Trump wants a complete break with the
system the West built after 1945....The multilateral institutions
built after the horrors of World War II, which underpin
democratically mandated international law, are incompatible with
"America First"; for Trump, they are merely an illusory
"abstraction."....Trump's America does not want to isolate
itself. But the sole principle of future defense is to focus on US
interests."
European
Policy Centre
26.01.26:
"The
Pentagon published its new National Defense Strategy (NDS) late on 23
January, and defence experts across Europe did not have to look hard
to spot a strategic shift. The 2026 NDS is not an incremental update
but a deliberate reordering of American defence priorities and
expectations.
The
most consequential shift is the move from integrated deterrence to an
explicit hierarchy of priorities. Rather than attempting to manage
multiple challenges simultaneously, the new strategy ranks threats
and missions plainly. Defending the US homeland and deterring China
sit at the top. Everything else, including Europe, is secondary.
Fortress
America. Homeland defence now serves as the organising principle of
American strategy, not a supporting task. The NDS frames borders, air
and missile defence, cyber resilience, and the Western Hemisphere as
core military priorities. It openly revives a Monroe Doctrine–style
approach, naming Greenland, the Panama Canal, and Gulf of Mexico as
key terrain to be controlled and defended. Forward deterrence abroad
is no longer the default expression of US security; territorial
defence at home is."
Sunday
Independent,
Dublin, 25.01.26:
"The post continued the threatening and menacing tone the
president had expressed during his Davos address.
As
did the publication of the US National Defence Strategy late Friday
night. Released by secretary of defence/war, Pete Hegseth, it's only
the fourth sentence of the introduction before Greenland is first
mentioned, and then repeated.
It
speaks of the need to "secure key terrain in the Western
Hemisphere", that the US would "no longer cede access to or
influence over" that key terrain, and that the department is
providing the president with "credible options to guarantee US
military and commercial access to key terrain… especially
Greenland".
None
of that sounds like a president who has changed his mind on something
that has been repeatedly referred to, since inauguration, and for
years, as a key priority of this administration, namely "acquiring
Greenland".
The
Pioneer,
New Delhi, 25.01.26: 'The
34-page page document, the first since 2022, was highly political for
a military blueprint, criticising partners from Europe to Asia for
relying on previous US administrations to subsidise their defence.
It
called for "a sharp shift - in approach, focus, and tone."
That translated to a blunt assessment that allies would take on more
of the burden countering nations from Russia to North Korea. "For
too long, the U.S. Government neglected - even rejected - putting
Americans and their concrete interests first," read the opening
sentence. It capped off a week of animosity between President Donald
Trump's administration and traditional allies like Europe, with Trump
threatening to impose tariffs on some European partners to press a
bid to acquire Greenland before announcing a deal that lowered the
temperature.
As
allies confront what some see as a hostile attitude from the US, they
will almost certainly be unhappy to see that Defense Secretary Pete
Hegseth's department will provide "credible options to guarantee
U.S. Military and commercial access to key terrain," especially
Greenland and the Panama Canal. Following a tiff this week at the
World Economic Forum meeting in Davos, Switzerland, with Canadian
Prime Minister Mark Carney, the strategy at once urges cooperation
with Canada and other neighbours while still issuing a stark warning.
"We
will engage in good faith with our neighbors, from Canada to our
partners in Central and South America, but we will ensure that they
respect and do their part to defend our shared interests," the
document says. "And where they do not, we will stand ready to
take focused, decisive action that concretely advances U.S.
Interests." '
The
Korean Times,
Seoul, 25.01.26: "Seoul
is expected to receive a detailed explanation about the new strategy
as Elbridge Colby, the U.S. under secretary of defense for policy,
arrived here on Sunday for a three-day visit. Colby, who played a
central role in drafting the new defense strategy, is scheduled to
meet senior South Korean officials, including Defense Minister Ahn
Gyu-back, to explain Washington’s approach and seek cooperation on
implementing the new framework.
Ahead
of the visit, the U.S. Department of Defense said Colby would travel
to South Korea and Japan to promote Trump’s security approach of
“peace through strength.” The Pentagon said the trip emphasizes
the importance of U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific region as
Washington moves to recalibrate deterrence responsibilities among
allies....During his visit, Colby is also scheduled to tour Camp
Humphreys, the largest U.S. military base overseas. He will travel to
Japan following his Korea visit as part of the same regional tour."
The
Express On Sunday,
London, 25.01.26: "A
YEAR ago, newly sworn in President Donald Trump announced in his
inaugural address that the "golden age of America begins right
now". From that moment, he instituted a "shock and awe"
strategy
of
steering the country hard to the political Right. Having experienced
the first Trump administration, the world thought it was prepared,
but it did not expect what followed....Most
controversially, however, Trump has reshaped geopolitics into one
bifurcated between the US and China: Trump's Corollary.....At the
one-year anniversary of President Trump's second term, the question
is can the "art of the deal" change geopolitics and keep
the Nato alliance intact?
