Take a good look, Prime Minister Rudd - your numbers are not looking so rosy

Take a good look, Prime Minister Rudd.
This is the current state of play in relation to opinion change according to Possum Comitatus and it is not as healthy a situation as Labor might like or have expected:

Credibility in the areas Possum highligts are not your only problem.

Websites listed as participating in The Great Australian Internet Blackout (and the thousands of Twitter accounts blacking out atavars) on 26 January 2010 represent just a fraction of the votes which will probably not go to Labor candidates at the next federal election, if you go ahead with your flawed plan to impose mandatory ISP-level Internet filtering on the Australian people.

These sites form part of a demographic which is spread right across every seat you will have to contest in 2010. Can you really afford to keep riling voters in this way in the lead up to what may yet be a closely fought election in rural and regional Australia?

Just how expensive will the 2010 federal election campaign be?

Starting to wonder just how much money the major political parties will p*ss down the drain during the 2010 federal election campaign?
The 2007 election was a pretty expensive and wasteful affair and this one will have to equal it, if only because of the level of noisy desperation which is bound to consume Abbott and his mates.
An Australian Electoral Commission media release on 29 January reminded us of just how much the pollies spent trying to swing our votes last time round.
The actual 2008-09 disclosure documents for that between elections period will not be online until 1 February 2010, but here is part of what the AEC is saying:

As at 21 January 2010 the AEC had received 73 political party returns with total receipts of $93,699,223 disclosed by political parties for 2008-09, compared to 73 political party returns with total receipts of $216,523,873 currently reported for the 2007-08 financial year.

The same 73 political party returns show $93,880,386 as a total expenditure for the 2008-09 financial year, compared to $213,492,720 currently reported for the 2007-08 returns.

192 associated entities reported total receipts of $716,800,790 for 2008-09, compared to 245 returns disclosing $702,561,166 for 2007-08.

37 returns of political expenditure by third parties show a total of $6,493,558 was spent on political commentary, advertising, polling or other research for 2008-09 compared to 75 returns for 2007-08 showing total expenditure of $51,333,987.

229 donors completed returns for 2008-09 disclosing total donations of $10,294,507 compared to 409 returns for 2007-08 disclosing $26,425,088 donated to political parties.

Apart from associated entities, the amounts disclosed are significantly less than for 2007-08 because that year covered a federal election and the Gippsland by-election. The only electoral events in 2008-09 were the by-elections in Lyne and Mayo.

But who will arrest John Howard?

On 25 January 2010 Monbiot.com announced a new website called Arrest Blair: for crimes against peace.

The new site is dedicated to the concept that Blair must face justice for his part in the Coalition of the Willing's unlawful invasion of Iraq:

This site offers a reward to people attempting a peaceful citizen's arrest of the former British prime minister, Tony Blair, for crimes against peace. Anyone attempting an arrest which meets the rules laid down here will be entitled to one quarter of the money collected at the time of his or her application.
Money donated to this site will be used for no other purpose than to pay bounties for attempts to arrest Tony Blair. All administration and other costs, apart from any charges added to your donations by Paypal, will be paid by the site's founder.
The intention is to encourage repeated attempts to arrest the former prime minister.

The U.K. Brown Government is at the moment in the middle of its Iraq Inquiry.
Former Prime Minister Tony Blair appeared before the inquiry on 29 January (his video evidence here) and although any reference to his now infamous and classified July 2002 private letter to then U.S. President George W. Bush (sent after their earlier April private meeting) could not be explored, the 23 July 2002 Downing Street Memo is on the public record.

In Australia we apparently think it is acceptable that the man who played a similar role in dragging this nation into a breach of international law - former prime minister John Winston Howard - is allowed to enjoy retirement without one serious question being asked of him.
Why is that so?

Times Online publication of the Downing Street Memo, May 2005 (red emphasis is mine):

SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY

DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 02

cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell

IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY

Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.

This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.

John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.

CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.

The two broad US options were:

(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).

(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.

The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:

(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.

(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.

(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.

The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.

The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.

The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.

On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.

For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.

Conclusions:

(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.

(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.

(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.

(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.

He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.

(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.

(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.

(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)


MATTHEW RYCROFT

• The Iraq Inquiry: So what did the then Australian PM John Howard know and when did he know it?

