On
Monday 15 August 2022 Australia learned that before Scott Morrison
lead his government to electoral defeat on 21 May 2022 he had made a
secret power grab at ministerial level in at least five key federal portfolios.
The
news came in a published edited excerpt of a soon to be released book
“Plagued” by two journalists turned authors, who were to
all intents and purposes quite unperturbed by the power grab and perhaps are relying to heavily on pro-Morrison sources for a timeline and explanation of events.
By
Tuesday details were being fleshed out in a Prime Minister Albanese
press conference, in mainstream media articles and on social media.
What
the citizens of Australian learned is as follows.
Between
March 2020 and May 2021 Prime Minister Morrison, already
having the existing ministerial responsibility for the portfolio of Prime Minister and
Cabinet and still being Minister
for the Public Service, secretly became a multiple ‘co-minister’ and, as yet there is no proof offered that he did not remain a
multiple ‘co-minister’ until 23 May 2022.
Morrison
became portfolio ‘co-ministers’ with:
1. Greg
Hunt
on
14 March 2020, the
then
Minister for Health from
24.1.2017
to 23.5.2022;
2. Mathias
Cormann
on
30
March 2020, the then
Minister for Finance from
28.8.2018 to 30.10.2020 and subsequently Simon
Birmingham
Minister for Finance from 30.10.2020 to 23.5.2022;
3. It
appears that from 15 April
2021 Morrison
may also have been a secret minister with some portfolio power during
the period Angus
Taylor
was Acting Minister for Industry, Science and Technology from
19.9.2021 to 8.10.2021 and then
permanent
Minister for Industry, Energy and Emissions Reduction from 8.10.2021
to 23.5.2022. He
was indeed a co-minister when
Keith Pitt
became the Minister for Resources and Water from 2.7.2021 to 23.5.2022;
4. Karen
Andrews
on
6
May 2021, the then
Minister for Home Affairs from
30.3.2021 to 23.5.2022. On 6 May when Morrison became a 'co-minister' the Minister for Home Affairs had administrative & legal powers derived from a portfolio covering immigration,
cyber security, the Australian Federal Police and the domestic
intelligence agency, ASIO; and
5. Josh
Frydenberg on 6 May 2021, the then Treasurer from 28.8.2018 to
23.5.2022.
Given
that over the time Scott Morrison was prime minister there were three
versions of a full ministry list – the first
ministry on 26 August 2018,
the reshuffle
on 26 May 2019 and the
second
ministry on 8 October 2021
– it appears that other former ministers may be in the process of finding
out that Morrison saw himself as ‘owning’ their ministries as well.
I
refer to ministers “finding out”, because apart from Greg Hunt
who knew from the very beginning, no other minister whose ministerial
power was deliberately weakened by this political 'land grab' had any idea at
the time that Morrison could at anytime meddle in their portfolios
or countermand their decisions at will. Keith Pitt only appears to have found out after
the fact, when he had a decision made as resource minister
countermanded by Morrison on political grounds.
ABC News confirmed that Home Affairs Secretary Mike Pezzullo was never informed that the
Prime Minister had also been sworn into the portfolio in May 2021,
alongside existing minister Karen Andrews.
The former Deputy Prime Minister and National Party Leader Barnaby Joyce alleges that he had known Morrison was joint Minister for Resources with Pitt since sometime in December 2021. He also chose to remain silent on the issue.
From
the outside looking in and based on an unfolding situation, it would
appear that in the days or weeks before 14 March 2021 there were two
original political co-conspirators, Scott Morrison and then
Attorney-General Christian Porter.
At some point before 14 March
Minister for Health Greg Hunt agreed to be a ‘co-minister’, with
Morrison the behind-the-scenes second health minister no-one would
know about.
An obliging and unquestioning Governor-General agreed to appoint Morrison
by administrative instrument as a minister responsible for the health portfolio and later as a minister in four other portfolios. Allegedly assenting to Morrison becoming minister based solely on Morrison’s own advice as a member of and chief advisor on the Federal Executive Council and, just as
obligingly failing to mention this fact to a soul.
It
would seem that the ease with which Morrison had expanded his political and
legal powers in health and finance may have gone to his head. For over the next 14 months
Morrison indulged his ego and political greed for power by making himself a
co-minister with direct administrative power over at least another three portfolios.
Speaking on 2GB radio on Tuesday 16 August Morrison admits to giving himself ministerial power in relation to health, finance and resources portfolios but did not recall any others.
There
is a strong suspicion that the range of powers Scott Morrison gave
himself may be revealed as much wider than previously thought. The Advocate on 16 August 2022 reported that; An
administrative arrangements order for the social services portfolio
was signed by Mr Morrison and Governor-General David Hurley on June
28, 2021, on top of him being privately sworn in to other ministries.
