Showing posts with label Australian Bureau of Statistics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Australian Bureau of Statistics. Show all posts

Friday 9 September 2016

Australian Bureau of Statistics: the pot of gold that is big data


The privacy concerns arising in respect of big data tend to have two foci. First, there are ethical questions about how private information is captured and subsequently used without the subject’s knowledge or consent. Second, there are concerns that the way governments and corporations store and secure this data fails to reach an appropriate standard, leaving the door open for private individual data to be accessed by unauthorised persons, or otherwise released. [NSW LC, Standing Committee on Law and Justice, Remedies for the serious invasion of Privacy in New South Wales, 3 March 2016]

The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) has shown an interest in accessing the gold mine that is retail scanner data.


Big data refers to the large volume of structured or unstructured data that organisations generate and store. It is characterised as data that generally contain high volume, high velocity and/or high variety information and demands cost-effective, innovative ways of processing for enhanced insight and decision making .

The opportunity that big data presents to statistical agencies is the potential to produce more relevant and timely statistics than traditional data sources such as sample surveys. As an input into official statistics, either for use on its own, or combined with more traditional data sources, Big data could help position National Statistical Offices (NSOs) to improve the accuracy of their measures or the quality of the statistics produced. It can also help improve the comprehensiveness of official statistics by addressing existing data gaps.

An example of Big data is transactions data from major retailers obtained from the electronic capture of product information at the point of sale. Transactions data contain detailed information about the business name and location of the transaction, date and time, quantities, product descriptions, values of products sold as well as their prices.


ABS innovations will meet new and emerging data needs. For example, the ABS is developing a prototype known as the Graphically Linked Information Discovery Environment (GLIDE), which is a suite of tools using Semantic Web methods to help analysts explore and visualise linked data. GLIDE has linked personal income tax data with business tax data to explore new methods to manage, link and analyse cross-sectional and longitudinal data.

A pilot project to inform policy development through the combination of Census and social security information was established between the ABS and the Department of Social Services.

The ABS is already a user of big data - with considerable potential to use much more - as effective use of this government data reduces our need to collect information separately and directly from households and businesses.

ABS is moving beyond the public data environment to draw insights from retail scanner data, to explore options with other data sources such as investigating the use of satellite imagery to measure agriculture crop yields and new methodological approaches to using telecommunication location information.

The spatial opportunities of big data approaches are considerable and have the potential to fundamentally change how we produce population information - especially the extent to which we can measure temporal dynamics which have generally been beyond the reach of traditional approaches.

And this online article gives a strong clue as to why the ABS would like to link national census data on individuals and households to retail scanner data – it will increase the commercial value of the statistical data products it offers for sale.

Ad News, 5 September 2013:

One of the country's biggest advertisers, Woolworths, said it doesn't need big splashy ad campaigns to launch its insurance offering. Because its database tells it the people it needs to target directly.

Woolworths Limited director of group retail services Penny Winn said the company has been deliberately shying away from traditional mass advertising for its new insurance business.

Woolworths' combined insurance statistics database and frequent shopper database found those who buy milk and red meat are better insurance risks than those who have pasta, rice and liquor in their shopping baskets. As a result, Woolworths are able to target those good insurance risk customers directly with better insurance offers.

“What we've been able to do is take our insurer's car crash database and overlay it with our Woolworth's Rewards database. I rarely see actuaries get excited but they were very excited about what we found because it was so statically significant,” said Winn.

“Because you see, customers who drink lots of milk and eat lots of red meat are very, very, very good car insurance risks versus those who eat lots of pasta and rice, fills up their petrol at night, and drink spirits. What that means is we're able to tailor an insurance offer that targets those really good insurance risk customers and give them a good deal via direct channels instead of above-the-line [advertising]. And it helps to avoid the bad insurance risks.”


It seems that along with an individual’s name, address, marital status, income range, education level, ancestry, personal hygiene regimen, criminal or traffic infringement record, taxation liability and/or welfare payment history, medication and health status, the ABS would also like to have the option of assessing the individual’s alcohol consumption and insurance risk level.

What a treasure trove for those with a malicious heart and refined hacking skills or overly inquisitive police and national security agencies.

Tuesday 6 September 2016

Senate Inquiry into Australian Census 2016: your chance to finally have a say on the ABS, personal privacy, data retention and #CensusFail



On 31 August 2016, the Senate referred an inquiry into the 2016 Census to the Senate Economics References Committee for inquiry and report by 24 November 2016.