Whether
one likes him or not, Trump is now one of the most consequential
presidents in history. His embrace and deployment of American
self-belief and military prowess have set him apart from recent
predecessors.
Dramatic
change does always come at a cost and the question remains whether
the old alliances that held together in the previous world order will
adapt to the new one."
In Australia the response is along the lines of....
Embassy
of Australia, 2026,
Australia and the United States:
"Australia and the United States established
diplomatic relations on 8 January 1940. Following the establishment
of Australian and US Legations in March and July 1940 respectively,
the White House announced the elevation of the Legations to Embassy
status on 9 July 1946. Australia's first Ambassador to the United
States, Norman J O Makin, presented his credentials to the US
Government on 11 September 1946. The first US Ambassador to
Australia, Robert Butler, presented his credentials on 25 September
1946......A central pillar of relations between Australia and the
United States is the 'ANZUS' Treaty, which was originally an
agreement between Australia, New Zealand and the United States. The
ANZUS Treaty was signed by the parties in San Francisco in 1951 and
entered into force in 1952. The ANZUS Treaty underpins the
Australia-United States Alliance. It binds Australia and the United
States to consult on mutual threats, and, in accordance with our
respective constitutional processes, to act to meet common dangers.
Australia invoked the ANZUS Treaty for the first time on 14 September
2001 in response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September."
SBS News online, 31 January 2026: "Donald
Trump has started 2026 with US military strikes on Venezuela, threats
of an invasion into Greenland and a continuation of his
administration's tariff trade war with friends and enemies alike.
While
such shocks have become familiar during the controversial president’s
two terms in office, they are increasingly testing the tolerance of
America’s partners and prompting fresh questions in Australia.
Canadian
Prime Minister, Mark Carney, highlighted these concerns in his
address to the World Economic Forum in Davos earlier this month.
"Every
day we're reminded that we live in an era of great power rivalry,
that the rules based order is fading, that the strong can do what
they can, and the weak must suffer. And faced with this logic, there
is a strong tendency for countries to go along to get along, to hope
that compliance will buy safety. Well, it won't. So, what are our
options?"
In
response to President Trump's trade tariffs and his stated desire to
make Canada the 51st state of the U-S, Mr Carney's government has
chosen to move Canada away from its historically close relationship
with its southern neighbour.
Dr
Emma Shortis, director of the International and Security Affairs
Program at The Australia Institute, is one of a number of foreign
policy experts who argue it's time for Australia to do the same.
"This
is a president who is unconstrained and who is incredibly dangerous.
And for Australia to tie not only our own security, but the security
of our region to that again, is incredibly risky and undermines our
regional relationships. That risk will only increase as Australia
remains tied to this rogue power that is going to continue acting
out. There's not many universes in which Trump's behaviour becomes
constructive."
A
November YouGov poll, commissioned by The Australia Institute,
suggests that only 16 per cent of Australians believe the United
States is a “very reliable” security ally while a previous poll
in May found that 54.2 per cent wanted a more independent foreign
policy.
So
what has led so many to question an alliance that has defined much of
modern Australian history?
The
economy and national security are two key pillars of the US-Australia
relationship often cited by Labor and the Coalition.
Dr
Shortis argues the economic relationship with the US has become
increasingly volatile under President Trump.
"The
Trump administration has ripped up Australia's free trade agreement
with the United States. It is trashing all the rules of global trade,
which were of course imperfect, but which for the most part benefited
Australia and created prosperity in Australia. Trump is trashing that
and that is a risk to our security, our economic security."....
It
can be difficult to understand what this decoupling of the US and
Australia could look like.
Dr
Emma Shortis says a first step from the federal government could be
scrutinising the deals and alliances it holds with the US such as the
AUKUS submarine deal, which could cost Australians up to $368
billion.
"So
I think a starting point is with democratic accountability and
scrutiny of the deals that we have with the United States in the
first place. And I think what that could look like, for example, is a
parliamentary inquiry into the AUKUS submarine deal, which the United
Kingdom has had an inquiry, the United States has had its own review.
There's no reason that Australia can't have a review of its own. That
will bring up many questions I think about Australia's broader
relationship with the United States issues of sovereignty and
independence. And I think that can, I suppose, get the ball rolling
in what a reframed relationship with the United States might mean."
What
leaders like Canada's Mark Carney are pushing for is middle power
countries like Canada and Australia to draw closer together in favour
of orbiting a major power like the US or China.
"The
middle powers must act together, because if we're not at the table,
we're on the menu. But we believe that from the fracture, we can
build something bigger, better, stronger, more just. This is the task
of the middle powers, the countries that have the most to lose from a
world of fortresses and most to gain from genuine cooperation."
Dr
Shortis says this focus on interdependence is key.
"So
building up our regional relationships in particular around climate
action and around public health, around education, around the things
that really do make us safer. And building our networks and
relationships in that way, much in the way that Mark Carney
described. Building coalitions, building alliances around shared
interests and around shared values."....
