Snapshot of former Australian prime minister & Liberal MP for Cook (far right) with his former deputy prime minister & Nationals MP for New England Barnaby Joyce (far left) belatedly swearing the Oath of Allegiance in the House of Representatives on Monday, 1 August 2022. IMAGE: Snapshot of House of Representatives video segment.
 |
| Sleeping on the job? IMAGE: via @BronwynHill1 |
I don’t appreciate being interrupted while speaking on serious risks of repeated covid infections.
— Dr Monique Ryan MP (@Mon4Kooyong) August 1, 2022
I particularly don’t appreciate being interrupted by shouting LNP MPs who refuse to wear masks.
We all have a duty to look after each other. Here & everywhere.
Put your mask on! pic.twitter.com/u5evZ0k4Oi
“The former NSW premier, Gladys Berejiklian, was reported in 2020 as saying that pork barrelling was “not an illegal practice”. The former prime minister of Australia, Scott Morrison, was recently reported as saying, in relation to any federal integrity commission that may be established, that such a body should focus on identifying criminal behaviour rather than subjective questions such as whether spending in respect of marginal seats amounts to pork barrelling. Mr Morrison added, “No one is suggesting anyone has broken any laws, are they?”.
The discussion below answers such suggestions with a clear statement: pork barrelling can indeed amount to a breach of the law, including the criminal law, and in some circumstances, it can also constitute serious corrupt conduct under the ICAC Act.” [NSW ICAC Report On Investigation Into Pork Barrelling In NSW, August 2022]
NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), media release, 1 August 2022:
ICAC finds pork barrelling could be corrupt, recommends grant funding guidelines be subject to statutory regulation
The NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) has found that pork barrelling could constitute corrupt conduct in certain circumstances, while recommending that any whole–of–government guidelines concerning grants funding be issued pursuant to a statutory regulation.
The Commission released its Report on investigation into pork barrelling in NSW (Operation Jersey), today, in which it defines pork barrelling as “the allocation of public funds and resources to targeted electors for partisan political purposes”. In the report, the Commission finds that while individual matters should always be assessed on a case-by-case basis, a minister, for example, may engage in corrupt conduct involving pork barrelling, within the meaning of section 8 of the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988, if the minister:
influences a public servant to exercise decision-making powers vested in the public servant, or to fulfil an official function, such as providing an assessment of the merits of grants, in a dishonest or partial way
applies downward pressure to influence a public servant to exercise decision-making powers vested in the public servant, or to fulfil an official function, such as providing an assessment of the merits of grants, in a manner which knowingly involves the public servant in a breach of public trust
conducts a merit-based grants scheme in such a way as to dishonestly favour political and private advantage over merit, undermining public confidence in public administration, and benefiting political donors and/or family members
deliberately exercises a power to approve grants in a manner that favours family members, party donors or party interests in electorates, contrary to the guidelines of a grant program which state that the grants are to be made on merit according to criteria
exercises a power to make grants in favour of marginal electorates, when this is contrary to the purpose for which the power was given.
The report notes that those who exercise public or official powers in a manner inconsistent with the public purpose for which the powers were conferred betray public trust and so misconduct themselves. The Commission also finds that pork barrelling could satisfy section 9 of the ICAC Act. It may do so, for example, by conduct amounting to a substantial breach of the Ministerial Code of Conduct, or the Members’ Code of Conduct, or conduct constituting or involving the common law offence of misconduct in public office.
The Commission notes that in issuing this report, it intends to make it clear that ministers and their advisers “do not have an unfettered discretion to distribute public funds. The exercise of ministerial discretion is subject to the rule of law, which ensures that it must accord with public trust and accountability principles.”
Altogether, the Commission makes 21 recommendations to help prevent or better regulate pork barrelling. These also include that:
the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 be amended to mirror section 71 of the Commonwealth Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 by including obligations that a minister must not approve expenditure of money unless satisfied that the expenditure would be an efficient, effective, economical and ethical use of the money and that the expenditure represents value for money
the grant funding framework, or equivalent requirements, apply to the local government sector. This should include situations where local councils are both grantees and grantors
clause 6 of the Ministerial Code of Conduct be amended to read, “A Minister, in the exercise or performance of their official functions, must not act dishonestly, must act in the public interest, and must not act improperly for their private benefit or for the private benefit of any other person”.
The Commission’s report follows an investigation it commenced in May 2020 into the NSW Government’s Stronger Community’s Fund. Following an inquiry by the NSW Legislative Council’s Public Accountability Committee, a performance audit by the NSW Auditor-General, an assessment by the State Archives and Records Authority and a review into grants administration in NSW (led by the Department of Premier and Cabinet in partnership with the NSW Productivity Commissioner), the Commission revised its investigation scope. It determined that it was in the public interest to examine and report on the circumstances where, it had concluded, pork barrelling could involve serious breaches of public trust and conduct that could amount to corrupt conduct.
