Showing posts with label telecommunications. Show all posts
Showing posts with label telecommunications. Show all posts

Wednesday 9 June 2010

Conroy denies vendetta, but how many believe him?

Australian Communications Minister Senator Stephen Conroy was quick off the mark to deny any suggestion that his referral of Google Inc to the Australian Federal Police over its StreetView cars collecting digital information which they had no right to access.
Still, it's easy to imagine that he was filled with gleeful anticipation as he set the train in motion, against what he refers to as the "creepy" IT giant.
However Stevo appears more interested in getting his own hands on what he believes this data contains:
"(If) you were doing a banking transaction, or transmitting personal information, they could have hoovered it up, sucked it up into their machine," he told ABC TV yesterday.
"What we want to ensure now is that we get access to the information that's been collected.
"We want to know where it's stored, we want to know what the information is, and importantly we want to ensure that Google don't destroy this information."
(Google has denied that it could read encrypted banking transactions).
Personally I'd be more worried about the Minister for Censorship & Moral Policing getting hold of any information downloaded from unsecured wireless connections, than I would be about Google having it.
Stevo's full frontal assault on basic freedoms in this country knows no bounds.

Thursday 3 June 2010

The true nature of Stephen Conroy?


"This week, I spent longer inside the mind of media minister Stephen Conroy than I would necessarily recommend.

The reason was as we've written in various posts his performance at the Senate Estimates Committee.

Reading the transcript has, I must admit, made me change my mind about him.

You see, when he was saying some of the more extreme stuff about his proposed internet filter over the last few months, I assumed it was just politics. I thought he was grandstanding on family values while of course knowing that it wouldn't fly.

But when you read his thoughts (you can find the 131 page transcript here if you like), it's enough to make you think again about him both as a person and as a minister.

(A slight declaration of interest at this point - unlike Rupert Murdoch, I've sat next to Conroy at dinner, within a few days of him being appointed. At that stage he seemed thoroughly affable, if more interested in talking about soccer than media policy.)

But the person who comes across in the transcript is a sneering, sarcastic grudge-bearing point scorer. And one who won't give a straight answer to a straight question, at that."

More from Tim Burrowes writing for MUmBRELLA here.

Stevo continued to cement his reputation as the federal pollie most loose-with-the truth (after el supremo o' teh lie Tony Abbott) when he was caught out by one Aussie ISP - "Don't claim we support filter, iiNet tells Conroy".

SMH online poll around 7am last Monday

By 6.30am on the second day 1st June 2010 the poll count was 85,271 - still running 99% against the Rudd-Conroy plan to censor the Australian Internet.

Monday 24 May 2010

Lesser books you may have missed


Where ever I looked in the Oz blogosphere last week we were all being so deadly serious, so 'twas a relief to come across this #lesserbooks tag at Twitter.
Here's a small selection of titles on offer:

A Basement Master's Guide (Second Edition)
The Color Mauve
Pedagogy of the Depressed
A Clear and Present Annoyance
The Scarlet Debtor
Diary of a Cake Fiend
Tupac Kills A Mockingbird
Horton Hears a Where
War and Peas
Prude and Prejudice
The Maltseser Falcon
The Hitchhiker's Guide to Montana
Gone With the Breeze
Apprehension and Disapproval In Las Vegas
The Lion, The Witch and the Cupboard
The 38 steps
The Norwich Outpatient
Lard Times
Thus Spoke Uncle Bert

Saturday 8 May 2010

Internet censorship - here's laffin' at you Stevo



Fair dinkum, it can't get better than this - proof positive that Stevo is a 24 carat dill.

Australian Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy, Stephen Conroy according to ITNews on the 4th May 2010: "ISPs will not be required to block circumvention attempts by their customers or end users," he said.
While he said it would be "irresponsible" of the Government to publish circumvention techniques, the Government took no measures to prevent other organisations from doing so."

The Australian Office of Privacy Commissioner on the same day giving Internet security tips highlighting circumnavigation techniques:

Anonymous Web Browsing

Use anonymous web surfing services such as:

Further tips are available in Thomas C Greene's anonymity tips article published by The Register.

Friday 7 May 2010

It is 2010 isn't it - not 1950?


Sometimes one has to shake the head in wonderment.

