Streuth Ruth! Abbott's a cobber of the elderly and Rudd's a granny basher?

You've gotta love the boy. Here he is gamely battling for that extra spin by having a go at Rudders and Swanee over the latest Intergenerational Report released yesterday.
Apparently the PM and Treasurer are guilty of elder bashing by pointing out that growing numbers entering retirement are posing a bit of a problem for a national economy which was traditionally coming off on a strong base of taxpaying workers.
Leader of the Coalition Opposition Tony Abbott hopes that I'll accept that he's my true blue friend, working flat out protecting me from Labor's nasty age discrimination.
"It's not seniors' fault that the government is under cost pressure. This idea somehow seniors are to blame for our economic problems, it is wrong, it is demeaning to great people who have worked hard for our country."sez our Tones.

Here's how Labor's 2010 intergenerational report basically assesses the aging of the population;
"Australia faces significant intergenerational challenges.
Population ageing will mean that there will be fewer workers to support retirees and young dependants.
This will place pressure on the economic growth that drives rising living standards.
At the same time, the ageing population will result in substantial fiscal pressures from increased demand for government services and rising health costs.
Australia's population will continue to grow over time but at slower rates
than in the past. A growing population will help manage pressures of the ageing population but will put pressure on our infrastructure, services and environment. This will require continued planning and investment ahead of time."

Here's how the Coalition's 2007 intergenerational report viewed the same issue;
Demographic and other factors will continue to pose substantial challenges for economic growth and long-term fiscal sustainability.
The projections in IGR2 show that over the next 40 years:

• the population will continue to increase in size but with a higher proportion of older people;
• economic growth per person will slow as the proportion of the population of traditional working age falls; and
• substantial fiscal pressures will emerge due to projected increases in spending, particularly in the areas of health, age pensions and aged care."

And before that in 2003 the Libs and Nats looked at that same ageing population in the first intergenerational report;
Australia, like most industrialised countries, is experiencing an ageing of its population. This is already beginning to place some pressure on government spending. However, much larger pressures are expected to emerge when the 'baby-boomer' generation starts reaching old age in the middle of the next decade.
By careful planning now, we will be better prepared to meet the future challenges of an ageing population.

Can't tell the chooks apart can you! Because the long term demographic shift exists and it will affect the economy.
Tony Abbott is showing what a bl**dy nong he really is in trying to run with this thought bubble for the next 24 hours and this particular greybeard would like to take his 'caring' and shove it down his dishonest pollie throat.

Take a good look, Prime Minister Rudd - your numbers are not looking so rosy

Take a good look, Prime Minister Rudd.
This is the current state of play in relation to opinion change according to Possum Comitatus and it is not as healthy a situation as Labor might like or have expected:

Credibility in the areas Possum highligts are not your only problem.

Websites listed as participating in The Great Australian Internet Blackout (and the thousands of Twitter accounts blacking out atavars) on 26 January 2010 represent just a fraction of the votes which will probably not go to Labor candidates at the next federal election, if you go ahead with your flawed plan to impose mandatory ISP-level Internet filtering on the Australian people.

These sites form part of a demographic which is spread right across every seat you will have to contest in 2010. Can you really afford to keep riling voters in this way in the lead up to what may yet be a closely fought election in rural and regional Australia?

Just how expensive will the 2010 federal election campaign be?

Starting to wonder just how much money the major political parties will p*ss down the drain during the 2010 federal election campaign?
The 2007 election was a pretty expensive and wasteful affair and this one will have to equal it, if only because of the level of noisy desperation which is bound to consume Abbott and his mates.
An Australian Electoral Commission media release on 29 January reminded us of just how much the pollies spent trying to swing our votes last time round.
The actual 2008-09 disclosure documents for that between elections period will not be online until 1 February 2010, but here is part of what the AEC is saying:

As at 21 January 2010 the AEC had received 73 political party returns with total receipts of $93,699,223 disclosed by political parties for 2008-09, compared to 73 political party returns with total receipts of $216,523,873 currently reported for the 2007-08 financial year.

The same 73 political party returns show $93,880,386 as a total expenditure for the 2008-09 financial year, compared to $213,492,720 currently reported for the 2007-08 returns.

192 associated entities reported total receipts of $716,800,790 for 2008-09, compared to 245 returns disclosing $702,561,166 for 2007-08.

37 returns of political expenditure by third parties show a total of $6,493,558 was spent on political commentary, advertising, polling or other research for 2008-09 compared to 75 returns for 2007-08 showing total expenditure of $51,333,987.

229 donors completed returns for 2008-09 disclosing total donations of $10,294,507 compared to 409 returns for 2007-08 disclosing $26,425,088 donated to political parties.

Apart from associated entities, the amounts disclosed are significantly less than for 2007-08 because that year covered a federal election and the Gippsland by-election. The only electoral events in 2008-09 were the by-elections in Lyne and Mayo.

But who will arrest John Howard?

On 25 January 2010 Monbiot.com announced a new website called Arrest Blair: for crimes against peace.

The new site is dedicated to the concept that Blair must face justice for his part in the Coalition of the Willing's unlawful invasion of Iraq:

This site offers a reward to people attempting a peaceful citizen's arrest of the former British prime minister, Tony Blair, for crimes against peace. Anyone attempting an arrest which meets the rules laid down here will be entitled to one quarter of the money collected at the time of his or her application.
Money donated to this site will be used for no other purpose than to pay bounties for attempts to arrest Tony Blair. All administration and other costs, apart from any charges added to your donations by Paypal, will be paid by the site's founder.
The intention is to encourage repeated attempts to arrest the former prime minister.

The U.K. Brown Government is at the moment in the middle of its Iraq Inquiry.
Former Prime Minister Tony Blair appeared before the inquiry on 29 January (his video evidence here) and although any reference to his now infamous and classified July 2002 private letter to then U.S. President George W. Bush (sent after their earlier April private meeting) could not be explored, the 23 July 2002 Downing Street Memo is on the public record.

In Australia we apparently think it is acceptable that the man who played a similar role in dragging this nation into a breach of international law - former prime minister John Winston Howard - is allowed to enjoy retirement without one serious question being asked of him.
Why is that so?

Times Online publication of the Downing Street Memo, May 2005 (red emphasis is mine):

SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY

DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 02

cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell

IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY

Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.

This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.

John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.

CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.

The two broad US options were:

(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).

(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.

The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:

(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.

(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.

(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.

The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.

The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.

The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.

On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.

For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.

Conclusions:

(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.

(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.

(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.

(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.

He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.

(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.

(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.

(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)


MATTHEW RYCROFT

• The Iraq Inquiry: So what did the then Australian PM John Howard know and when did he know it?