Tweet of the Week

“I am the only person my child has,” the single mother of a five-year-old daughter said, “and she’s looking to me on Christmas morning to take the lead and I’m just sitting there with tears streaming down my face.” https://t.co/imnIYg9eBW #auspol #centrelink

— Luke Henriques-Gomes (@lukehgomes) December 28, 2018

Australian Home Affairs Minister Peter Dutton demonstrates his incompetence yet again

During the less than one term he served as Australian prime minister Liberal MP for Warringah Tony Abbott rushed through amendments to the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 in 2015.

Given that the Minister for Home Affairs and Liberal MP for Dickson Peter Dutton has used these amendments to strip Australian citizenship from twelve individuals, the most recent being the revocation of citizenship of a Melbourne-born man currently gaoled in Turkey which now leaves him stateless1 and, as the minister has referenced the Citizenship Loss Board in his decision making perhaps it is time to recall the sketchy details known about this board.

The Guardian, 22 July 2018:

The identity of officials on one of the most powerful government boards in Australia – which has the effective power to strip Australians of citizenship – has been revealed for the first time.

A freedom of information request by Guardian Australia for minutes of the Citizenship Loss Board’s first meeting in February shows the panel is made up of senior departmental secretaries from across government. The secretariat of the committee is Hamish Hansford, an assistant secretary of the immigration department. 

He previously served as the national manager of the intelligence branch of the Australian Crime Commission.

The department of the prime minister’s counter-terrorism co-ordinator, Greg Moriarty, is also on the board, as are Gary Quinlan, from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Katherine Jones, from the Attorney-General’s Department, and Christopher Dawson from the Australian Crime Commission.

The immigration department has by far has the largest number of representatives with five officers: Rachel Noble, Michael Manthorpe, Maria Fernandez, Michael Outram and Pip De Veau.

The Australian federal police and defence department’s members are unknown. Both declined to participate in the February meeting for undisclosed reasons.

The Australian Security Intelligence Service (Asis) and Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (Asio) each have a member. Neither officer is named, listed only as a “representative”.

The Citizenship Loss Board has the de facto power to strip dual nationals of their citizenship under the federal government’s legislation introduced last year.

Although the law was touted as an anti-terrorism tool, it left open the possibility that people who damaged commonwealth property or even national security whistleblowers could have their citizenship revoked. Legal experts have argued it could create a tier of second-class citizenship.

Although the Citizenship Loss Board appears to be the effective arbiter of this exceptional power, there is no reference to it in the legislation. None of its members are parliamentarians or members of the judiciary. It operates in a legal vacuum. Its recommendations go to the immigration minister with no clear legal mandate.

In theory the board does not have the express power to revoke citizenship. The laws were built to withstand judicial scrutiny, describing the key mechanism to remove citizenship as one of “revocation by conduct” – the argument is that if the law is “self-executing” this could head off judicial review.

The board’s official role is to consider cases where an individual’s behaviour meets the criteria to have citizenship revoked under the law.

This mechanism has been described by University of New South Wales dean of law George Williams as a “legal fiction”. He has previously outlined concerns about the board and the basis for its power. [my yellow highlighting]

Footnote

1. Eligibility requirements for Fijian citizenship which this individual does not currently meet.

http://www.immigration.gov.fj/travel-requirements/fiji-citizenship, retrieved 3 January 2018:

Citizenship by registration covers six categories of individuals:

The first category covers children born outside the Fiji islands on or after 10th April 2009 if at the date of the child’s birth either of the child's parents was a citizen – section 8(1) of the Citizenship of Fiji Decree 2009.

The second category covers children under 18 years of age of a foreign nationality that are adopted by Fiji Citizens – section 8 (2) of the Citizenship of Fiji Decree 2009.

The third category covers children who were under the age of 18 when either parent became a Fiji citizen – Section 8(3) of the Citizenship Decree 2009.

The fourth category covers persons who would have qualified under the previous three categories but they have reached the age of 18 years. These applicants cannot be granted citizenship unless they have been lawfully present in Fiji for a total of three (3) of the five (5) years immediately before the application – Section 8(5) of the Citizenship of Fiji Decree 2009.

The fifth category provides for former adult Fiji citizens who wish to regain their Fiji citizenship. With the introduction of the multiple citizenship policy former citizens wishing to regain their Fiji citizenship need NOT renounce their other citizenship – Section 8(6) of the Citizenship of Fiji Decree 2009.

