In February-March 2022 and again in April the seven local government areas in the Northern Rivers region experienced heavy rainfall events, with some local rainfall exceeding historical records that had been kept since the late 1800s. These rainfall events were exacerbated by at least one large East-Coast Low stormfront.
The flood which occurred while often expected, was at times unpredictable in its behaviour, record breaking in its spread, highly destructive and, in the case of Lismore City local government area calamitous.
The 100 kilometre wide coastal zone of New South Wales experienced natural disaster on a scale that would have been hard to imagine before climate change began to widen our experience.
Post-flooding, a state parliamentary select committee was established to inquire into and report on the response to major flooding across New South Wales in 2022. Terms of reference were referred to the committee by the NSW Legislative Council on 23 March 2022 and Report No.1 was published on 9 August 2022.
Set out below is the full report in scrollable form.
However, right now I would note eight of the twenty-one findings of the report. I am sure that many Northern Rivers residents will recognise concerns which local communities have raised repeatedly across the years in times of flood.
Especially once state government decided emergency service headquarters, coordination functions and staff/volunteer numbers were to be either downsized or moved further south and away from north-east New South Wales.
Finding 1
That the NSW State Emergency Service and Resilience NSW failed as lead agencies to provide adequate leadership and effective coordination during the major flooding of February-March 2022.
Finding 2
That NSW Government agencies lacked coordination, created confusion and responded poorly in the February-March 2022 floods, resulting in the North Coast community being let down in their greatest time of need.
Finding 3
That demarcation disputes and a lack of integration between NSW Government agencies slowed the roll-out of support and assistance to those affected by the February-March 2022 floods.
Finding 4
That NSW Government agencies and the Bureau of Meteorology were not prepared for, nor did they comprehend the scale of the February-March 2022 floods, and some agencies were criticised for treating it as a nine to five business operation.
Finding 5
That the centralisation of the NSW State Emergency Service and a shortage of volunteers significantly hindered the ability of the agency to lead the response to the major flooding of February-March 2022.
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Finding 7
That the NSW State Emergency Service failed in its public communication of flood warnings and evacuation information during the February-March 2022 floods, by issuing out of date, inaccurate and confusing messages.
Finding 8
That NSW Government agencies and telecommunications providers failed to ensure that communities affected by the February-March 2022 floods had adequate emergency communications capabilities.
Finding 9
That, notwithstanding the role of the NSW State Emergency Service to perform rescues, individual members of the community had no other option but to ignore government advice and save lives, which was only possible due to local and historical knowledge and local communication, given information from the NSW State Emergency Service and the Bureau of Meteorology was incorrect and out of date.
NSW Parliament, Legislative Council, Inquiry Report No 1 - Response to Major Flooding Across New South Wale... by clarencegirl on Scribd
Chair's Foreword
Major flooding in NSW in February-March 2022 was a catastrophic disaster, causing widespread devastation and damage – particularly in the Northern Rivers and Hawkesbury regions. Tragically, lives were lost, thousands of homes were damaged or destroyed, and significant local infrastructure was damaged.
Five months later, families are homeless with some still living in tents, businesses are still waiting for long-promised assistance, and there are still unresolved policy matters involving buy-backs and land swaps – to name just a few of the myriad remaining pressing problems.
This inquiry was set up to consider the NSW Government's preparedness, coordination, and response to the flooding events. While this report outlines many of the failures of the NSW Government, it also seeks to ensure that the Government is better prepared and coordinated when the next natural disaster of this nature inevitably occurs.
A considerable focus of this inquiry was on the performance of the NSW State Emergency Service (SES), as the leading agency for emergency response, and Resilience NSW as the leading agency in recovery.
Ultimately, the committee found that these two organisations failed to provide leadership and effective coordination in the community’s greatest time of need. Demarcation disputes and a lack of integration slowed the roll-out of support and assistance to flood-affected communities.
The State Government’s failure to implement a streamlined grants process also meant that applicants were repeatedly interviewed, and had to re-live their experiences, leading to further frustration and trauma as part of the support process.
With respect to the NSW SES, it is clear that the centralisation of this organisation, and a shortage of volunteers, significantly hindered the ability of the agency to lead the emergency response. In many cases, flood warnings and evacuation information were out of date, inaccurate and confusing. Further still, many community members felt that they had no choice but to conduct their own rescues in dangerous conditions as many calls for assistance to 000 and the NSW SES went unanswered.
Put simply, the community was forced to save themselves; neighbour saving neighbour. While this is an admirable testament to these communities, it is both unreasonable and undesirable as a matter of public policy. For these reasons, the NSW Government should consider restructuring the SES to ensure that it better harnesses local knowledge and networks, coordinates more closely with other rescue agencies, and increases resources, including by driving volunteer recruitment.
Resilience NSW demonstrated some of the biggest failures of the NSW Government's response to the floods. Witnesses repeatedly expressed frustration and were confused about the role of Resilience NSW, particularly in the recovery phase following the floods. The committee found that the NSW Government failed to comprehend the scale of the floods and treated the disaster response as a “nine to five” business operation – when it was one of the greatest natural disasters in generations.
The agency failed to engage or coordinate with community groups leading flood recovery efforts in their communities. This was despite Resilience NSW having been established almost two years ago.
Accordingly, the NSW Government must consider the viability of Resilience NSW unless it can ensure that the agency's role is clear after reviewing policies, objectives, and funding; and that the organisation and its policies are apt to actually meet community disaster response needs.
It is this chair’s view that the NSW Government should abolish Resilience NSW.
Our focus is now on the enormous task of clean-up, restoration and reconstruction. Many flood affected individuals, families and businesses still need assistance. The NSW Government must work with much greater urgency to secure temporary housing options as many continue to live in tents and cars near their homes.
The committee also calls on the government to finalise its long term housing options and ensure that it considers investing in supporting relocations, land swaps, and providing fair compensation for landowners who wish to relocate from severely flood-impacted areas.The committee also made practical recommendations such as providing satellite phones and satellite terminals to community hubs in flood-prone areas.
The committee has noted evidence that – following the appointment of NSW Police Force Deputy Commissioner, Mal Lanyon, to the role of Northern NSW Recovery Coordinator – recovery efforts significantly improved, and that he provided much-needed leadership. The Committee has accordingly recommended a senior police officer with 'combat' experience should lead recovery efforts in future natural disasters as a matter of policy.
On behalf of the committee, I would like to thank the flood-affected communities and individuals who took the time to share their stories with us. It is the committee’s wish that this report will help to improve the NSW Government's response to future natural disasters to minimise adverse effects on local communities.
In total, the committee made 21 findings and 37 recommendations. The committee received almost 90 submissions and almost 120 responses to its online questionnaire. It held six public hearings. This included ones in Ballina; Lismore; Murwillumbah; Windsor; and two at Parliament House.
Significantly, the Committee held four public forums. We hope they were regarded as valuable by flood-stricken communities, given that they allowed 75 flood-affected individuals to speak directly under parliamentary privilege to the committee.
Furthermore, I wish to acknowledge the political leaders – at all three levels of government – who put aside their differences to support their communities. They all cooperated with this inquiry, providing forthright and honest views. This was appreciated.
Finally, I would like to thank my committee colleagues for their collaboration, and the secretariat — particularly Tina Higgins, Shaza Barbar, Stephen Fujiwara and Andrew Ratchford, as well as Hansard staff for their professional assistance on this important Inquiry.
The Hon Walt Secord MLC
Committee Chair
