Once more NSW residents bring the issue of the Koala Extinction Crisis before state parliament......

 

Via @talkingkoala

A message from the New South Wales Legislative Assembly

9 August 2022

The ePetition "End Public Native Forest Logging" has closed for signatures and has been presented in the Legislative Assembly by Mrs Shelley Hancock.

The ePetition text in full is:

To the Speaker and Members of the Legislative Assembly,

Public native forest logging is pushing iconic species like the koala, swift parrot and greater glider towards extinction.

The 2019/20 Black Summer bushfires burnt over 5 million hectares of forest and have left them more vulnerable to the impacts of logging. The Natural Resources Commission (NRC) and the Environmental Protection Agency have recommended that in bushfire affected areas logging should cease entirely or face tighter restrictions, as current logging practices may cause irreversible damage to ecosystems and wildlife.

Logging of public native forests is tax-payer subsidised. Forestry Corporation’s Hardwood Division has been operating at a significant loss for the past decade. In 2020/21 it ran at a loss of $20 million, with predictions that it will face losses of $15 million until 2024.

Reports also show our state forests can generate far more income through their protection than from logging, through recreation, tourism and carbon abatement.

The Western Australian and Victorian Governments have already committed to ending this industry and have developed transition plans to support affected workers and businesses.

The petitioners ask the Legislative Assembly to:

1. Develop a plan to transition the native forestry industry to 100% sustainable plantations by 2024.

2. In the interim, place a moratorium on public native forest logging until the regulatory framework reflects the recommendations of the leaked NRC report.

3. Immediately protect high-conservation value forests through gazettal in the National Parks estate.

4. Ban use of native forest materials as biomass fuel.

The ePetition received 21046 signatures and has been sent to the NSW Government for a response.

You will receive an email with a link to the response when it is received.

As the ePetition received more than 20,000 signatures, it will also be debated in the Legislative Assembly at 4pm on 15/09/2022.

You can watch the debate on the webcast at https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/pages/la-webcast-page.aspx

Ms. Taneska Frank’s e-petition was signed by a total of 21,046 NSW residents by the end of the petition period on 2 August 2022.

Via @talkingkoala

New South Wales. Parliament. Legislative Council. Select Committee on the Response to Major Flooding across New South Wales in 2022. Report no. 1 (9 August 2022).

In February-March 2022 and again in April the seven local government areas in the Northern Rivers region experienced heavy rainfall events, with some local rainfall exceeding historical records that had been kept since the late 1800s. These rainfall events were exacerbated by at least one large East-Coast Low stormfront.

The flood which occurred while often expected, was at times unpredictable in its behaviour, record breaking in its spread, highly destructive and, in the case of Lismore City local government area calamitous.

The 100 kilometre wide coastal zone of New South Wales experienced natural disaster on a scale that would have been hard to imagine before climate change began to widen our experience.

Post-flooding, a state parliamentary select committee was established to inquire into and report on the response to major flooding across New South Wales in 2022. Terms of reference were referred to the committee by the NSW Legislative Council on 23 March 2022 and Report No.1 was published on 9 August 2022.

Set out below is the full report in scrollable form.

However, right now I would note eight of the twenty-one findings of the report. I am sure that many Northern Rivers residents will recognise concerns which local communities have raised repeatedly across the years in times of flood.

Especially once state government decided emergency service headquarters, coordination functions and staff/volunteer numbers were to be either downsized or moved further south and away from north-east New South Wales.

Finding 1

That the NSW State Emergency Service and Resilience NSW failed as lead agencies to provide adequate leadership and effective coordination during the major flooding of February-March 2022.

Finding 2

That NSW Government agencies lacked coordination, created confusion and responded poorly in the February-March 2022 floods, resulting in the North Coast community being let down in their greatest time of need.

Finding 3

That demarcation disputes and a lack of integration between NSW Government agencies slowed the roll-out of support and assistance to those affected by the February-March 2022 floods.