It should be noted that a number of previous Administrative Arrangements Orders coming into effect from February 2020 onwards and co-signed by the current Governor-General and then Prime Minister Morrison, had their schedules amended
by Orders in Council dated 5 March, 2 &15 April 2020 and 10 & 28 June, 2 July 2021.
Additionally, there is speculation in the media that another former Morrison Government cabinet minister (besides Hunt and Porter) had to have known in March 2020 that Morrison was planning a takeover of the health and finance portfolios.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
UPDATES
Department
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet,
17 August 2022:
The
instruments by which the then Prime Minister, the Hon Scott Morrison
MP, was appointed to portfolios other than the Department of the
Prime Minister and Cabinet during 2020 and 2021.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
BACKGROUND
The
Australian Online,
Monday 15 August 2022:
Secret
plan
By
March 18, Covid-19 was spreading internationally and in the
Australian community. Australia’s daily case numbers were running
in triple digits. The pace of the virus was accelerating and with
vastly more serious measures likely to be required, Morrison was
worried that even national cabinet might not always be able to act
quickly enough.
He
and Hunt had been considering a drastic measure, invoking the
emergency powers – the so-called trumping provisions – under the
little-known section 475 of the Biosecurity Act which would empower
the Governor-General to declare a “human biosecurity emergency”.
A
declaration under section 475 gave Hunt as health minister exclusive
and extraordinary powers. He, and only he, could personally make
directives that overrode any other law and were not disallowable by
parliament. He had authority to direct any citizen in the country to
do something, or not do something, to prevent spread of the disease.
Morrison
knew that if he asked the Governor-General to invoke section 475, he
effectively would be handing Hunt control of the country. If they
were going to use them, Morrison wanted protocols set up as well as a
formal process to impose constraints. The protocols required the
minister to provide written medical advice and advance notice of his
intentions to the national security cabinet.
However,
Morrison wasn’t satisfied, feeling that there needed to be more
checks and balances before any single minister could wield such
powers. One option was to delegate the powers to cabinet, but
attorney-general Christian Porter’s advice was these powers could
not be delegated and could reside only with the health minister.
Morrison
then hatched a radical and until now secret plan with Porter’s
approval. He would swear himself in as health minister alongside
Hunt. Such a move was without precedent, let alone being done in
secret, but the trio saw it as an elegant solution to the problem
they were trying to solve – safeguarding against any one minister
having absolute power.
Porter
advised that it could be done through an administrative instrument
and didn’t need appointment by the Governor-General, with no
constitutional barrier to having two ministers appointed to
administer the same portfolio.
“I
trust you, mate,” Morrison told Hunt, “but I’m swearing myself
in as health minister, too.”
It
would also be useful if one of them caught Covid and became
incapacitated. Hunt not only accepted the measure but welcomed it.
Considering the economic measures the government was taking, and the
significant fiscal implications and debt that was being incurred,
Morrison also swore himself in as finance minister alongside Mathias
Cormann. He wanted to ensure there were two people who had their
hands on the purse strings.
This
is an edited extract from Plagued by Simon Benson and Geoff Chambers,
published by Pantera Press. Out Tuesday.
Scott Morrison's 16 August 2022 Facebook response to being discovered, in which he appears to argue that the risk of ministers being incapacitated by COVID-19 required their ministerial powers to be solely concentrated in his person rather than in the pool of around 30 other ministers and 17 assistant ministers:
Scott
Morrison (ScoMo)
The
devastating impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and associated recession
required an unprecedented policy response from our Government.
These
were extraordinary times and they required extraordinary measures to
respond. Our Government’s overriding objective was to save lives
and livelihoods, which we achieved. To achieve this we needed to
ensure continuity of government and robust administrative
arrangements to deal with the unexpected in what was a period of
constant uncertainty during the nation’s biggest crisis outside of
wartime.
Information
and advice changed daily and even hourly. Meetings with Ministers,
officials and advisers were constant, as was liaison with industry
and other stakeholders as we were dealing with everything from supply
chain shocks to business closures, the overwhelming of the social
security and hospital system and the sourcing of critical medical
supplies and workforce. The prospect of civil disruption, extensive
fatalities and economic collapse was real, especially in the early
stages, which was occurring in other parts of the world.
The
risk of Ministers becoming incapacitated, sick, hospitalised,
incapable of doing their work at a critical hour or even fatality was
very real. The Home Affairs Minister was struck down with COVID-19
early in the pandemic and the UK Prime Minister was on a ventilator
and facing the very real prospect of dying of COVID-19.
The
Parliament was suspended from sitting for a time and Cabinet and
others meetings were unable to be held face to face, as occurred with
businesses and the public more generally.