The sixth category provides for spouses of Fiji citizens. Applicants must have been lawfully present in Fiji for a total period of three of the five years immediately before the application – Section 8(7) of the Citizenship of Fiji Decree 2009. (refer to below checklist for fees and other requirement).

Fijian Government position:

"Neil Prakash has not been or is a Fijian citizen. For a child of a Fiji citizen born overseas, the parent has to apply for citizenship for the child to become a Fiji citizen. The department has searched the immigration system and confirms that he has not entered the country nor applied for citizenship since birth." [Head of Fiji's Immigration Department, Nemani Vuniwaqa, quoted in ABC News, 2 January 2018]

Something to remember every time a Liberal or Nationals politician opens his/her mouth in 2019

With both a NSW state election and a federal general election in the first half of this year the Murdoch press and Coalition spokespersons will at some point turn their thoughts to the allegedly oppressive burden of welfare payments on Australian taxpayers and the prevalence of so-called 'welfare bludgers' that are supposedly ripping off the taxpayer.

Leaving aside the fact that every single person in Australia pays one or more forms of tax, even welfare recipients, what is the truth about who gets what from government tax concessions or cash transfers?

In 2018 Australia’s richest 20 per cent of the population owned est. 68 per cent of national private wealth, which means that they owned 80 times more in assets and savings than the poorest 20 per cent of the population.

They also received higher tax and transfer amounts from federal government coffers than welfare recipients.

Here is how that comes about......

Per Capita, The Cost of Privilege Report #7, Executive Summary excerpts, 29 March 2018:

The modelling assessed the various tax concessions and other benefits available to high-income earners and contrasts them with well-understood direct income support measures for low-income earners and those reliant on our social security safety net.

This report quantifies the annual cost to the federal budget of various measures that allow Australians in our wealthiest quintile to minimise their taxable income, thereby reducing government revenue that pays for services for all citizens.

These measures include superannuation tax concessions, negative gearing, capital gains tax concessions, the use of discretionary trusts, the exemption from the Goods and Services Tax (GST) of private health insurance and education, and the exemption from Capital Gains Tax (CGT) of the principal place of residence. All of these concessions disproportionately benefit high income and high wealth households. 

Our analysis shows that, in combination, these measures impose a cost on the federal budget that easily outstrips that of any single welfare recipient group.

According to our calculations, the cost of foregone tax revenue from the richest 20% of Australians is over AU$68 billion per annum. That’s around $37 a week from every worker in the country.¹

In contrast, the cost of income support in the 2016-2017 financial year was, by group:

Age Pension $44.468 billion ($35 a week per worker)

Assistance to families with children $36.404 billion ($20 a week per worker)

Assistance to people with disabilities $31.721 billion ($17 a week per worker)

Newstart (unemployment benefits) $10.994 billion ($6 a week per worker)

1 Calculated using the methodology outlined in Answer to Question On Notice No: 257, Taxation paid and 2016-17 Financial Year, what was the total government spend? Senate Economics Legislation Committee, Treasury Portfolio, Budget Policy Division, Supplementary Budget Estimates 2017 – 2018

Here is a practical example of the value of tax concessions to the third family above who fall within the top 20 per cent of the population:

Household Three – Michael and Gillian

Michael and Gillian have two children, Isabella, aged 12 and Max, aged 8.

They paid off their mortgage two years ago and live in a four bedroom house in a bayside suburb of Melbourne. 

Isabella and Max go to the local Catholic primary school and will go on to Catholic secondary college. The family has intermediate hospital and extras private health insurance.

Michael is a Team Leader at a large telecommunications company, and earns $230,000 per year. Gillian works 20 hours a week, during school hours, in the HR department of a major bank, and earns $60,000 per year.

Both Michael and Gillian salary sacrifice into their superannuation accounts up to the $25,000 concessional cap. While Michael can only contribute an extra $3,150 of his pre-tax income to super on top of the $21,850 in compulsory contributions already made by his employer, Gillian can contribute $19,000, reducing her taxable income to $41,000.

They own a three bedroom house in Rye, which they rent out through AirBnB as a holiday home and negatively gear, allowing them to reduce Michael’s tax by a further $9,400.

The value of the capital gains tax concession on their holiday home gives them $4,500 in concessional benefits annually, and the tax exemption of their family home in Melbourne provides another concession of $23,500 per year.