Excerpt from a New Matilda article:

Apple's portable devices like the iPhone and the iPad are unlike laptop or desktop computers in that new applications can only be obtained through Apple's centralised App Store, a global marketplace for mobile applications and content. For an application to be available in the App Store, it must first be reviewed by Apple. The set of criteria on which the applications are appraised are not quite clear. According to Apple:

"Applications may be rejected if they contain content or materials of any kind (text, graphics, images, photographs, sounds, etc.) that in Apple's reasonable judgement may be found objectionable, for example, materials that may be considered obscene, pornographic, or defamatory."

While many applications get rejected for solid technical reasons, there are some recent controversial examples of applications that have fallen foul of these content rules.

The restrictions on "objectionable" content, for example, have led to several dictionary applications being rejected on the grounds that they contain obscene entries. And an electronic book reader was rejected because, among thousands of titles, it gave users access to the Kama Sutra.

The introduction of an adults-only category for applications eased some of these restrictions in that dictionaries were no longer censored — but any content more adult than a picture of a bikini-clad model is still unlikely to be approved.

Thursday 22 April 2010

So which blog did an Australian government ask Google to trash?



Article 19 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights states that "everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers." Written in 1948, the principle applies aptly to today's Internet -- one of the most important means of free expression in the world. Yet government censorship of the web is growing rapidly: from the outright blocking and filtering of sites, to court orders limiting access to information and legislation forcing companies to self-censor content.

So it's no surprise that Google, like other technology and telecommunications companies, regularly receives demands from government agencies to remove content from our services. Of course many of these requests are entirely legitimate, such as requests for the removal of child pornography. We also regularly receive requests from law enforcement agencies to hand over private user data. Again, the vast majority of these requests are valid and the information needed is for legitimate criminal investigations. However, data about these activities historically has not been broadly available. We believe that greater transparency will lead to less censorship.

We are today launching a new
Government Requests tool to give people information about the requests for user data or content removal we receive from government agencies around the world. For this launch, we are using data from July-December, 2009, and we plan to update the data in 6-month increments. Read this post to learn more about our principles surrounding free expression and controversial content on the web.

Here is the raw data for Australian government requests received by Google between July 1, 2009 and December 31, 2009:
  • 155 data requests
  • 17 removal requests
    • 52.9% of removal requests fully or partially complied with.
    • 1 Blogger
    • 1 Geo (except Street View)
    • 1 Web Search
    • 14 YouTube
This data does not include any blocking requests or requests to remove child pornography and, the statistics primarily cover requests in criminal matters including information concerning Google user account details or products.

Which leaves an interesting question hanging in the air.
Which blog did the Rudd Government (or one of the state governments) ask Google to remove from the Internet and did Google comply?

Thursday 18 March 2010

Friday 26 February 2010

Microsoft threatens & Networks disables whistleblower website, but......


Everytime one turns around some government or multinational corporation appears to be gathering data concerning our lives and habits and, in the process attempting to treat citizens/customers as though they have little or no right to know the extent of these activities.

This time it was Microsoft's turn to be outed and Cryptome posted a downloadable file titled Microsoft Spy Guide which contained the company document Microsoft Global Criminal Compliance Handbook, March 2008.

This document opens with information concerning its online Free Email Services @hotmail.com @msn.com @live.com, Authentication Service: Windows Live ID, Instant Messaging: Windows Live Messenger, Social Networking Services: Windows Live Spaces & MSN Groups, Custom Domains: Windows Live Admin Center & Office Live Small Business, Online File Storage: Office Live Workspace & Windows Live SkyDrive, and Gaming: Xbox Live :

Microsoft Online Services will respond to emergency requests outside of normal business hours if the emergency involves "the danger of death or physical injury to any person…" as permitted in 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(8) and (c)(4). Emergencies are limited to situations like kidnapping, murder threats, bomb threats, terrorism threats, etc. If you have an emergency request, please call the law enforcement hotline at

(425) 722-1299.....

Microsoft has established local contacts within your country or region to handle legal process related to Microsoft Online Services. If you are not already familiar with your local contact, please e-mail the Global Criminal Compliance team at globalcc@microsoft.com, and you will be directed to the local contact handling requests from your country.

All legal process for criminal matters from non-U.S. law enforcement, prosecutors and courts must be directed to Microsoft Corporation, One Microsoft Way, Redmond, WA 98052 and not to Microsoft's local subsidiary as all Microsoft Online Services customer data is stored in the U.S. Your local contact will be able to educate you as to what local process must be followed in order to obtain online services customer account records from Microsoft.