The Inquiry terms of reference are:

The 2016 Census, with particular reference to:
  1. the preparation, administration and management on the part of the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and the Government in the lead up to the 2016 Census;
  2. the scope, collection, retention, security and use of data obtained in the 2016 Census;
  3. arrangements, including contractual arrangements, in respect of the information technology aspects of the Census;
  4. the shutting down of the Census website on the evening of 9 August 2016, the factors leading to that shutdown and the reasons given, and the support provided by government agencies, including the Australian Signals Directorate;
  5. the response rate to the Census and factors that may have affected the response rate;
  6. privacy concerns in respect of the 2016 Census, including the use of data linking, information security and statistical linkage keys;
  7. Australia’s Census of Population and Housing generally, including purpose, scope, regularity and cost and benefits;
  8. the adequacy of funding and resources to the ABS;
  9. ministerial oversight and responsibility; and
  10. any related matters.

Submissions close on 21 September 2016.

Address for submissions:

Senate Standing Committees on Economics
PO Box 6100
Parliament House
Canberra ACT 2600

Phone: +61 2 6277 3540
Fax: +61 2 6277 5719
economics.sen@aph.gov.au

Online submissions may be lodged here.

Friday 2 September 2016

Australian Census 2016 stumbles on.....


The Australian reports on the desperation of the Australian Bureau of Statistics to achieve the numbers required to legitimize census results, 29 August 2016:

The Australian Bureau of Statistics’ grand experiment with digital technology has entered a new phase, asking more than 25,000 census collectors to use their own smartphones and tablets in a blitz of 3.5 million households that have failed to return their questionnaires.

In one of the world’s largest “bring-your-own-technology” enterprises, more than 500 varieties of smartphone and tablet have been registered to track which homes have been visited and what hazards collectors should expect when they arrive.

The initiative is part of an ABS effort to match the 98.3 per cent coverage achieved by the census in 2011 — a target the federal opposition suspects is now out of reach amid public panic over privacy concerns and website outages in its early stages.

Census chief Duncan Young said the census field collectors had been equipped with Apple iOS and Android applications instead of the hefty bound books issued to census collectors in previous years. Mr Young downplayed the system’s vulnerability to cyber attack, saying collectors faced strict security hurdles before being allowed access to the system……

If this exchange is correct in its details then something is seriously wrong with the attitude and actions of the Australian Bureau of Statistics, the Turnbull Government and, with  Australian society if it tolerates this behaviour.

          1.    Amy Gray @_AmyGray_  Aug 22
Census collectors came to my place last week. They knocked on and then tried to OPEN my door. Another #CensusFail
          2.   kelloveslife @kelloveslife  Aug 26
@_AmyGray_ I came home Sat evening to find a card ON MY DINING TABLE that the census person had left!
          3.    Amy Gray @_AmyGray_  Aug 26
@kelloveslife No one had let them in?
          4.   kelloveslife @kelloveslife  Aug 26
@_AmyGray_ no one was home except the dog & cat
          5.    Amy Gray @_AmyGray_  Aug 26
@kelloveslife Just to confirm: no one who lives in your home took materials from or let in a census worker?
;          6.  kelloveslife @kelloveslife  Aug 26
@_AmyGray_ AFAIK no, there was nobody home all day
          7.  Amy Gray @_AmyGray_  Aug 26
@kelloveslife Have you asked the other people in your house? Sorry, just trying to confirm and edge out any potential deniablity from them.

       kelloveslife@kelloveslife


9:21 AM - 26 Aug 2016

Monday 15 August 2016

The fallout from #CensusFail continues......


It is now the sixth day after Cenus Night 2016 in Australia and information has been slowly seeping out into the public domain.

First there's the genuine attempts to explain the spectacular failure to launch as opposed to the ABS-Turnbull Government propaganda on the subject.......

Reddit user mykro76 via @Qldaar, 10 August 2016:

Sortius, 10 August 2016:

So, I contacted Softlayer support, this was their response @ABSCensus #CensusFail


Patrick Gray at Risky.Biz on #CensusFail, 11 August 2016:



Community and Public Service Union, media release, 12 August  2016:

ABS STAFF ANGRY AT TURNBULL GOVERNMENT OVER CENSUS DEBACLE

The CPSU says the highly qualified and dedicated staff at the Australian Bureau of Statistics must not be blamed for the decisions by the Turnbull Government that are the real cause of Tuesday night’s Census debacle.

