In
February-March 2022 and again in April the seven local government
areas in the Northern Rivers region experienced heavy rainfall
events, with some local rainfall exceeding historical records that had been kept since the late 1800s. These rainfall events were exacerbated by at least
one large East-Coast Low stormfront.
The
flood which occurred while often expected, was at times unpredictable
in its behaviour, record breaking in its spread, highly destructive
and, in the case of Lismore City local government area calamitous.
The 100 kilometre wide coastal zone of New South Wales experienced natural disaster on a scale that would have been hard to imagine before climate change began to widen our experience.
Post-flooding, a state parliamentary select committee was established to inquire
into and report on the response to major flooding across New South
Wales in 2022. Terms of reference were referred to the committee by
the NSW Legislative Council on 23 March 2022 and Report No.1 was
published on 9 August 2022.
Set
out below is the full report in scrollable form.
However,
right now I would note eight of the twenty-one findings of the report.
I am sure that many Northern Rivers residents will recognise concerns
which local communities have raised repeatedly across the years in
times of flood.
Especially once state government decided emergency service headquarters,
coordination functions and staff/volunteer numbers were to be either
downsized or moved further south and away from north-east New South
Wales.
Finding
1
That
the NSW State Emergency Service and Resilience NSW failed as lead
agencies to provide adequate leadership and effective coordination
during the major flooding of February-March 2022.
Finding
2
That
NSW Government agencies lacked coordination, created confusion and
responded poorly in the February-March 2022 floods, resulting in the
North Coast community being let down in their greatest time of need.
Finding
3
That
demarcation disputes and a lack of integration between NSW Government
agencies slowed the roll-out of support and assistance to those
affected by the February-March 2022 floods.
Finding
4
That
NSW Government agencies and the Bureau of Meteorology were not
prepared for, nor did they comprehend the scale of the February-March
2022 floods, and some agencies were criticised for treating it as a
nine to five business operation.
Finding
5
That
the centralisation of the NSW State Emergency Service and a shortage
of volunteers significantly hindered the ability of the agency to
lead the response to the major flooding of February-March 2022.
.......
Finding
7
That
the NSW State Emergency Service failed in its public communication of
flood warnings and evacuation information during the February-March
2022 floods, by issuing out of date, inaccurate and confusing
messages.
Finding
8
That
NSW Government agencies and telecommunications providers failed to
ensure that communities affected by the February-March 2022 floods
had adequate emergency communications
capabilities.
Finding
9
That,
notwithstanding the role of the NSW State Emergency Service to
perform rescues, individual members of the community had no other
option but to ignore government advice and save lives, which was only
possible due to local and historical knowledge and local
communication, given information from the NSW State Emergency Service
and the Bureau of Meteorology was incorrect and out of date.
NSW Parliament, Legislative Council, Inquiry Report No 1 - Response to Major Flooding Across New South Wale... by clarencegirl on Scribd
https://www.scribd.com/document/586199870/NSW-Parliament-Legislative-Council-Inquiry-Report-No-1-Response-to-Major-Flooding-Across-New-South-Wales-in-2022
Chair's Foreword
Major
flooding in NSW in February-March 2022 was a catastrophic disaster,
causing widespread devastation and damage – particularly in the
Northern Rivers and Hawkesbury regions. Tragically, lives were
lost, thousands of homes were damaged or destroyed, and significant
local infrastructure was damaged.
Five
months later, families are homeless with some still living in tents,
businesses are still waiting for long-promised assistance, and there
are still unresolved policy matters involving buy-backs and land
swaps – to name just a few of the myriad remaining pressing
problems.
This
inquiry was set up to consider the NSW Government's preparedness,
coordination, and response to the flooding events. While this report
outlines many of the failures of the NSW Government, it also seeks
to ensure that the Government is better prepared and coordinated when
the next natural disaster of this nature inevitably occurs.
A
considerable focus of this inquiry was on the performance of the NSW
State Emergency Service (SES), as the leading agency for emergency
response, and Resilience NSW as the leading agency in recovery.