As
Prime Minister I considered it necessary to put in place safeguards,
redundancies and contingencies to ensure the continuity and effective
operation of Government during this crisis period, which extended for
the full period of my term.
To
ensure oversight, the Government, with the support of the Opposition,
established a concurrent public Senate Inquiry into the management of
COVID that effectively ran for the duration of my term as Prime
Minister.
In
addition I took the precaution of being given authority to administer
various departments of state should the need arise due to incapacity
of a Minister or in the national interest. This was done in relation
to departments where Ministers were vested with specific powers under
their legislation that were not subject to oversight by Cabinet,
including significant financial authorities.
Given
the significant nature of many of these powers I considered this to
be a prudent and responsible action as Prime Minister.
It
is not uncommon for multiple Ministers to be sworn to administer the
same Department. However, given that such additional Ministers were
in a more junior position in the relevant Departments, and would not
be familiar with all the details of the pandemic response, I
considered it appropriate that the redundancy be put in place at a
higher level within the Government and not at a more junior level.
The
major Department for which this was considered was the Health
Department, given the extensive powers afforded to the Minister by
the Biosecurity Act. This was put in place on March 14, 2020. The
Department of Finance was added on March 30, 2020.
As
an added administrative precaution, as a ‘belts and braces’
approach, the Departments of Treasury and Home Affairs were added
some time after in May 2021. I did not consider it was likely that it
would be necessary to exercise powers in these areas, but the future
was very difficult to predict during the pandemic. As events
demonstrated with the resurgence of COVID-19 in the second half of
2021, we could never take certainty for granted. In hindsight these
arrangements were unnecessary and until seeking advice from the
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet today, I had not recollected
these arrangements having been put in place. There was a lot going on
at the time.
Thankfully
it was not necessary for me to trigger use of any of these powers. In
the event that I would have to use such powers I would have done so
disclosing the authority by which I was making such decisions. The
authority was pre approved to ensure there would be no delay in being
able to make decisions or take actions should the need arise.
The
crisis was a highly dynamic environment and it was important to plan
ahead and take what precautions could lawfully be put in place to
ensure I could act, as Prime Minister, if needed.
It
is important to note that throughout this time Ministers in all
Departments, where I was provided with authority to act, exercised
full control of their Departments and portfolios without
intervention. Ministerial briefs were not copied to me as Prime
Minister in a co-Minister capacity, as this was not the nature of the
arrangement. These arrangements were there as a ‘break glass in
case of emergency’ safeguard. I also did not wish Ministers to be
second guessing themselves or for there to be the appearance to be a
right of appeal or any diminishing of their authority to exercise
their responsibilities, as this was not the intention of putting
these arrangements in place. I simply wanted them to get on with
their job, which they did admirably and I am grateful for their
service.
The
decision in relation to the Department of Industry, Energy and
Resources was undertaken in April 2021 for separate reasons. This was
the consequence of my decision to consider the issues of the PEP11
license directly. Under the legislation the decision is not taken by
Cabinet, but unilaterally by a Minister with authority to administer
that Department. I sought and was provided with the authority to
administer matters in relation to this Department and considered this
issue observing all the necessary advice and issues pertaining to the
matter before making a decision, without prejudice, which I announced
publicly. Once having been given the authority to consider this
matter I advised the Minister of my intention to do so and proceeded
to consider the matter. I retained full confidence in Minister Pitt
who
I
was pleased to have serve in my Ministry. I believe I made the right
decision in the national interest. This was the only matter I
involved myself directly with in this or any other Department.
The
use of the powers by a Prime Minister to exercise authority to
administer Departments has clearly caused concern. I regret this, but
acted in good faith in a crisis.
I
used such powers on one occasion only. I did not seek to interfere
with Ministers in the conduct of their portfolio as there were no
circumstances that warranted their use, except in the case of the
Department of Industry, Science, Energy and Resources which I have
explained.
The
pandemic has been a difficult time for Australia, although we have
performed better than almost any other developed country in the
world. There is no guide book in these circumstances and there is
much commentary that will be offered in hindsight from the comfort of
relatively calmer conditions. It is not surprising that some of this
commentary will have a partisan or other motive, but that’s
politics. In a democracy it is a positive thing for these issues to
be discussed and for experience to inform future decisions and I hope
my statement will help inform that process.
I
have endeavoured to set out the context and reasoning for the
decisions I took as Prime Minister in a highly unusual time. I did so
in good faith, seeking to exercise my responsibilities as Prime
Minister which exceeded those of any other member of the Government,
or Parliament. For any offence to my colleagues I apologise. I led an
outstanding team who did an excellent job and provided me great
service and loyalty as Ministers.