The union’s National Secretary Nadine Flood said: “Our members working in the ABS have slugged their guts out for months to make this Census work despite multiple Government decisions that have caused major problems. They know how critical the information collected in the Census is to the nation and they’re absolutely gutted at the damage done to the ABS's reputation and the Census itself.”

“Staff saw these problems coming a mile off. There are 700 fewer staff at the ABS now than when the last Census was conducted five years ago and as a result staff are suffering under massive workloads. Critical planning time was lost as the Government foolishly considered axing the Census, chopped and changed ministers three times and dilly-dallied for nearly a year in appointing a new chief statistician.”

“It’s shameful that Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull has said ‘heads will roll’ at the ABS over the Census while taking no responsibility for the real cause of this debacle, the decisions made by his Government.”

“It is Governments that are responsible for the reliability of public services and the Turnbull Government cannot dodge responsibility for slashing budgets and jobs. Prime Minister Turnbull should be apologising not finger pointing.”

“This situation in the ABS is just one example of how cuts to public sector staffing and capacity have gone too far, and how it’s ultimately the Australian public that suffers as a result.

Australians are struggling to get through on the Census hotline today, but that’s no less disturbing than the one in three calls to Medicare and Centrelink that go unanswered every day.”

“The dedication of ABS staff has ensured the Census has played a critical role in public policy in Australia for more than a century. It remains an important tool and we are urging Australians to participate despite the Government’s failings.”

Unsurprisingly the privacy concerns haven't gone away........

Digital Rights Watch, 12 August 2016:

The letter, signed by prominent privacy advocates, academics and journalists, reads:

The conduct of this year’s census raises serious and pressing ethical, legal, security and technological concerns. These throw doubt on the value of the exercise and the quality of the data collected.

The Australian government must put the Census 2016 on hold while it consults with the Australian people on the value and ethical ramifications of this and similar mass data-collection exercises. Expert input and advice must be sought to determine best practice ethical, governance and security standards for data collection, use, linkage, storage, and real-world implementation.

These problems, and the difficulties Australians have experienced in accessing and completing both the paper and electronic forms, make imperative the provision of the following two remedies.

We therefore respectfully request:
1. Amnesty for anyone who files a late or incomplete census
2. An independent inquiry into the ABS’s conduct of Census 2016. This should include a comparison of the ethical and institutional governance arrangements for hard-copy and electronic data collection, storage, linkage and use with international and best practice standards. Community consultation should take place in regard to the appointment of heads of this inquiry, precise terms of reference and timeframes for reporting.

Signed by:

Tim Norton, Digital Rights Watch
Amy Gray, Digital Rights Watch
Asher Wolf, journalist
Dr Suelette Dreyfus
Peter Tonoli
Jenna Price
Liam Pomfret, Australian Privacy Foundation
Mark Walkom, Australian Privacy Foundation
Simon Frew, Pirate Party Australia
Felicity Ruby, PhD Candidate
Professor Ariadne Vromen
Tim Cashmere
Mary Kostakidis, Freelance Journalist
Gautam Raju, Campaigner
Jack Skinner
Dr Leslie Cannold
Melissa Castan, Law Lecturer
Dr Ben Harris-Roxas
Professor Robert Sparrow
Robin Doherty, Hack for Privacy
Dr Kristoffer Greaves, Legal Educator
Archie Law, CEO ActionAid Australia
Thomas Kane
Kate Galloway, Law Lecturer
Tom Sulston, Technology Consultant
Trisha Jha
Suzy Wood, IP Lawyer
Justin Clacherty, Future Wise Australia
Cade Diehm, SpiderOak
Trent Yarwood, Future Wise Australia
Julian Burnside AO QC
Dr Matthew Rimmer, Professor of Intellectual Property and Innovation Law, QUT Faculty of Law
Dan Nolan, software engineer


Then there's those zealous casual employees on the ABS Census team attempting to salvage something from the wreckage…….


The mocking has even spread into mainstream media on Northern Rivers…….