Details of the war of words between the whistleblower website and Microsoft can be found at The People's Forum. Cryptome itself is no longer accessible on the Internet as of yesterday 25 February 2010.

However, as usual netizens reacted and now the original Crypotme document (1.75MB PDF or 29KB TXT) can be found at Scribd here.

Why the Microsoft Corporation feels that its customers should not be aware of the extent of their potential exposure (due to company policy and legislated requirements under U.S. law), or why it wants to embarrass itself by drawing attention to a posted copy of the document it was wishing to conceal, remains a mystery.

This desire to hide from the general public its ability and willingness to data gather and store information over long periods is an attitude it appears to share with other big corporations and government agencies around the world.

Aw tell me it ain't so, Stevo! You haven't gone and nobbled a government website?


This is the content of the very small tag cloud found on the Dept. of Broadband, Communications, Digital Economy and Compulsory National Censorship webpage Senator the Hon. Stephen Conroy, Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy,Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate:

NBN Broadband
National Broadband
Network ABC
Broadcasting National Broadcasters
SBS Digital Switchover
Digital Television Youth Advisory Group
Cyber-Safety
Internet Budget E-Health
Mobile Services

Looks unexceptional don't it?
Then someone on a Whirlpool forum asked themselves a question. Why isn't the search term "ISP filtering" or similar up there somewhere?
After all that term is found in about 63 media releases archived on the website and presumably cyber visitors go looking.

Oh noes! came the answer, the word cloud has been nobbled!

Filtering already begun! :)

User #185532 8 posts
Forum Regular

I find this one rather humorous, on Conroy's website, if you take a look at the right hand side there is the "cloud" for searched items, the more searched the phrase or word is, the larger the item is.

Looking at the source code of the site, there is the entire list of words that the script uses to determine the cloud words and how prevelant they are. Basically breaks it down to an array, counts and then sets the size based on how frequent it is etc...

In the script that generates the cloud, there is a line that says basically if the seach term is "ISP Filtering" to skip and go onto the next.

In the time I was on the site, there were about 16 instances of "ISP Filtering" in the cloud, and only about 5 instances of E-Health, though ISP Filtering did not show in the cloud....

Anyway just a funny, and some food for thought! :)

//for(var i=0; i<unique.length; i++)
for(var i=0; i<=15/*<-Important! increase this value by 1 everytime a keyword is excluded below*/; i++)
{

var z=0;
for(var j=0; j<split.length; j++) {
if (unique[i]==split[j]) {
z=z+1;
}
counts[i] = z;
}
var size = getTagClass(z);
//Customise the tag-cloud to display what shows up
if (unique[i] == "ISP Filtering")
{
continue;
}
document.write('<a class="'+size+'" href=\"http://www.minister.dbcde.gov.au/search?q='+unique[i]+'">'+unique[i]+'</a> ');
}
document.write('</p>');
document.write('</div>');
}

EDIT: Thought I should add the URL of the site, incase people get confused with stephen-conroy.com :) This is on the minister for broadband and other random crap that he has no idea about site.... URL: http://www.minister.dbcde.gov.au/

Friday 5 February 2010

For everyone who followed the David & Goliath battle 'Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Limited' - the judgment


In Mach 2009 the Australian Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy, Senator Stephen Conroy, was reported as having rather improperly commented on a matter which was sub judice:
"I saw iiNet's defence in court under oath ... they have no idea if their customers are downloading illegally music or movies," he said today at the Commsday summit in Sydney. "Stunning defence, stunning defence," he continued in what appeared to be a sarcastic comment.
I thought a defence in terms of 'we had no idea' ... belongs in a Yes Minister episode.

This court case has now concluded and the full Australian Federal Court judgment is available here against the thirty-four applicants who took iiNet Limited to court, including Twentieth Century Fox, Warner Bros, Universal Studios, Sony Pictures and Paramount Pictures.

Perhaps the Minister might like to withdraw his words?

Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Limited (No. 3) [2010] FCA 24

SUMMARY

  1. In accordance with the practice of the Federal Court in some cases of public interest, importance or complexity, the following summary has been prepared to accompany the orders made today. This summary is intended to assist in understanding the outcome of this proceeding and is not a complete statement of the conclusions reached by the Court. The only authoritative statement of the Court's reasons is that contained in the published reasons for judgment which will be available on the internet at www.fedcourt.gov.au.
  2. The judgment in this proceeding is necessarily complicated both as to fact and law. It is also lengthy, running for 636 paragraphs and almost 200 pages. I have decided to provide short oral reasons for the judgment which I am presently to hand down. These reasons are not intended to be a substitute for reading the judgment itself which will be accessible online this morning.
  3. This proceeding raises the question whether an internet service provider or ISP authorises the infringement of copyright of its users or subscribers when they download cinematograph films in a manner which infringes copyright. In Australian copyright law, a person who authorises the infringement of copyright is treated as if they themselves infringed copyright directly.
  4. This proceeding has attracted widespread interest both here in Australia and abroad, and both within the legal community and the general public. So much so that I understand this is the first Australian trial to be twittered or tweeted. I granted approval for this to occur in view of the public interest in the proceeding, and it seems rather fitting for a copyright trial involving the internet.
  5. That this trial should have attracted such attention is unsurprising, given the subject matter. As far as I am aware, this trial, involving suit against an ISP claiming copyright infringement on its part due to alleged authorisation of the copyright infringement of its users or subscribers, is the first trial of its kind in the world to proceed to hearing and judgment.
  6. The 34 applicants who have instituted this claim represent the major motion picture studios both in Australia and the United States. They have brought this proceeding against iiNet which is the third largest ISP in Australia. An organisation known as the Australian Federation Against Copyright Theft or AFACT has, on behalf of the applicants, been prominent in the conduct of the claim.
  7. AFACT employed a company known as DtecNet to investigate copyright infringement occurring by means of a peer to peer system known as the BitTorrent protocol by subscribers and users of iiNet's services. The information generated from these investigations was then sent to iiNet by AFACT, with a demand that iiNet take action to stop the infringements occurring. The measures which AFACT requested iiNet perform were never precisely elucidated. However, as the evidence at trial indicated, AFACT wanted iiNet to send a warning to the subscriber who was allegedly infringing. If a warning was not sufficient to stop the infringement, AFACT intended that iiNet suspend the internet service of that subscriber. If the subscriber remained unco-operative, termination of the internet service was sought as the ultimate sanction. In addition, or in the alternative, the applicants suggested that iiNet should block certain websites.
  8. The evidence of infringement gathered by AFACT utilised the BitTorrent protocol, a blueprint for a highly efficient and effective mechanism to distribute large quantities of data. This protocol was created in 2001. It has been used, or more accurately, the constituent parts of the protocol (such as the client, tracker and .torrent files) have been used by those accessing the internet through iiNet's facilities (the 'iiNet users') to download the applicants' films and television shows in a manner which infringes copyright. I shall refer to the constituent parts of the BitTorrent protocol together as the BitTorrent system.
  9. The critical issue in this proceeding was whether iiNet, by failing to take any steps to stop infringing conduct, authorised the copyright infringement of certain iiNet users.
  10. The first step in making a finding of authorisation was to determine whether certain iiNet users infringed copyright. I have found that they have. However, in reaching that finding, I have found that the number of infringements that have occurred are significantly fewer than the number alleged by the applicants. This follows from my finding that, on the evidence and on a proper interpretation of the law, a person makes each film available online only once through the BitTorrent system and electronically transmits each film only once through that system. This excludes the possible case of a person who might repeatedly download the same file, but no evidence was presented of such unusual and unlikely circumstance. Further, I have found, on the evidence before me, that the iiNet users have made one copy of each film and have not made further copies onto physical media such as DVDs.
  11. The next question was whether iiNet authorised those infringements. While I find that iiNet had knowledge of infringements occurring, and did not act to stop them, such findings do not necessitate a finding of authorisation. I find that iiNet did not authorise the infringements of copyright of the iiNet users. I have reached that conclusion for three primary reasons which I now refer to.