Finding 4

That NSW Government agencies and the Bureau of Meteorology were not prepared for, nor did they comprehend the scale of the February-March 2022 floods, and some agencies were criticised for treating it as a nine to five business operation.

Finding 5

That the centralisation of the NSW State Emergency Service and a shortage of volunteers significantly hindered the ability of the agency to lead the response to the major flooding of February-March 2022.

.......

Finding 7

That the NSW State Emergency Service failed in its public communication of flood warnings and evacuation information during the February-March 2022 floods, by issuing out of date, inaccurate and confusing messages.

Finding 8

That NSW Government agencies and telecommunications providers failed to ensure that communities affected by the February-March 2022 floods had adequate emergency communications capabilities.

Finding 9

That, notwithstanding the role of the NSW State Emergency Service to perform rescues, individual members of the community had no other option but to ignore government advice and save lives, which was only possible due to local and historical knowledge and local communication, given information from the NSW State Emergency Service and the Bureau of Meteorology was incorrect and out of date.

NSW Parliament, Legislative Council, Inquiry Report No 1 - Response to Major Flooding Across New South Wale... by clarencegirl on Scribd

https://www.scribd.com/document/586199870/NSW-Parliament-Legislative-Council-Inquiry-Report-No-1-Response-to-Major-Flooding-Across-New-South-Wales-in-2022

Chair's Foreword

Major flooding in NSW in February-March 2022 was a catastrophic disaster, causing widespread devastation and damage – particularly in the Northern Rivers and Hawkesbury regions. Tragically, lives were lost, thousands of homes were damaged or destroyed, and significant local infrastructure was damaged.

Five months later, families are homeless with some still living in tents, businesses are still waiting for long-promised assistance, and there are still unresolved policy matters involving buy-backs and land swaps – to name just a few of the myriad remaining pressing problems.

This inquiry was set up to consider the NSW Government's preparedness, coordination, and response to the flooding events. While this report outlines many of the failures of the NSW Government, it also seeks to ensure that the Government is better prepared and coordinated when the next natural disaster of this nature inevitably occurs.

A considerable focus of this inquiry was on the performance of the NSW State Emergency Service (SES), as the leading agency for emergency response, and Resilience NSW as the leading agency in recovery.

Ultimately, the committee found that these two organisations failed to provide leadership and effective coordination in the community’s greatest time of need. Demarcation disputes and a lack of integration slowed the roll-out of support and assistance to flood-affected communities.

The State Government’s failure to implement a streamlined grants process also meant that applicants were repeatedly interviewed, and had to re-live their experiences, leading to further frustration and trauma as part of the support process.

With respect to the NSW SES, it is clear that the centralisation of this organisation, and a shortage of volunteers, significantly hindered the ability of the agency to lead the emergency response. In many cases, flood warnings and evacuation information were out of date, inaccurate and confusing. Further still, many community members felt that they had no choice but to conduct their own rescues in dangerous conditions as many calls for assistance to 000 and the NSW SES went unanswered.

Put simply, the community was forced to save themselves; neighbour saving neighbour. While this is an admirable testament to these communities, it is both unreasonable and undesirable as a matter of public policy. For these reasons, the NSW Government should consider restructuring the SES to ensure that it better harnesses local knowledge and networks, coordinates more closely with other rescue agencies, and increases resources, including by driving volunteer recruitment.

Resilience NSW demonstrated some of the biggest failures of the NSW Government's response to the floods. Witnesses repeatedly expressed frustration and were confused about the role of Resilience NSW, particularly in the recovery phase following the floods. The committee found that the NSW Government failed to comprehend the scale of the floods and treated the disaster response as a “nine to five” business operation – when it was one of the greatest natural disasters in generations.

The agency failed to engage or coordinate with community groups leading flood recovery efforts in their communities. This was despite Resilience NSW having been established almost two years ago.