The Daily Examiner, 13 August 2016:

SORRY guys, looks like we caused the Census website to crash, but it was worth it.
We only told one little lie but suddenly our street is crawling with engineers, government types, teachers, plumbers, interpreters, shopping centre magnates and consultants.
Man, we haven't seen so many consultants since they sold Telstra.
Anyway, it was all part of objecting to have to put your name on the Census.
Not sure why we're objecting, everyone knows me and I would be happy if someone stole my identity. I could just slip away quietly and watch the fireworks.
They are as welcome to the $10 in my bank account as they are to my dog, and well, truth be known, Ms L. probably would appreciate the change too, and it'd be cheaper than a holiday for her.
But if it's not good enough for Nick X, then it's not good enough for us, so I didn't use my name.
However I did say that there were 23,000 people staying at our place that night and that's when the fun started.
We ensured half the number were children so the Education Department has acquired land for a primary school, a high school, half a TAFE and a branch of some wannabe regional uni, all within a kilometre.
Westfield is knocking down the other houses in our neighbourhood and building a shopping centre.
The Department of Transport built a bus interchange across the road (guess we didn't make the cut for an airport, but gee it gave Badgerys Creek a fright).
There's a new hospital with no queues on a Saturday night. However that might be because of the lockout laws. Yeah, we didn't see that coming. Apparently when you get that many people together they want to stay up late and party. Well, der. But this is Australia, mate, not Paris or Berlin, New York or London.
We're locked out after dark and the internet doesn't work, but gee the other services are good and I'll drink to that. BYO at home, that is.
Sorry about the website thing.

An important point that shouldn't be lost in all the media noise........
Finally, an estimation of how many premises and or households are still missing in action (including an unknown number involved in acts of civil disobedience)......

It is possible that as of today the Australian Bureau of Statistics only holds an est. 30-45 per cent of all Census forms (paper & online) it anticipated receiving.

The statistical margin of error flowing from that sort of respondent percentage would be too large to make it a credible national snapshot of population and housing.


Thursday 11 August 2016

Singing the post-Census 2016 blues


One would have to live in a deep sink hole in the middle of Australia not to have heard of the mishandling of the 2016 national census, now not so fondly known as #CensusFail.

First the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) decides to keep census participants' names and addresses (without informed consent) for between four years or until after death– whichever takes its fancy.

It does this so it can match the individual with other records held by government departments to create a super database packed to the brim with sensitive information.

This information goes beyond who you are, where you live and the makeup of your household – it's also how much you earn, how much tax you pay, what illnesses you have been diagnosed with, what prescription drugs you take, how many times you visit the doctor, how many speeding fines you paid, if you have been brought before the court, the sentence you received and, much more.

All this is gathered under a unique Statistical Linkage Key (SLK-581) which follows you forever through census after census after census.

This is what these keys look like:


How do I know that this is what an SLK looks like?

Because an SLK is generated according to a standard formula and the Australian Government not only helpfully lets everyone know what that formula is, it even provides an online open access key generator for our use.

Now one would think that because most people were being manoeuvred into encouraged to fill in the Census form online on 9 August 2016 that the platform ABS was using would be very secure.

However, it turns out that in order to allow people with older versions of Windows on their home computer to access the census form online the ABS decided to have the website support the SHA-1 hashing algorithm long considered to be insecure.

Leaving it vulnerable to man-in-the-middle encryption downgrade attacks which can make it easier to intercept data being sent.

Here is a breakdown of website vulnerabilities from High Tech Bridge
www.census.abs.gov.au SSL/TLS Security Test on 29 July 2016:

The server does not prefer cipher suites providing strong Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS). We advise to configure your server to prefer cipher suites with ECDHE or DHE key exchange.
The HTTP version of the website does not redirect to the HTTPS version. We advise to enable redirection.
The server does not send the HTTP-Strict-Transport-Security. We advise to enable it to enforce the user to browse the website in HTTPS.
The server does not send HTTP-Public-Key-Pinning header. We advise to enable HPKP in order to avoid Man-In-The-Middle attacks.
TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV extension prevents protocol downgrade attacks. We advise to update your TLS engine to support it.
Preferred cipher suite for each protocol supported (except SSLv2). Expected configuration are ciphers allowed by PCI DSS and enabling PFS:
TLSv1.0 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHAMisconfiguration or weakness
TLSv1.1 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHAMisconfiguration or weakness
TLSv1.2 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256Misconfiguration or weakness
Third party content (such as images, JavaScript, or CSS) is loaded from external resources. Despite that for some web applications it can significantly improve loading time, it may also put website visitor's privacy at risk, as information about website visitors become accessible to these third-party content providers. ​Moreover, a third-party content delivered via HTTP and not HTTPS channel may also expose your privacy.
HTTP methods (or verbs) that are allowed by the server. Some may be dangerous if not handled properly by the application.

Then other security issues raised their heads including the fact that census answers may not always be encrypted for the entire journey from the keyboard to IBM on the SoftLayer cloud.

By then the Australian Bureau of Statistics was on social media telling people they will be fined if they refuse to answer all the questions on the census form.