  12. Firstly, in the law of authorisation, there is a distinction to be drawn between the provision of the 'means' of infringement compared to the provision of a precondition to infringement occurring. The decisions in Moorhouse, Jain, Metro, Cooper and Kazaa are each examples of cases in which the authorisers provided the 'means' of infringement. But, unlike those decisions, I find that the mere provision of access to the internet is not the 'means' of infringement. There does not appear to be any way to infringe the applicants' copyright from the mere use of the internet. Rather, the 'means' by which the applicants' copyright is infringed is an iiNet user's use of the constituent parts of the BitTorrent system. iiNet has no control over the BitTorrent system and is not responsible for the operation of the BitTorrent system.
  13. Secondly, I find that a scheme for notification, suspension and termination of customer accounts is not, in this instance, a relevant power to prevent copyright infringement pursuant to s 101(1A)(a) of the Copyright Act, nor in the circumstances of this case is it a reasonable step pursuant to s 101(1A)(c) of the Copyright Act. The reason for this finding is complicated and lengthy, and is not suitable for reduction to a short summary for present purposes so I shall refrain from attempting to do so.
  14. Thirdly, I find that iiNet simply cannot be seen as sanctioning, approving or countenancing copyright infringement. The requisite element of favouring infringement on the evidence simply does not exist. The evidence establishes that iiNet has done no more than to provide an internet service to its users. This can be clearly contrasted with the respondents in the Cooper and Kazaa proceedings, in which the respondents intended copyright infringements to occur, and in circumstances where the website and software respectively were deliberately structured to achieve this result.
  15. Consequently, I find that the applicants' Amended Application before me must fail. However, for the sake of completeness, I have considered all the issues argued before me.
  16. I find that the Telecommunications Act would not have operated to prohibit iiNet from acting on the AFACT Notices of infringement. However, as I have already found that iiNet did not authorise copyright infringement, such issue is irrelevant.
  17. I find that s 112E of the Copyright Act would not have operated to prevent a finding of authorisation of copyright infringement against iiNet. However, as I found on conventional principles of authorisation that the respondent did not authorise copyright infringement, such issue is irrelevant.
  18. Finally, I find that iiNet did have a repeat infringer policy which was reasonably implemented and that iiNet would therefore have been entitled to take advantage of the safe harbour provisions in Division 2AA of Part V of the Copyright Act if it needed to do so. I have drawn assistance from United States authority dealing with similar statutory instruments in making the finding. While iiNet did not have a policy of the kind that the applicants believed was required, it does not follow that iiNet did not have a policy which complied with the safe harbour provisions. However, as I have not found that iiNet authorised copyright infringement, there is no need for iiNet to take advantage of the protection provided by such provisions.
  19. The result of this proceeding will disappoint the applicants. The evidence establishes that copyright infringement of the applicants' films is occurring on a large scale, and I infer that such infringements are occurring worldwide. However, such fact does not necessitate or compel, and can never necessitate or compel, a finding of authorisation, merely because it is felt that 'something must be done' to stop the infringements. An ISP such as iiNet provides a legitimate communication facility which is neither intended nor designed to infringe copyright. It is only by means of the application of the BitTorrent system that copyright infringements are enabled, although it must be recognised that the BitTorrent system can be used for legitimate purposes as well. iiNet is not responsible if an iiNet user chooses to make use of that system to bring about copyright infringement.
  20. The law recognises no positive obligation on any person to protect the copyright of another. The law only recognises a prohibition on the doing of copyright acts without the licence of the copyright owner or exclusive licensee, or the authorisation of those acts. In the circumstances outlined above and discussed in greater detail in my judgment, it is impossible to conclude that iiNet has authorised copyright infringement.
  21. In summary, in this proceeding, the key question is: Did iiNet authorise copyright infringement? The Court answers such question in the negative for three reasons: first because the copyright infringements occurred directly as a result of the use of the BitTorrent system, not the use of the internet, and the respondent did not create and does not control the BitTorrent system; second because the respondent did not have a relevant power to prevent those infringements occurring; and third because the respondent did not sanction, approve or countenance copyright infringement.
  22. I will now make my formal orders. For the reasons provided in the written judgment I make the following orders.
    1. The Amended Application be dismissed.
    2. Subject to Order 3 and 4, the Applicants pay the costs of the Respondent, including costs thrown away as a result of the Applicants' abandoning the primary infringement claim against the Respondent.
    3. Any party or person applying for an order for costs different to that provided by Order 2 is to notify the Court within 14 days in which event Order 2 will be vacated and in lieu costs will be reserved.
    4. If any application for costs is made as provided in Order 3 the parties and/or persons are to consult and prepare consent directions for the filing of submissions and, if required, for a hearing on costs.
  23. I publish my reasons.