Cane Toads the movie - who da thunk it!

After hearing about Cane Toads the movie wowing them at the 2010 Sundance Film Festival, I'm wondering if I should take an autograph book out into the backyard tonight and ask one of the not so little blighters if he (or she) would get one of their movie star cousins to give me a footprint signature.
To Pete with affection would do nicely.

Facts gleaned from the movie's website:

Cane Toads: The Conquest is a comic yet provocative account of Australia's most notorious environmental blunder from filmmaker Mark Lewis.
Shot against the harsh and beautiful landscape of northern Australia, Cane Toads: The Conquest tracks the unstoppable journey of the toad across the continent. Director Mark Lewis (Cane Toads: An Unnatural History, The Natural History of the Chicken) injects his trademark irreverence and humor into the story as he follows a trail of human conflict, bizarre culture and extraordinary close encounters.
Filmed with high-resolution 3D technology, Cane Toads is the first Australian digital 3D feature film. Custom designed equipment allows viewers to get up close and personal with these curious creatures like never before. The unique viewing experience is like being immersed in the world of the toad......

The storyline? 102 Cane Toads (Bufo marinus) were imported to Australia in 1935 in an attempt to rid the country of the Greyback Cane Beetle, which was decimating Queensland sugar cane crops. Unfortunately, the toads were disinclined to eat cane beetles.
Instead, they set about doing what cane toads do best - multiplying, migrating and thriving. 75 years later, an estimated 1.5 billion toads occupy over 1 million square kilometers of territory – and their conquest steadily continues......

Meet Kevin Ladynski, toad taxidermist, and his 2.5kg pet toad Melrose; Monica Kraus remembers her massive childhood friend Dairy Queen; Merinda Sharp explains why she sends toads on 'trips to Alaska'; Tip Byrne laments the day his father released the toads onto their Cane Farm.

The principal cast? Millions of cane toads Australia wide, mostly from the North.

Coming to a venue near you on the NSW North Coast if cinema owner-operators have any sense.

The truth revealed? Uncorrected transcript of former British Pm Tony Blair's evidence to the Iraq Inquiry

Evidence taken on 29 January 2010 by the U.K. Iraq Inquiry was a rather pointless exercise at times - for the most part questions carefully walked around a former leader rather than confronting issues head-on.

The Rt. Hon. Tony Blair was allowed to interrupt committee members and drag out his political soap-box at length almost unchallenged.

However, what clearly comes through is the fact that Blair:
(i) was probably heavily influenced on a personal level by George W. Bush;
(ii) was determined on regime change in Iraq;
(iii) held a desire for change which was never predicated on Iraq as a hive of international terrorism;
(iv) was aware U.N. sanctions had effectively 'contained' Saddam; and
(v) presented a supposedly intelligence-driven policy position to the British people in which any identified breaches of U.N. sanctions or allegations of weapons of mass destruction were only the smoke screen behind which the Coalition of the Willing had agreed to advance their invasion agenda.

Full uncorrected 249-page transcript here.

The Sydney Morning Herald, 30 January 2010, British press shocked at Blair's no regrets on Saddam

Australi, austra, austri....dammit - Oztria!

Travel World website on 23 January 2010
Click on image to enlarge

General info about Australia
Once the center of power for the large Austro-Hungarian Empire, Austria was reduced to a small republic after its defeat in World War I. Following annexation by Nazi Germany in 1938 and subsequent occupation by the victorious Allies in 1945, Austria's status remained unclear for a decade. A State Treaty signed in 1955 ended the occupation, recognized Austria's independence, and forbade unification with Germany. A constitutional law that same year declared the country's "perpetual neutrality" as a condition for Soviet military withdrawal. The Soviet Union's collapse in 1991 and Austria's entry into the European Union in 1995 have altered the meaning of this neutrality. A prosperous, democratic country, Austria entered the EU Economic and Monetary Union in 1999.

I don't know who should be more insulted at this sloppy confusion - Australia or Austria.

A Saturday walk on the arts side

Voyager
Tamasin Pepper



Arctic Meander 2009
Suvira McDonald








School of Fish
Mark Gibson
















These artists can be found at Visual Arts Network