Accordingly, the NSW Government must consider the viability of Resilience NSW unless it can ensure that the agency's role is clear after reviewing policies, objectives, and funding; and that the organisation and its policies are apt to actually meet community disaster response needs.

It is this chair’s view that the NSW Government should abolish Resilience NSW.

Our focus is now on the enormous task of clean-up, restoration and reconstruction. Many flood affected individuals, families and businesses still need assistance. The NSW Government must work with much greater urgency to secure temporary housing options as many continue to live in tents and cars near their homes.

The committee also calls on the government to finalise its long term housing options and ensure that it considers investing in supporting relocations, land swaps, and providing fair compensation for landowners who wish to relocate from severely flood-impacted areas.The committee also made practical recommendations such as providing satellite phones and satellite terminals to community hubs in flood-prone areas.

The committee has noted evidence that – following the appointment of NSW Police Force Deputy Commissioner, Mal Lanyon, to the role of Northern NSW Recovery Coordinator – recovery efforts significantly improved, and that he provided much-needed leadership. The Committee has accordingly recommended a senior police officer with 'combat' experience should lead recovery efforts in future natural disasters as a matter of policy.

On behalf of the committee, I would like to thank the flood-affected communities and individuals who took the time to share their stories with us. It is the committee’s wish that this report will help to improve the NSW Government's response to future natural disasters to minimise adverse effects on local communities.

In total, the committee made 21 findings and 37 recommendations. The committee received almost 90 submissions and almost 120 responses to its online questionnaire. It held six public hearings. This included ones in Ballina; Lismore; Murwillumbah; Windsor; and two at Parliament House.

Significantly, the Committee held four public forums. We hope they were regarded as valuable by flood-stricken communities, given that they allowed 75 flood-affected individuals to speak directly under parliamentary privilege to the committee.

Furthermore, I wish to acknowledge the political leaders – at all three levels of government – who put aside their differences to support their communities. They all cooperated with this inquiry, providing forthright and honest views. This was appreciated.

Finally, I would like to thank my committee colleagues for their collaboration, and the secretariat — particularly Tina Higgins, Shaza Barbar, Stephen Fujiwara and Andrew Ratchford, as well as Hansard staff for their professional assistance on this important Inquiry.

The Hon Walt Secord MLC

Committee Chair

 

So how do the securely employed professional classes in the Australian population calculate poverty?

 

According to the 2021 Census, around half the people aged 15 years of age and older living in the seven local government areas of north east New South Wales have personal incomes averaging from $0 to $645 a week - which is way below the state average of $813 a week and the national average of $805 a week. Included in these figures would be the individual weekly incomes of those local residents who receive full aged pensions. 

One sometimes sees media coverage that describes this part of the state as a low income region. Indeed, the region made NCOSS mapping of economic disadvantage - coming in at between est. 8.7% to 21.3% of the population experiencing economic disadvantage across the region in 2016. By the same token, in 2016 the NSW Government rated the region's local government areas on the "Index of Relative Socio-economic Advantage and Disadvantage" (IRSAD) as between only 1 to 8 points where "1" represents most disadvantaged and "129" least disadvantaged relative to other state local government areas.

We live in a beautiful region but are not unaware that life can be a quiet struggle for many in our communities. Sometimes it is even ourselves, our own families and friends who struggle.

It should come as no surprise that when poverty in Australia is officially defined, none of those doing the defining are classed as poor or living in poverty.

Sometimes it seems the voices of those with no incomes or low incomes are confined to short quotes in submissions made to governments by registered charities and lobby groups.

So how, by way of example, are those living below a current poverty line doing financially in 2022, according to the professors, researchers and statisticians in one self-styled “pre-eminent economic and social policy research centre”?

Melbourne Institute: Applied Economic & Social Research,

POVERTY LINES: AUSTRALIA, MARCH QUARTER 2022, July 2022, p. 4 of 4:

Click on image to enlarge

Although this March Quarter comparison table gives an indication of disposable income it is uncertain if it takes account of rising inflation in 2022, given the only table included in the report which factors in Cost Price Index ends its calculations in 2020-21. 