Cowdroy J
Sydney
4 February 2010



iiNet's reaction to the judgment
AFACT's reaction

Friday 29 January 2010

DBCDE is sending out emails on Conroy's mad Internet censorship scheme




A short, snappy (and blatantly untruthful) version of the Rudd Government's plan to censor the Australian Internet from an email sent out last week by the Department of Broadband, Communication and the Digital Economy.

Better be careful what you say about Stephen Conroy on Twitter then. No more threatening to set his undies on fire or vote him out of the Senate! ;-)

Sunday 24 January 2010

EFA questions about mandatory national ISP-level Internet filtering which shoud be answered by Austrlaia's Comminications Minister


Colin Jacobs of Electronic Frontiers Australia has posted the following questions for the Australian Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy:

The top 10 filtering questions yet to be answered

The Rudd Government's mandatory ISP filtering bill will soon be introduced into Parliament, and we can only hope that the debate there will focus more on the real merits of the scheme – which are few and far between – than empty rhetoric about protecting children. When the debate happens, here are some questions the Government needs to answer under the glare of public scrutiny.

1. Given the trouble and expense of this policy, you must have some pretty convincing evidence that children are being constantly exposed to RC material. How was your research conducted and will it be released to the public?

(In fact, research indicates that of all the threats kids face online, accidental exposure to disturbing content is about the least significant.)

2. Two-thirds of Internet-connected households don't have school-age children. Isn't forcing a filter onto them as well as businesses unnecessary?

(We have never heard a cogent explanation why the filter should be mandatory and not opt-in, or why it's a better solution than more comprehensive and customisable PC-based filters.)

3. Given the reasonably poor uptake of filters by parents in the past, what makes you so sure the Australian people want a filter at a national level?

(Survey data shows that parents who don't install filters do so mainly because they consider them unnecessary or too restrictive, not for technical or cost reasons.)

4. Why did you meet with the Australian Christian Lobby before making last week's announcements? Have you met with groups opposed to the filter?

(Conroy's office ignores our polite requests to make our case.)

5. In targeting child pornography, isn't the blacklist mechanism, which relies on the media regulator and the Australian public, a poor way to track down this material compared to investigations by law enforcement professionals?

(Illegal material is not typically published on the open web, and when it is, is usually taken down quickly.)

6. In the past you have indicated that the blacklist will include material imported from overseas groups like the Internet Watch Foundation. Is it still the case that lists prepared by unaccountable third parties overseas might be part of Australian censorship?

(The Internet Watch Foundation's list caused controversy in Britain when it added a Wikipedia page to its list in 2008.)

7. The Enex trial indicated tests at speeds far below those promised by the new National Broadband Network. Won't the filter interfere with the rollout of this much more important project?

(We can't understand why the Government is pursuing the filtering policy so zealously when the $43 billion NBN is so clearly a higher priority for the country.)

8. Experts say than an ISP filter is easy to circumvent by anyone who wants to. Doesn't that undermine the usefulness of the entire enterprise?

(It's inevitable that getting around the filter will be easy. Therefore, it only prevents accidental access to any site on the list.)

9. When they reach banned websites, will Australians see a message from the government informing them why the page was blocked, or will the page just refuse to load?

(We have many more worries about transparency in the system, especially concerning the oversight of the list itself.)

10. What would stop some future conservative governments adding to the blacklist in a campaign against dangerous or immoral content?

(Of course, this question only has one answer: Nothing. Once the blacklisting has begun, it's hard to imagine it will never expand, let alone ever be rolled back.)

Sadly, EFA suspects that if these issues have been considered at all by the Government, they do not have good answers ready. We maintain that until all of them can be addressed satisfactorily, mandatory ISP filtering amounts to nothing more than a political stunt designed to wedge the opposition and garner some easy votes.

Friday 15 January 2010

How green is the Internet?


How green is the Internet? Not green at all would have to be the answer to that question.

Information and communication technology is said to directly contribute a whopping 2% of global carbon emissions according to Bell Labs research and the average network user consumes an estimated 25 watts of energy.

This means that worldwide the use of landlines, mobile phones, blackberries, personal computers etc. result in more greenhouse gas emissions in a year than total annual emission levels from entire countries like Australia and, the industry's carbon levels are expected to more than double over the next decade if communication technology is allowed to continue as usual.

In an effort to reduce this dismal state of affairs a consortium (which includes the University of Melbourne's Institute for a Broadband-Enabled Society) has formed under the banner Green Touch to work towards an energy efficiency level, via changes in coding techniques which might eventually see the world's communications networks run for three years on the energy it currently takes to collectively power these networks for a day.

ITNews reports that the Australian Government already spent $1.411 million over three consecutive financial years on investigations used to create the nucleus of the URL blacklist it intends to use to censor the Internet from mid-2011, but what will the cost be in carbon terms once ISPs operating in this country have to run a mandatory filtering program against the online activity of every Australian user?