Doubts also began to pop up as to whether stream10.census.abs.gov.au would be able to handle the millions of people logging in on Census Night.

Predictably it couldn't and suddenly there is multiple choice blame being handed out.

It's all the fault of:
a) evil hackers;
b) malicious furriners mounting denial of service attacks;
c) lazy people not filling out their online forms out days ahead of time; or
d) political plotters wanting to embarrass the Turnbull Government.

Reddit user mykro76 via @Qldaar on 10 August 2016 is probably closer to the mark:


The call is now going out to ditch the 9 August Census and try again at a later date if the government demographers can get their act together.

This is one example:


Monday 8 August 2016

#CensusFail: Dear Magistrate, sincerely Anna


Well this is one of the guarded front doors for all the world to see......

Alternative names:
www.census.abs.gov.au

stream00.census.abs.gov.au
stream10.census.abs.gov.au
stream20.census.abs.gov.au
stream12.census.abs.gov.au
stream13.census.abs.gov.au
stream21.census.abs.gov.au
stream22.census.abs.gov.au
stream23.census.abs.gov.au
stream31.census.abs.gov.au
stream32.census.abs.gov.au
stream33.census.abs.gov.au
stream41.census.abs.gov.au
stream42.census.abs.gov.au
stream43.census.abs.gov.au
cdn1.census.abs.gov.au
cdn2.census.abs.gov.au

Excerpt from High Tech Bridge, www.census.abs.gov.au SSL/TLS Security Test, 29 July 2016:

The server does not prefer cipher suites providing strong Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS). We advise to configure your server to prefer cipher suites with ECDHE or DHE key exchange.
The HTTP version of the website does not redirect to the HTTPS version. We advise to enable redirection.
The server does not send the HTTP-Strict-Transport-Security. We advise to enable it to enforce the user to browse the website in HTTPS.
The server does not send HTTP-Public-Key-Pinning header. We advise to enable HPKP in order to avoid Man-In-The-Middle attacks.
TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV extension prevents protocol downgrade attacks. We advise to update your TLS engine to support it.
Preferred cipher suite for each protocol supported (except SSLv2). Expected configuration are ciphers allowed by PCI DSS and enabling PFS:
TLSv1.0 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHAMisconfiguration or weakness
TLSv1.1 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHAMisconfiguration or weakness
TLSv1.2 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256Misconfiguration or weakness
Third party content (such as images, JavaScript, or CSS) is loaded from external resources. Despite that for some web applications it can significantly improve loading time, it may also put website visitor's privacy at risk, as information about website visitors become accessible to these third-party content providers. ​Moreover, a third-party content delivered via HTTP and not HTTPS channel may also expose your privacy.
HTTP methods (or verbs) that are allowed by the server. Some may be dangerous if not handled properly by the application.

Now where are those back doors to all that sensitive personal information? Hmmmm....

Salinger Privacy, 6 August 2016:

Dear Magistrate,

In case the ABS is prosecuting me for non-completion of this year’s Census, I thought I should explain to you my reasons why I have decided that a boycott is the only moral position I can take.

The short version is this:  Yes to a national snapshot.  No to detailed data-linking on individuals.  That’s not what a census is for.

I have wrestled with what my personal position should be.  I am normally a fan of the Census.  It has an important role to play in how we as a people are governed.  As a former public servant with a policy and research background, I believe in evidence-based policy decisions.  As a parent and a citizen, I want good quality data to help governments decide where to build the next school or hospital, or how to best direct aged care funding, or tackle indigenous disadvantage.

But as a former Deputy Privacy Commissioner, and a privacy consultant for the past 12 years, I can also see the privacy risks in what the ABS is doing.

Months ago I wrote an explanation of all the privacy risks caused by the ABS’s decision to keep and use name and address information for data-linking, in the hope that reason would prevail.  I was assuming that public and political pressure would force the ABS to drop the proposal (as they did in 2006 when I was Chair of the Australian Privacy Foundation and we spoke up about it).  Lots of people (as well as one penguin, the marvellous Brenda, the Civil Disobedience Penguin), are now coming to realise the risks and speak out against them, but right now, just a few days out, it looks like the ABS is pushing ahead regardless.

There are those who say that we shouldn’t boycott the Census because it is too important.  To them I say:  Bollocks.  (If you pardon my language, Your Worship.)  We know where that ‘too big to fail’ argument leads: to more arrogance, more heavy-handed treatment of citizens, more privacy invasions.