What it does calculate is that total maximum weekly disposable income in all but one of the pension and allowance categories is well below an Australian poverty line established in 1964. 

However, in doing so the report attempts to minimise the lived experience of others by, in the first instance by broadly assuming that all cats are black in the dark and differences in individual circumstances don't matter and long as final percentage totals reach 100.

As one example. Not every single lone aged or disability pensioner who rents and is eligible for rent assistance actually receives rent assistance as disposable income or that such rent assistance amount is credited to their actual real life cash rent payments. In New South Wales alone it is likely that somewhere in the vicinity of 58,924 lone pensioners who rent are affected. That number of NSW aged and disability pensioners are likely receiving a total weekly disposable income derived solely from welfare payments which is not as the report suggests $59.49 above a poverty line in 2022 but in fact is an est. $11.91 below that same poverty line.

In the second instance the report minimises the lived experience of others by choosing to define all those receiving federal government cash transfers through Centrelink as being better off in March Quarter 2022 than they were in the last 49 years up to 30 June 2021. 

The sources referred to, the many qualifications applied in compiling this data or even the contents of the four tables, will not be what media commentators, political advisors and public servants take away with them after reading.

No, what will be remembered is the impression given that all pensioners live above the poverty line instead of that most live in deeper poverty than that benchmark and the statement; “Put another way, the real purchasing power of the income at the poverty line rose by 60.7 percent between 1973/74 and 2020/21.”

BACKGROUND

Melbourne Institute: Applied Economic & Social Research,

POVERTY LINES: AUSTRALIA, MARCH QUARTER 2022:

What are the Poverty Lines?

Poverty lines are income levels designated for various types of income units. If the income of an income unit is less than the poverty line applicable to it, then the unit is considered to be in poverty. An income unit is the family group normally supported by the income of the unit.

How the Poverty Lines are Calculated

The poverty lines are based on a benchmark income of $62.70 per week for the December quarter 1973 established by the Henderson poverty inquiry. The benchmark income was the disposable income required to support the basic needs of a family of two adults and two dependent children. Poverty lines for other types of family are derived from the benchmark using a set of equivalence scales. The poverty lines are updated to periods subsequent to the benchmark date using an index of per capita household disposable income. A detailed description of the calculation and use of poverty lines is published in the Australian Economic Review, 4th Quarter 1987 and a discussion of their limitations is published in the Australian Economic Review, 1st Quarter 1996.

The Poverty Lines for the March Quarter 2022

The Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research has updated the poverty line for Australia to the March quarter 2022. Inclusive of housing costs, the poverty line is $1,148.15 per week for a family comprising two adults, one of whom is working, and two dependent children. This is an increase of $5.16 from the poverty line for the previous quarter (December 2021). Poverty lines for the benchmark household and other household types are shown in Table 1.

The Poverty Lines are Estimates

As has been stated in paragraph 2, the poverty lines are based on an index of per capita household disposable income. The index is calculated from estimates of household disposable income and population provided by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). Because the index is based on estimates, the poverty lines themselves will be estimates. As more information becomes available, the ABS may update population and household disposable income estimates for previous quarters. Whenever these estimates are changed, it is necessary to re-estimate the poverty lines. Accordingly, in addition to providing estimates of current poverty lines, we provide sufficient information for readers to calculate poverty lines for all quarters dating back to December 1973.

Click to enlarge

How to calculate poverty lines for other

quarters

Table 2 shows the estimated per capita household disposable income for all quarters between September 1973 and March 2022. This table may

be used to calculate poverty lines for any quarter within this period. For instance, to find the poverty line for the June quarter 1996 for any household type, multiply the current value of its poverty line by the ratio of per capita household disposable income in the June quarter 1996 to that in the current quarter; that is, the poverty line for a benchmark household in June 1996 would be 1,148.15 × 346.11 / 977.25 = $406.64.