Michael and Gillian also receive GST tax exemptions on their private health and education costs to the value of $3,250.00 per year.

Their combined family income after tax is $215,446 per annum, or $4,143.19 per week.

The total amount received from the taxpayer in tax concessions for this family is $71,705 per year, or $1,378.94 per week.

This imbalance in the value of government assistance received by different groups in society, which is so strongly biased towards giving most to the affluent, is a perfect example of Prime Minister and Liberal MP for Cook Scott Morrison's social and economic policies structured to give to those who already have.

Giving to those he appears to believe are 'good' or 'worthy' because they have high levels of income and assets, as opposed to those who are 'bad' or 'unworthy' because they have little in the way of income and assets.

When I was young this attitude was simply described as the Protestant Ethic, now it appears to be known as the Prosperity Gospel.

Under either name it is not the mark of an egalitarian society or of a nation which prides itself on giving everyone "a fair go".

Something readers might care to think on as they decide who to vote for this year.

The Liberal Party of Australia: fighting to suppress climate science & avoiding responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions since 1996

The Age, 1 January 2019:

The Howard government was urged more than 20 years ago to consider an emissions trading scheme, while its signature plans to deal with Australia's greenhouse gas emissions were considered by its own departments to be merely aimed at deflecting global criticism.

As the Morrison government continues to fight a debilitating internal battle over how to deal with climate change, previously secret papers from the 1990s reveal a suite of major government departments said the most effective and efficient way to deal with greenhouse gases was to impose a carbon price.

Cabinet papers from 1996 and 1997 released on Tuesday by the National Archives reveal the beginnings of the Howard government's drawn-out response to the threat posed by rising greenhouse gas emissions and the way some of those issues are still playing out in the Morrison government…….

Government departments headed by Prime Minister and Cabinet, Treasury and Foreign Affairs fleshed out the details of a series of proposals backed by the government in September 1997 in a bid to deal with Australia's emissions.

The co-ordinating document produced by the departments, which were aiming to finalise a package discussed at cabinet earlier in the month, made clear the bureaucracy did not believe the government's plans would go nearly far enough in cutting emissions but may be sufficient to deflect international criticism.

"None of the packages presented here would achieve the stabilisation of emissions at 1990 levels," they said.

"Rather, they are aimed at deflecting criticism that Australia is not fully committed to reducing its emissions."

The departments costed a series of proposals which would ultimately become part of the government's official response to climate change.

These included a focus on tree plantations, encouragement for businesses to slice their emissions, the introduction of ethanol into petrol and subsidies to boost investment in renewable energy.

They noted Australia had a "poor international reputation for driving fuel efficient cars", arguing significant gains could be made by improving the nation's car fleet.

Building codes, reform of the energy market and investment in climate research were all encouraged.

But the departments, which acknowledged the government's opposition to a price signal, said these would ultimately be expensive initiatives which would not deliver a real impact on the nation's overall emissions profile.

"The most effective way to reduce emissions would be to combine significant price signals (either general or sectoral increases in taxes on greenhouse producing activities), information so firms and individuals can reduce greenhouse production, opportunities to invest in carbon sinks and some degree of compulsion to address areas where markets cannot be made to work effectively," they said.

"It is generally agreed that reductions will not happen without significant persuasion, incentives or leadership from government."

In late 2006, Mr Howard announced a panel would investigate an emissions trading scheme. Both the Howard government and the Kevin Rudd-led ALP would take a trading scheme policy to the following year's election.

But in 1997, the government's most esteemed departments told cabinet it should consider an ETS even if the results of the study were kept hidden from the public.

"A study of possible emissions trading mechanisms and regulations would help position Australia in the event that emissions trading is introduced internationally," they said.

"This study would not be for public announcement since it may not help our international negotiating position if it became public knowledge."....

The Guardian, 1 January 2018:

In June 1996, cabinet agreed that “Australia’s overall objective in climate change negotiations should be to safeguard our national trade and economic interests while advancing compatible outcomes that are environmentally and economically effective”.

While Australia recognised “the need for effective global action on climate change”, it vowed to pursue an international agreement that “does not contain targets which are legally binding” and argued for differentiated, rather than uniform, reduction targets.

The then environment minister, Robert Hill, reported to cabinet that for the first time the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change scientific report had said that the balance of scientific evidence supported the view that the changes in climate and greenhouse gas concentrations were due to human activity.