Wednesday 6 January 2010

The King Canute of Cyberspace! (Yes, I'm laughing at you, Kevin Rudd)


For a man who appeared to hold some promise when he became Australia's prime minister in November 2007, Kevin Rudd is now descending into absurdity with the eager assistance of Communications Minister Stephen Conroy.

Their plan to impose mandatory ISP-level filtering on Australian Internet access via a URL blacklist is an expensive joke perpetrated by the right-wing of the ruling Labor Party.

A scheme allegedly created to protect children by partially blocking access to the world wide web for 21 million or so citizens - many millions of whom don't appear to have dependant children living in their homes.

This pathetic ACMA-inspired blacklist currently stands at around a thousand website/page addresses and is expected to grow once national digital censorship is imposed.

However, there is not hardware or filtering software available to Australian servers with which to blanket filter the entire indexed Web before it reaches Australian citizens, without either these servers malfunctioning dramatically or just quietly letting most of those supposed 'nasties' slip through their nets.

This is what the Google Inc. official blog said in 2008 about the number of URLs already out there in cyberspace:

We've known it for a long time: the web is big. The first Google index in 1998 already had 26 million pages, and by 2000 the Google index reached the one billion mark. Over the last eight years, we've seen a lot of big numbers about how much content is really out there. Recently, even our search engineers stopped in awe about just how big the web is these days -- when our systems that process links on the web to find new content hit a milestone: 1 trillion (as in 1,000,000,000,000) unique URLs on the web at once!

How do we find all those pages? We start at a set of well-connected initial pages and follow each of their links to new pages. Then we follow the links on those new pages to even more pages and so on, until we have a huge list of links. In fact, we found even more than 1 trillion individual links, but not all of them lead to unique web pages. Many pages have multiple URLs with exactly the same content or URLs that are auto-generated copies of each other. Even after removing those exact duplicates, we saw a trillion unique URLs, and the number of individual web pages out there is growing by several billion pages per day.

So how many unique pages does the web really contain? We don't know; we don't have time to look at them all! :-) Strictly speaking, the number of pages out there is infinite -- for example, web calendars may have a "next day" link, and we could follow that link forever, each time finding a "new" page. We're not doing that, obviously, since there would be little benefit to you. But this example shows that the size of the web really depends on your definition of what's a useful page, and there is no exact answer.

We don't index every one of those trillion pages -- many of them are similar to each other, or represent auto-generated content similar to the calendar example that isn't very useful to searchers. But we're proud to have the most comprehensive index of any search engine, and our goal always has been to index all the world's data.

To keep up with this volume of information, our systems have come a long way since the first set of web data Google processed to answer queries. Back then, we did everything in batches: one workstation could compute the PageRank graph on 26 million pages in a couple of hours, and that set of pages would be used as Google's index for a fixed period of time. Today, Google downloads the web continuously, collecting updated page information and re-processing the entire web-link graph several times per day. This graph of one trillion URLs is similar to a map made up of one trillion intersections. So multiple times every day, we do the computational equivalent of fully exploring every intersection of every road in the United States. Except it'd be a map about 50,000 times as big as the U.S., with 50,000 times as many roads and intersections.


Now how is your pathetic little blacklist going to keep up with that, Prime Minister?
Or are you intending (once this censorship becomes Australian law) to approach Google Inc. with a view to this corporation creating a censored google.com.au for Australia, as it did for its search engine in that notoriously authoritarian regime China?

Photo from Google Images

Wednesday 23 December 2009

Kevin Rudd gets anti-censorship mail from Paris


From Reporters Without Borders:

The Hon Kevin Michael Rudd
Prime Minister
Parliament House
Canberra ACT 2600 Australia

Paris, 18 December 2009

Dear Prime Minister,

Reporters Without Borders, an organisation that defends free expression worldwide, would like to share with you its concern about your government's plan to introduce a mandatory Internet filtering system. While it is essential to combat child sex abuse, pursuing this draconian filtering project is not the solution. If Australia were to introduce systematic online content filtering, with a relatively broad definition of the content targeted, it would be joining an Internet censors club that includes such countries as China, Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Communications minister Stephen Conroy announced on 15 December that, after a year of testing in partnership with Australian Internet service providers (ISPs), your government intended to introduce legislation imposing mandatory filtering of websites with pornographic, paedophile or particularly violent content.