Click to enlarge

Relative poverty and the cost of living Updating poverty lines according to changes in per capita household disposable income means that the poverty lines are relative measures of poverty. As real incomes in the community rise, so too will the poverty lines. The value of the poverty lines will therefore be reasonably stable relative to general standards of living, but may change relative to the cost of living. An alternative method for updating poverty lines is to use a cost-of-living index, such as the ABS Consumer Price Index (CPI). Poverty lines generated in this way are absolute measures of poverty. The real purchasing power of the income at the poverty line is maintained, but it may change in comparison to general standards of living. Table 3 compares annual movements in the poverty line for the benchmark income unit between 1973/74 and 2020/21 updated in these two ways. The table shows that, by 2020/21, an income unit whose income was adjusted to match movements in average household disposable income would have 60.7 per cent more income than one whose income was adjusted to match movements in consumer prices. Put another way, the real purchasing power of the income at the poverty line rose by 60.7 per cent between 1973/74 and 2020/21.....

Full PDF document online here.

WHO declares Monkeypox to be a Public Health Emergency of International Concern & Australia declares it to be a Communicable Disease Incident of National Significance with NSW Health beginning vaccine rollout

 

Monkeypox: First deaths outside Africa in Brazil and Spain

Image: BBC, 30 July 2022

A statement from Professor Paul Kelly, Australian Government Chief Medical Officer, declaring monkeypox (MPX) a Communicable Disease Incident of National Significance.

28 July 2022

I have declared the unfolding situation regarding monkeypox (MPX) in Australia to be a Communicable Disease Incident of National Significance.

This follows the World Health Organization (WHO) declaring the global situation regarding MPX to be a public health emergency of international concern.

The latest data from 1 January to 28 July 2022 as reported by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (US CDC) indicates there have been 20,311 MPX cases in 71 countries (including Australia) that have not historically reported MPX.

In Australia, there have been 44 cases – the majority of which have been within returned international travellers.

It is important to note that although I have declared MPX to be a Communicable Disease Incident of National Significance, it is far less harmful than COVID-19 and there have been no deaths reported during the current outbreak outside of countries where the virus is endemic.[inoperative statement as of 30.07.22] 

MPX is also not transmitted in the same way as COVID-19 – and is far less transmissible.

The decision to declare MPX a Communicable Disease Incident of National Significance was made under the Emergency Response Plan for Communicable Disease Incidents of National Significance, in consultation with the Australian Health Protection Principal Committee.

Since May, Australian Government Department of Health and Aged Care public health experts have engaged with at-risk communities in partnership with key stakeholders and have been working very closely with their counterparts in state and territory health departments to ensure our response to MPX has been swift and coordinated.

The National Incident Centre has been activated to provide enhanced national coordination to assist states and territories to effectively manage the outbreaks within their jurisdictions.

MPX’s rash and flu-like symptoms are relatively mild, and in most cases, resolve themselves within two to four weeks without the need for specific treatments.

Most cases of MPX in Australia have been among people aged 21 to 40 years. The experience internationally and in Australia to date is most cases have been among gay, bisexual and other men who have sex with men.

Although MPX is not usually considered a sexually transmissible infection, physical contact with an infected person during sexual intercourse carries a significant risk of transmission and intimate physical contact such as hugging, kissing and sexual activities represent a risk of infection, with infectious skin sores being the likely mode of transmission.

The rash usually occurs on the face before spreading to other parts of the body, including the palms of the hands and the soles of the feet. However, in this outbreak it is being seen especially on the genital and perianal regions of affected people.

The rash can vary from person to person and take on the appearance of pimples, blisters or sores. The flu-like symptoms often include fever, chills, body aches, headaches, swollen lymph nodes and tiredness.