Small island states were proposing a 20% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions from 1990 levels by 2005. While other time frames were being discussed, all were potentially problematic for Australia because of its carbon-intensive economy.

Hill told the cabinet that modelling showed Australia’s emissions from the energy sector – accounting for half of national emissions – were projected to be 30% above 1990 levels by 2010…..

The consternation grew further by mid-1997. A joint submission to cabinet warned of the prospect of an “EU–US bilateral understanding for progressing climate change” at a forthcoming G7 summit…..

The cabinet actively considered walking away from Kyoto altogether.

It was facing publishing its future emissions as part of the Kyoto process but modelling was now showing that emissions from the energy sector would be 40% to 50% above 1990 levels by 2010…

The cabinet also agreed in July to establish a climate change taskforce to advance Australia’s domestic greenhouse gas strategies, to strengthen its bargaining stance. One option to be explored was “domestic and international emissions trading”.

In the following months, Treasury modelled various measures for reducing domestic emissions.

The memorandum warned that none of its scenarios would cap carbon emissions at 1990 levels but would achieve potential cuts of 22%.

And so began Australia’s long and tortured debate over carbon trading schemes.

A proposal was put forward by the Australian Greenhouse Office in 2000, but was scuttled in cabinet; another came forward in 2003, but was vetoed by Howard.

Finally, in the dying days of his government in December 2006, Howard announced an emissions trading scheme, after bureaucrats convinced him it was the most efficient way to meet Australia’s commitments.

BACKGROUND

National Archives of Australia, 1996 and 1997 – Keating and Howard governments, Cabinet Papers, released 1 January 2018.

The Howard Government fight against taking responsibility for Australia's own domestic greenhouse gas missions.....

See: https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/NAAMedia/ShowImage.aspx?B=32709070&T=PDF. My apologies for not posting this document but current slow upload times have meant that I cannot yet display this document here.

Murray-Darling Basin Plan: a $13 billion fraud on the environment

Some home truth about the current Murray-Darling Basin Plan to remember as we enter into the morass of competeing claims in NSW State and Australian Federal election campaigns in the first half of this year....

IN THE MATTER OF THE MURRAY-DARLING BASIN ROYAL COMMISSION, Adelaide South Australia, 23 October 2018:

MR R. BEASLEY SC, Senior Counsel Assisting:

….Commissioner, the Water Act and the Basin Plan have been hailed as ground-breaking reform. They are. What this Commission has learnt, however, from the evidence it has gathered, and from the witnesses that have informed us, is that it’s one thing to enact transformative legislation like the Water Act and the Basin Plan, it’s quite another thing to faithfully implement it. Sadly, the implementation of the Basin Plan at crucial times has been characterised by a lack of attention to the requirements of the Water Act and a near total lack of transparency in an important sense.

Those matters have had, and continue to have, a negative impact on the environment and probably the economies of all the Basin Plan states but the state that will suffer the most is the state at the end of the system, South Australia. The Water Act was a giant national compromise. At its heart was a recognition that all of the Basin states – Queensland, NSW, Victoria and South Australia – were taking too much water from the system and had been for a long time. That, as a matter of statutory fact in the Water Act, and as a matter of reality, has led to serious degradation of the environment of the Basin. The Millennium Drought of 2000s underscored the fact that, if nothing was done, over-allocation of the water entitlements in the Basin would inevitably and quickly lead to irreversible damage to the Basin environment.

The Water Act was a response to that. It was the statutory means by which the process of restoration and protection of environmental assets would begin. I say the Water Act was a compromise because the Act contemplates that water will be taken from our rivers and used consumptively for irrigation, the growing of crops and permanent plants. Of course, also for human water needs. But it sets a limit. That limit is that no more water can be taken beyond the point where key areas of the environment and its ecosystems might be damaged. In an environment that’s already degraded, that means the Water Act requires the environment to have both enough water to restore degraded wetlands and the like and also, of course, to maintain them.

That’s not just the right thing to do. It’s what Australia’s international obligations require. That task, setting a limit on the extraction of water, is to be based on the best available science. Not guided by the best science, not informed by the best science but based on the best available science. It also has to be achieved by taking into account the well-known principles of ecologically sustainable development. What the Commission has learnt from the evidence presented to it is that the implementation of the Basin Plan, at crucial stages, has not been based on the best available science. Further, ecologically sustainable development has either been ignored or, in some cases, in relation to supply measures, actually inverted.