Reporters Without Borders would like to draw your attention to the risks that this plan entails for freedom of expression.

Firstly, the decision to block access to an "inappropriate" website would be taken not by a judge but by a government agency, the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA). Such a procedure, without a court decision, does not satisfy the requirements of the rule of law. The ACMA classifies content secretly, compiling a website blacklist by means of unilateral and arbitrary administrative decision-making. Other procedures are being considered but none of them would involve a judge.

Secondly, the criteria that the proposed law would use are too vague. Filtering would be applied to all content considered "inappropriate," a very slippery term that could be interpreted very differently by different people. In all probability, filtering would target "refused classification" (RC) sites, a category that is extremely controversial as it is being applied to content that is completely unrelated to efforts to combat child sex abuse and sexual violence, representing a dangerous censorship option. Subjects such as abortion, anorexia, aborigines and legislation on the sale of marijuana would all risk being filtered, as would media reports on these subjects.

The choice of filtering techniques has not been clearly defined. Would it be filtering by key-words, URL text or something else? And what about the ISPs that are supposed to carry out the filtering at the government's request? Will they be blamed, will they be accused of complicity in child sex abuse if the filtering proves to be ineffective, as it almost certainly will?

Your government claims that the filtering will be 100 per cent effective but this is clearly impossible. Experts all over the world agree that no filtering system is effective at combating this kind of content. On the one hand, such a system filters sites that should not be affected (such as sites about the psychology of child sexuality or paedophile crime news). And on the other, it fails to filter targeted sites because their URLs contain key-words that are completely unrelated to their content, or because their content (photo and text) is registered under completely neutral terms. Furthermore, people who are determined to visit such sites will know how to avoid the filtering by, for example, using proxy servers or censorship circumvention software or both.

The Wikileaks website highlighted the limitations of such as system when it revealed that the ACMA blacklist of already banned websites contained many with nothing reprehensible in their content. According to Wikileaks, the blacklist included the Abortion TV website, some of the pages of Wikileaks itself, online poker sites, gay networks, sites dealing with euthanasia, Christian sites, a tour operator's site and even a Queensland dentist's site.

The US company Google has also voiced strong reservations. Google Australia's head of policy, Iarla Flynn, said yesterday: "Moving to a mandatory ISP filtering regime with a scope that goes well beyond such material is heavy handed and can raise genuine questions about restrictions on access to information."

As regards paedophilia, the most dangerous places on the Internet are websites offering chat and email services. So if this project were taken to its logical conclusion, access to sites such as Gmail, Yahoo and Skype would also have to be blocked, which would of course be impossible.

There are more effective ways to combat child pornography, including tracking cyber-criminals online (by means of cookies, IP address comparison, and so on), combined with police investigation into suspects and their online habits. Why did your government end the programme launched by the previous government, which made free filtering systems available to Australian families? This procedure had the merit of being adapted to individual needs and gave each home the possibility of shielding its children from porn.

A real national debate is needed on this subject but your communications minister, Stephen Conroy, made such a debate very difficult by branding his critics as supporters of child pornography. An opportunity was lost for stimulating a constructive exchange of ideas.

We also regret the lack of transparency displayed by your government as regards the tests carried out in recent months using procedures that have been kept secret. Your government paid some 300,000 Australian dollars to ISPs to finance the tests. Australian taxpayers have a right to be given detailed information about the results.

Finally, you must be aware that this initiative is a source of a concern for your compatriots. In a recent Fairfax Media poll of 20,000 people, 96 per cent were strongly opposed to such a mandatory Internet filtering system, while around 120,000 Australians have signed a petition against Internet censorship launched by the online activist group GetUp. The withdrawal of this proposal would therefore satisfy public opinion as well as prevent a democratic country from introducing a system that threatens freedom of expression.

I thank you in advance for the consideration you give to our recommendations.

Sincerely,

Jean-François Julliard
Secretary-General

Sunday 20 December 2009

The Oz Minister for Censorshop speaks. I reply


"Australia stands on the cusp of a digital transformation."
So says the Oz Minister for censorsip on the DBCDE website in the same week he announced that the Internet will be censored and then told a whole heap of pork pies about his decision.

There's only one reply possible:

Thursday 17 December 2009

Stephen Conroy - mass murderer?



Memo to the Australian Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy: This is the type of publicity a censor-in-chief receives. You may ban this image as offensive but you will never be able to ban its Internet distribution.