The National Medical Stockpile has available stock of MPX treatments, such as antivirals, for states and territories to access on request.

The Australian Technical Advisory Group on Immunisation (ATAGI) has updated clinical guidance on vaccination against monkeypox using the ACAM2000 vaccine to include the use of MVA-BN vaccine to prepare for supplies of the third-generation vaccine being made available in Australia.

Further information about monkeypox is available from the Department of Health and Aged Care’s website www.health.gov.au/health-topics/monkeypox-mpx 

NOTE 

As of 28 July 2022 there were 45 cases (confirmed and probable) of MPX in Australia. This includes 25 in New South Wales, 16 in Victoria, 2 in the Australian Capital Territory, 1 in Queensland and 1 in South Australia [Australian Dept. of Health, 29 July 2022].

Eleven days later, on 8 August, it was reported that the number of cases has risen to 58 cases, with 33 of those cases being found in NSW. All but two cases appear to have been contracted overseas.

NSW Health has begun distribution of the JYNNEOS smallpox vaccine to groups considered vulnerable to MPX.

The Lancet, 30 July 2022:

WHO's declaration on July 23 that the current monkeypox outbreak constitutes a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) was unprecedented. It is the seventh such declaration, but the first made against the advice of a majority of the emergency committee (nine were against, six were for). Dr Tedros’ decision is a brave one. It needs to serve as a global wake-up call. The question is whether it will prompt the escalated efforts required to control the outbreak.

Dr Tedros gave three broad reasons for his decision. “We have an outbreak that has spread around the world rapidly, through new modes of transmission about which we understand too little, and which meets the criteria in the International Health Regulations.” The details make for a compelling case. So far this year, up to July 22, 16016 cases have been reported from 75 countries. Where monkeypox is endemic, such as in DR Congo, large new outbreaks have been reported in diverse populations. Outside of west and central Africa, the outbreak is concentrated, for now, in men-who-have-sex-with-men (MSM). Why the disease's epidemiology has changed is still unclear, as are many other aspects of the outbreak. Recent case series from non-endemic countries have shown differences in clinical features compared with previous reports. Lethargy and fever seem to be less common, and several patients have no prodromal symptoms. Skin lesions are found predominantly in genital or perianal areas. Transmission is known to occur through skin-to-skin contact, but monkeypox DNA has been found in patients’ seminal fluid—whether it represents replication-competent virus remains unknown. The rapid worldwide spread of a disease, for reasons we are unsure of, was clearly an over-riding concern for Dr Tedros. An urgent energised research effort is now needed to understand these and other issues related to the outbreak.

Countries must strengthen public health preparedness and response. Case definitions should be updated and harmonised as new data emerge, with heightened surveillance, case detection, and contact tracing. Patients need to be supported in isolation and treatment, and targeted immunisation might be needed for people at high risk of exposure. Recent experience with COVID-19 might help countries institute these measures but many health systems are at breaking point already. There is a risk too that the public is fatigued by talk of pandemics and their control. Misinformation about monkeypox has already begun to circulate. The public need to be engaged and targeted risk-communication strategies developed. Monkeypox is not COVID-19. The R0 is around 1, and transmission mechanisms are entirely different. The clade of monkeypox that seems to be responsible for the outbreak largely causes mild self-limiting illness, although patients have been admitted to hospital, mainly for pain. Ensuring wide understanding of these points is key for managing public anxiety.

Engagement among many MSM has been high since the outbreak started, and this population is—as ever—keen to take care of its health (and do their part to protect others). Countries that criminalise homosexuality and marginalise LGBTI+ communities risk both patients’ wellbeing and chances of controlling transmission. Stigma and discrimination need to be fought. It would be wrong to categorise monkeypox as a disease of MSM.