 I want to read to you a peer review of the Guide to the Basin Plan from some international scientists in 2010 because it demonstrates that they were well aware, even back then, of what was actually going on in the early stages of drafting the Basin Plan. This is a peer review report by Professor Gene Likens of the Cary Institute of Ecosystem Studies, Mr Per Bertilsson of the Stockholm International Water Institute, Professor Asit Biswas from the Third World Centre for Water Management and Professor John Briscoe, Gordon McKay Professor from Harvard University. What they said was this, in reviewing the Basin Plan, at page 34 of what became exhibit RCE38:

It is a fundamental tenet of good governance that scientists produce facts and the government decides on values and makes choices. We are concerned that scientists in the Murray-Darling Basin Authority, who are working to develop the facts, may feel they are expected to trim those so that the sustainable diversion limit will be one that is politically acceptable. We strongly believe that this is not only inconsistent with the basic tenets of good governance but that it is not consistent with the letter of the Water Act. We equally strongly believe that government needs to make the necessary trade-offs and value judgments and need to be explicit about these, assume responsibility and make the rationale behind these judgments transparent to the public.

If all the MDBA had been done in the past eight years since that review was written is “trim the facts”, that would be bad enough. But it’s worse than that. The implementation of the Basin Plan has been marred by maladministration. By that I mean mismanagement by those in charge of the task in the Basin Authority, its executives and its board, and the consequent mismanagement of huge amounts of public funds. The responsibility for that maladministration and mismanagement falls on both past and current executives of the MDBA and its board. Again, while the whole of the Basin environment has and will continue to suffer as a result of this, the state whose environment will suffer the most is South Australia.

The principal task of those implementing the Plan is to set the Basin-wide sustainable diversion limit. How much water can be taken from the rivers before the environment suffers? You’ve heard evidence that has been unchallenged that this task was infected by deception, secrecy and is the political fix. The modelling it has been said to have been based on is still not available seven years later. The recent adjustment of the sustainable diversion limit by raising it by 605 gigalitres, on the evidence you’ve heard, is best described as a fraud on the environment. That’s a phrase I used in opening. It was justified then. It’s re-enforced by the evidence you’ve heard subsequently. The so-called 450 gigalitres of upwater, the water that the then South Australian Government fought for, for this State’s environment, is highly unlikely to ever eventuate. The constraints to the system are just one major problem in the delivery of that water.

Like all aspects of the implementation of the Basin Plan, efficiency measures or infrastructure projects that form the basis of how the 450 gigalitres of water is to be attained, and which are funded by public money, lack any reasonable form of transparency and, as the Productivity Commission recently, and witnesses to this Commission, have noted, are hugely more expensive and less reliable than purchasing water entitlements. I will discuss this in detail but I will give you one quote from an expert who can talk with real authority about the extra 450 gigalitres proposed for South Australia under the Basin Plan. That’s the former Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder, David Papps. In his evidence to you said:

 I would bet my house that South Australia is not getting that water.

Mr Papps’ prediction seems safe when one considers the proposed amendments to the Basin Plan by the governments of NSW and Victoria concerning the 450 gigalitres that I will come to shortly. Everything that I have just said to you is based on the views of eminent scientists and other people who have given evidence and lodged submissions. However, neither the Commonwealth Department of Agriculture and Water, the Murray-Darling Basin Authority, or any Commonwealth government agency has provided any answer to anything I have just said or to the evidence before the Commission that I will refer to shortly. They have no answer. The submissions provided to you very recently by the Murray-Darling Basin Authority, and the DAWR, Department of Agriculture and Water Resources, demonstrate, as did their unwillingness to give evidence, culminating in proceedings to the High Court, that they do not have any answer.

The MDBA, you will recall, were even too busy to meet you. The States also have no answer, as demonstrated in their somewhat thin submissions to you, with the exception of the South Australian Government. When I say the MDBA has no answer to the expert evidence given in this Commission, I should emphasise also that it clearly has no answer to the maladministration and unlawfulness of its implementation of the Basin Plan. It is nevertheless a great pity that relevant persons from the Basin Authority, and other Commonwealth agencies, were not required to give answers to you under oath concerning the scientific evidence the Commission gathered.