Ultimately,
the committee found that these two organisations failed to provide
leadership and effective coordination in the community’s greatest
time of need. Demarcation disputes and a lack of integration slowed
the roll-out of support and assistance to flood-affected communities.
The
State Government’s failure to implement a streamlined grants
process also meant that applicants were repeatedly interviewed, and
had to re-live their experiences, leading to further frustration and trauma
as part of the support process.
With
respect to the NSW SES, it is clear that the centralisation of this
organisation, and a shortage of volunteers, significantly hindered
the ability of the agency to lead the emergency response. In many cases,
flood warnings and evacuation information were out of date,
inaccurate and confusing. Further still, many community members felt
that they had no choice but to conduct their own rescues in dangerous
conditions as many calls for assistance to 000 and the NSW SES went
unanswered.
Put
simply, the community was forced to save themselves; neighbour saving
neighbour. While this is an admirable testament to these communities,
it is both unreasonable and undesirable as a matter of public policy.
For these reasons, the NSW Government should consider restructuring
the SES to ensure that it better harnesses local knowledge and
networks, coordinates more closely with other rescue agencies, and
increases resources, including by driving volunteer recruitment.
Resilience
NSW demonstrated some of the biggest failures of the NSW Government's
response to the floods. Witnesses repeatedly expressed frustration
and were confused about the role of Resilience NSW,
particularly in the recovery phase following the floods. The
committee found that the NSW Government failed to comprehend the
scale of the floods and treated the disaster response as a “nine to
five” business operation – when it was one of the greatest
natural disasters in generations.
The
agency failed to engage or coordinate with community groups leading
flood recovery efforts in their communities. This was despite
Resilience NSW having been established almost two years ago.
Accordingly,
the NSW Government must consider the viability of Resilience NSW
unless it can ensure that the agency's role is clear after reviewing
policies, objectives, and funding; and that the organisation and
its policies are apt to actually meet community disaster response
needs.
It
is this chair’s view that the NSW Government should abolish
Resilience NSW.
Our
focus is now on the enormous task of clean-up, restoration and
reconstruction. Many flood affected individuals, families and
businesses still need assistance. The NSW Government must work with
much greater urgency to secure temporary housing options as many
continue to live in tents and cars near their homes.
The
committee also calls on the government to finalise its long term
housing options and ensure that it considers investing in supporting
relocations, land swaps, and providing fair compensation for
landowners who wish to relocate from severely flood-impacted areas.The
committee also made practical recommendations such as providing
satellite phones and satellite terminals to community hubs in
flood-prone areas.
The
committee has noted evidence that – following the appointment of
NSW Police Force Deputy Commissioner, Mal Lanyon, to the role of
Northern NSW Recovery Coordinator – recovery efforts significantly
improved, and that he provided much-needed leadership. The Committee
has accordingly recommended a senior police officer with 'combat'
experience should lead recovery efforts in future natural disasters
as a matter of policy.
On
behalf of the committee, I would like to thank the flood-affected
communities and individuals who took the time to share their stories
with us. It is the committee’s wish that this report will help to
improve the NSW Government's response to future natural disasters to
minimise adverse effects on local communities.
In
total, the committee made 21 findings and 37 recommendations. The
committee received almost 90 submissions and almost 120 responses to
its online questionnaire. It held six public hearings. This included
ones in Ballina; Lismore; Murwillumbah; Windsor; and two at
Parliament House.
Significantly,
the Committee held four public forums. We hope they were regarded as
valuable by flood-stricken communities, given that they allowed 75
flood-affected individuals to speak directly under parliamentary
privilege to the committee.
Furthermore,
I wish to acknowledge the political leaders – at all three levels
of government – who put aside their differences to support their
communities. They all cooperated with this inquiry, providing
forthright and honest views. This was appreciated.
Finally,
I would like to thank my committee colleagues for their
collaboration, and the secretariat — particularly Tina Higgins,
Shaza Barbar, Stephen Fujiwara and Andrew Ratchford, as well as
Hansard staff
for their professional assistance on this important Inquiry.
The
Hon Walt Secord MLC
Committee
Chair