The expedited pathways for research, development, regulatory approval, and manufacturing of medical countermeasures developed for COVID-19 should be repurposed for monkeypox. A lack of diagnostic tests is hampering case identification in some countries. Tecovirimat, originally produced to treat smallpox, has been licenced by European regulators for monkeypox, but not yet by the US FDA. Other promising treatments, such as cidofovir and brincidofovir, require clinical study. A monkeypox vaccine (sold as Imvanex in Europe and Jynneos in the USA) has been approved, but supplies of both treatments and vaccines are extremely limited. WHO will have to take a much more muscular approach to ensure global access and avoid the inequities of the COVID-19 response.

Whether or not you agree with WHO's decision, there has undoubtedly been a missed opportunity. Monkeypox is not new. It has been causing illness and death in large numbers for decades. Specialists have long called for affordable countermeasures, strengthened surveillance, and more study. But like Ebola and Zika, monkeypox only commands global attention when it hits high-income countries with predominantly White populations. As a result, the window of opportunity to prevent monkeypox becoming established in communities worldwide is closing. Now is a key moment. It warrants the strongest medical, scientific, and political global effort.

BACKGROUND

World Health Organisation:

Key facts

• Vaccines used during the smallpox eradication programme also provided protection against monkeypox. Newer vaccines have been developed of which one has been approved for prevention of monkeypox

• Monkeypox is caused by monkeypox virus, a member of the Orthopoxvirus genus in the family Poxviridae.

• Monkeypox is usually a self-limited disease with the symptoms lasting from 2 to 4 weeks. Severe cases can occur. In recent times, the case fatality ratio has been around 3–6%.

• Monkeypox is transmitted to humans through close contact with an infected person or animal, or with material contaminated with the virus.

• Monkeypox virus is transmitted from one person to another by close contact with lesions, body fluids, respiratory droplets and contaminated materials such as bedding.

• Monkeypox is a viral zoonotic disease that occurs primarily in tropical rainforest areas of central and west Africa and is occasionally exported to other regions.

• An antiviral agent developed for the treatment of smallpox has also been licensed for the treatment of monkeypox.

• The clinical presentation of monkeypox resembles that of smallpox, a related orthopoxvirus infection which was declared eradicated worldwide in 1980. Monkeypox is less contagious than smallpox and causes less severe illness.

• Monkeypox typically presents clinically with fever, rash and swollen lymph nodes and may lead to a range of medical complications….

Outbreaks

Human monkeypox was first identified in humans in 1970 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in a 9-month-old boy in a region where smallpox had been eliminated in 1968. Since then, most cases have been reported from rural, rainforest regions of the Congo Basin, particularly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and human cases have increasingly been reported from across central and west Africa.

Since 1970, human cases of monkeypox have been reported in 11 African countries: Benin, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, the Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone and South Sudan. The true burden of monkeypox is not known. For example, in 1996–97, an outbreak was reported in the Democratic Republic of the Congo with a lower case fatality ratio and a higher attack rate than usual. A concurrent outbreak of chickenpox (caused by the varicella virus, which is not an orthopoxvirus) and monkeypox was found, which could explain real or apparent changes in transmission dynamics in this case. Since 2017, Nigeria has experienced a large outbreak, with over 500 suspected cases and over 200 confirmed cases and a case fatality ratio of approximately 3%. Cases continue to be reported until today.

Monkeypox is a disease of global public health importance as it not only affects countries in west and central Africa, but the rest of the world. In 2003, the first monkeypox outbreak outside of Africa was in the United States of America and was linked to contact with infected pet prairie dogs. These pets had been housed with Gambian pouched rats and dormice that had been imported into the country from Ghana. This outbreak led to over 70 cases of monkeypox in the U.S. Monkeypox has also been reported in travelers from Nigeria to Israel in September 2018, to the United Kingdom in September 2018, December 2019, May 2021 and May 2022, to Singapore in May 2019, and to the United States of America in July and November 2021. In May 2022, multiple cases of monkeypox were identified in several non-endemic countries. Studies are currently underway to further understand the epidemiology, sources of infection, and transmission patterns.