The opportunity may have been there had the High Court decided those proceedings in your favour. I’m not going to speculate on what the High Court would have done but, regrettably, the South Australian Government chose not to extend your Commission in order to provide you with the opportunity that may have been available to you to question those relevant people. You made it clear to the South Australian Government that was your strong preference. You advised them that the Commission had potential witnesses that wanted to give important evidence, evidence relevant to the South Australian environment, but only if they were compelled by summons. In other words, they were too scared to talk about the implementation of the Basin Plan without the force of a summons. Why the Commission was not extended to explore these crucial matters is something upon which you can draw inferences as you see fit. I will only say that it’s a great opportunity lost……

Water theft within the Murray Darling Basin continues

Water news 21/12/18
Thanks to Barrier Daily Truth

" Dam owner pinged " pic.twitter.com/t2anNiIO86

— Chris Rawlins 🚙 (@ChrisBH011) December 20, 2018

State of Play: NSW North Coast Employment Opportunities

It's a brand new year but in regional New South Wales the old issues followed us past midnight on 31 December 2018.

Employment opportunities - where will our unemployed and underemployed people find a job in 2019 and beyond?

This is how the old year ended.....

NSW North Coast -Summary Data

List of summary data inNorth Coast
Data Name	Data Value
Unemployment Rate (15+):	6.1%
Unemployed (15+):	7,000
Total jobactive Caseload (15+):	10,643
Youth jobactive Caseload (15-24):	1,779
Mature Age jobactive Caseload (50+):	3,562

Download Summary Data in Excel

http://lmip.gov.au/default.aspx?LMIP/GainInsights/VacancyReport

The future appears to be a mixed bag for the NSW North Coast over the next twenty-four years. 

At which point the population may have reached somewhere in the vicinity of 400,000 residents.

However, it is expected there will be a drop in employment levels across Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing on the North Coast.

While Manufacturing only grows slightly in the Richmond-Tweed region and remains static same elsewhere.

Wholesale Trade remains steady in Tweed-Richmond with up to 300 new jobs, but is projected to go backwards in Coffs Harbour-Grafton over the next 24 years.

Retail Trade is predicted to grow modestly across the North Coast, with 900 new jobs predicted.

The Accommodation and Food Services sector is expected to show unspectacular growth right across the North Coast regions with only 900 additional jobs.

Administrative and Support Services employment is projected to rise - but only by 700 jobs up to 2023 and Public Administration & Safety are only expected to add 300 jobs over that same time period.

The Education sector is expected to grow by 700 jobs.

Information, Media & Telecommunications is expected to grow by 8.4% but it will take 24 years to achieve this small improvement on May 2018 figures and barely represents an est. 100 jobs overall.

Financial and Insurance sector employment opportunities are expected to diminish across the regions, but there are expected to be 500 more jobs in the Professional, Scientific & Technical Services.

Transport, Postal & Warehousing employment is predicted to remain at near present levels.

The Mining sector is not expected to grow past May 2018 levels on the North Coast from the Clarence Valley up to the NSW-Queensland border taking in all seven Northern Rivers local government areas.

However Construction employment is expected to grow by 15-16% by 2023 across the region. This represents est. 3,000 more jobs above May 2018 numbers.

Healthcare & Social Assistance is also predicted to grow by 3,900-4,000 available positions by 2023.

See the following Labour Market Information Portal links for further employment projections for regional Australia, including the NSW North Coast:

Employment projections for the five years to May 2023

Each year, the Department of Jobs and Small Business produces employment projections by industry, occupation, skill level and region for the following five-year period. These employment projections are designed to provide a guide to the future direction of the labour market, however, like all such exercises, they are subject to an inherent degree of uncertainty.

The 2018 employment projections are based on the forecasted and projected total employment growth rates published in the 2018-19 Budget, the Labour Force Survey (LFS) data (June 2018) for total employment, and the quarterly detailed LFS data (May 2018) for industry employment data.

2018 Industry Employment Projections Report (Word) (245.0KB)

Industry projections – five years to May 2023 (Excel) (49.3KB)

Occupation projections – five years to May 2023 (Excel) (80.4KB)

Skill Level projections – five years to May 2023 (Excel) (24.6KB)

Regional projections – interactive tool (Excel) (2.2MB)

Regional projections – five years to May 2023 (Excel) (921.3KB)

2018 Gender Employment Projections Report (Word) (116.7KB)