And there are the demographers who say the Census data should be linked to other health records like PBS prescription records, because if we as patients were asked for our identifiable health data directly, we would refuse to answer.  To them I say:  Hello, THAT’S THE POINT!  It’s my health information, not yours.  You should ask me nicely, and persuade me about your public interest research purpose, if you want access to my identifiable health records.  Maybe then I will say yes.  But going behind people’s backs because they would refuse their consent if asked is not what the National Health & Medical Research Council’s National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research is about.

This morning I suddenly realised: the ABS is behaving like a very, very bad boyfriend.  He keeps on breaking promises, pushing boundaries and disappointing you, but you forgive him each time.  You don’t want to call him out in case then he gets angry and dumps you.  So you just put up with it, and grumble over drinks to your girlfriends.

And this bad boyfriend keeps saying these reassuring things, like “oh we’ll only keep the data for four years”, and “the names and addresses are in a separate database”.  To that I say:  Nice try, but that’s a red herring.

Although there are certainly heightened privacy and security risks of accidental loss or malicious misuse with storing names and addresses, the deliberate privacy invasion starts with the use of that data to create a Statistical Linkage Key (SLK) for each individual, to use in linking data from other sources.  Please don’t believe that SLKs offer anonymity.  SLKs are easy to generate, with the same standard used across multiple datasets.  That’s the whole point: so that you can link data about a particular individual.  For example, Malcolm Turnbull would be known by the SLK URBAL241019541 in the type of datasets the ABS wants to match Census data against, including mental health services (yes, mental health!) and other health records, disability services records, early childhood records, community services records, as well as data about housing assistance and homelessness.

Anyone with access to these types of health and human services datasets can search for individuals by generating and searching against their SLK.  All you need to know is their first and last names, gender and date of birth.  Scott Morrison is ORICO130519681.  Kylie Minogue is INGYL280519682.  Deltra Goodrem is OOREL091119842.  Now tell me that their privacy will be absolutely protected if their Census data is coded the same way.

Never mind four years; the ABS could destroy all the actual name and address data after only four days or four seconds – but if they have already used it to generate an SLK for each individual Census record, the privacy damage has been done.

(Oh, and that line about how “we’ve never had a privacy breach with Census data”?  To that I say:  Great!  Let’s keep it that way!  DON’T COLLECT NAMES.)

So I say no.  No.  I am not putting up with that bad boyfriend any longer.  I believe in the importance of the Census, which is why I am so damn pissed off (sorry again Your Worship) that the ABS is being such a bad boyfriend to the Australian people: trashing not only our privacy, but the value of our data too.  It’s time to break up with them.

I have come to this decision with a heavy heart.  I am normally a law-abiding citizen.  Plus, I don’t really fancy facing a $180 fine for every day that I refuse to comply with a direction to complete the Census, with no cap on the number of days.  (Seriously, what kind of heavy-handed law is that?  Are you really going to keep hitting me with daily fines for the rest of my life, Your Worship?)

I know that I could give the ABS misinformation instead.  Say my name is Boaty McBoatface and that I am a 97 year old man living with 8 wives, that I have 14 cars, my language at home is Gibberish and that my religion is Jedi.  Giving misinformation is a common, rational response by about three in ten people who want to protect their privacy when faced with the collection of personal data they have no choice about.  Of course, that is also a crime in relation to the Census, but at least that one maxes out at an $1,800 fine.

But I won’t do that, because I do believe in the integrity of the census data.  I don’t want people to have to give misinformation in order to protect themselves.  We shouldn’t be placed in that position.

The definition of ‘census’ is “an official count”.  I actually want to stand up and be counted.  Butonly counted; not named or profiled or data-matched or data-linked, or anything else.  The privacy risks of doing anything else are just too great.

I have thought about just refusing to provide my name.  But even if I don’t give my name, if the ABS is determined to link my Census data with other datasets, there would be enough other information in my Census answers (sex, age, home address, previous home address, work address) to let them proceed regardless.  It won’t be enough to protect my privacy.

So until the ABS reverses its decision to match Census data about individuals with other datasets about individuals, I am not going to answer the Census questions at all.

I am sorry, Your Worship.  I don’t like being forced to choose, because I believe Australians deserve to have both good quality statistical data for government decision-making, AND their privacy respected.  But on Tuesday night, I will choose privacy.

The Census should be a national snapshot, not a tool for detailed data-linking on every individual.  Now convict and fine me if you disagree.

Yours sincerely,

Anna Johnston