Failure
of the icare Board to govern, lack of expertise, conflicts of interest, unethical
behaviour, financial mismanagement, failure to meet standards,
inappropriate behaviour, lack of accountability and grossly excessive executive remuneration
– just a few of the problematic issues
revealed in the 2020
annual review of this state
compulsory workers compensation scheme, managed by icare
since 2015 under
‘reforms’ established by the NSW Baird Coalition Government.
Sadly,
the 2019 Independent
reviewer report on the Nominal Insurer of the NSW workers
compensation scheme: For the State Insurance Regulatory Authority
(NSW)
foreshadowed
what was to come in 2020, by failing in
its report to
discourage the
icare board
and management from continuing the organisation’s wayward course.
NSW Legislative Council, Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 2020
review of the Workers Compensation Scheme,
April 2021, excerpt:
Findings
Finding
1
That
the multi-billion losses incurred recently by the Nominal Insurer and
Treasury Managed Fund have been caused, in large part, by a collapse
in return to work rates arising from icare’s decision to
introduce a new claims management model.
Finding
2
That
return to work rates have fallen further in schemes managed by icare
than in schemes managed by specialist and self-insurers.
Finding
3
That
icare has failed to address the fall in return to work rates in the
Nominal Insurer and the Treasury Managed Fund with either the urgency
or thoroughness they deserved given the negative impacts
falling return to work rates have on injured workers and the
financial sustainability of the scheme.
Finding
4
That
the Nominal Insurer and the Treasury Managed Fund will continue to
sustain major underwriting losses until icare improves return to work
rates.
Finding
5
That
implementation of the Work Injury Screening and Early Intervention
(WISE) protocols, that deliver early and active intervention for
injured workers with musculoskeletal injury that have a risk of
delayed return to work, have had a significant positive impact on
return to work rates, and despite this evidence being available to
icare they have not been adopted in the Nominal Insurer or the
Treasury Managed Fund.
Finding
6
That
icare has too often failed to reach the standards of behaviour
expected of a New South Wales public sector agency.
Finding
7
That
icare’s decision to select Guidewire and Capgemini to build the
Nominal Insurer Single Platform appears to have been predetermined,
and led to project costs rising from $110 million to more than $360
million.
Finding
8
That
Mr Vivek Bhatia and Mr Michael Carapiet failed to take appropriate
steps to declare, record and manage the conflict of interests arising
from Mr Bhatia’s personal relationship with the leaders of
Capgemini.
Finding
9
That
Mr John Nagle's decision to appear in a video endorsing Guidewire’s
software, and to accept their sponsorship of a trip to Las Vegas to
appear at their 2018 conference, was inappropriate.
Finding
10
That
icare failed to clearly notify bidders that it was considering the
appointment of a sole scheme agent to manage Nominal Insurer claims
in the 2018 tender and as a consequence, the tender process was not
fairly conducted.
Finding
11
That
icare’s implementation of a claims management system that has a
single scheme agent to manage all nominal insurer claims by using a
sole scheme agent has failed.
Finding
12
That
icare appears to have applied undue pressure on EML to engage The
Bridge International using a Project Service Order mechanism.
Finding
13
That
icare’s decision to select the Perceptive Group to develop a Net
Promoter Score transgressed all reasonable conflict of interest
principles.
Finding
14
That
icare’s decision to award Mr Rob Craig unlimited authority to enter
into contracts to build the Nominal Insurer Single Platform was
inappropriate and contrary to an express policy determined by the
Board.
Finding
15
That
icare’s systemic failure to comply with key requirements of the
Government Information (Public Access Act (2009) is longstanding,
systematic and remains unacceptable.
Finding
16
That
icare’s policy of permitting senior executives to engage in
secondary employment is inappropriate, especially given the
extraordinary levels of the salaries paid to icare executives to perform
their work for icare.
Finding
17
That
the icare Board failed to appropriately sanction the former Chief
Executive Officer and Managing Director after his inadequate
disclosure of a serious conflict of interest involving a close family
member.
Finding
18
That
icare failed to provide Mr Chris McCann with a safe workplace and
inappropriately required him to enter into a non-disclosure agreement
after he raised serious concerns with icare's governance.
Finding
19
That
the icare Board comprehensively failed to properly govern icare.
Finding
20
That
icare's Board lacked members with expertise in personal injury
management or workers compensation.
Finding
21
That
mechanisms between the icare Board and Treasurer have failed to work
in making icare accountable for its conduct.
Finding
22
That
the level of executive remuneration at icare is grossly excessive,
and is likely to have contributed to poor cultural practices at
icare, and is out of keeping with community expectations.
Meet the icare Board at https://www.icare.nsw.gov.au/about-us/our-people/our-board.