To assist its investigation, the Commission engaged a number of experts to prepare papers and participate in a public forum held on 3 June 2022. The report represents the view of the Commission but draws on the analysis of these experts. The report is available on the Commission’s website.
_____ENDS_____
In which it is revealed just how much wiggle room there is left to the Perrottet Government that would allow it to proceed with business-as-usual pork barrelling if it continues to support Recommendation 2 in the April 2022 Review of grants administration in NSW: Final Report. As well as its lukewarm "in principal" support for the creation of law to hold members of parliament accountable.....
Excerpts from NSW ICAC Report On Investigation Into Pork Barrelling In NSW, August 2022 which include parts of the transcript of the NSW ICAC Forum on Pork Barrelling held 3 June 2022:
At Page 6:
Also in 2020, the NSW Auditor-General announced a performance audit of the SCF, and the Public Accountability Committee (PAC) of the NSW Legislative Council established an inquiry into NSW grant programs (including the SCF). The reports issued by the Auditor-General (in February 2022) and the PAC (in March 2021 and February 2022) made numerous observations about the management of the SCF, including adverse findings. The State Archives and Records Authority (SARA) also released a report in January 2021, dealing with recordkeeping aspects of the SCF.
In November 2021, Premier the Hon Dominic Perrottet MP announced a review of grants administration in NSW. Given the existing findings and review processes concerning the SCF, the Commission decided that it was not in the public interest to continue investigative action that could have led to adverse findings against any individual. Consequently, the scope of the Commission’s investigation was revised to focus on the practice of pork barrelling more broadly and, in particular, whether it could allow, encourage or cause corrupt conduct (chapter 1).
At Page 78:
Now, in November 2021 the new Premier Dominic Perrottet stated that “Taxpayers expect the distribution of public funds will be fair and I share that expectation,” he said. He ordered a review of how grants should be administered and this was a very good sign that something might actually be done to prevent the recurrence of such abuses in the spending of public money. Now, that report was published quite recently in April. Some of its recommendations are very good, such as the creation of a new guide on grants management to better ensure documentation and critically transparency.
So that’s the first step that needs to be taken. In my view I don’t think it goes far enough. First, the obligations on ministers and their staff in relation to grants need to be imposed by law, not just in a premier’s memorandum and was proposed in that report. And this is because other accountability provisions in codes of conduct and statutes such as the ICAC Act turn on whether there has been breach of a law, not a premier’s memorandum, a law. So for example if a minister has behaved in a partial manner and his or her behaviour would cause a reasonable person to believe that it would bring the integrity of the office or parliament itself into serious disrepute, a finding of corrupt conduct can be made by ICAC if the minister’s acts also constitute breach of a law, not a premier’s memorandum, a law. [my yellow highlighting]
Similarly, clause 5 of the Ministerial Code of Conduct requires a minister not to direct or request a public service agency to act contrary to a law. Burying grants rules in a memorandum rather than in a law avoids consequences for ministers if they breach those rules or if they instruct others to do so. Another problem is the failure to address the issue of grants being made for the advantage of a political party including when they are election promises. Now, at the Commonwealth level the use of ad hoc noncompetitive grants to give effect to election promises has resulted in rules about merit and proper assessments being tossed out the window.
Any new state grant rules should explicitly provide that grants must only be allocated in the public interest and not predominantly for party political purposes. New grants rules should also contain express provisions to prevent avoidance and to ensure that election promises must still be subject to proper scrutiny and merit assessment.
At Page 128:
The second thing is that I think that we’ve got to recognise that at a Commonwealth level those statutory or the rules that have the force of law, you know, are crucial. I think we should remember that in the sports rorts affair, the main recommendation of the Australian National Audit Office there in relation to that was to bring those grants within those guidelines, and ministerial decision-making about grants within those guidelines. It was recommendation 4 and the government accepted it on the spot. So it’s a bit like saying, yep, actually we’re a bit scared now but we’re going to accept that recommendation. So actually to say that nothing was done is not accurate because, in fact, the system was pushed in the right direction. But I think the key problem is those mechanisms for transparency around when ministers decide to deviate from their official advice, making those mechanisms real so that there’s a real deterrent to poor or partisan decision making. Because we have the problem of corruption in plain sight. There’s plenty of people, I suspect that John Barilaro might have been one of them, who would say, “Yeah, we’ll just do it openly. We’ll just say, yeah, these are the reasons,” and, you know, and dare anybody to tell us that this is not in the public interest. So we’ve actually got, that’s got to work in a way that actually can be a realistic disincentive to make poor decisions while not stopping the ability to make good decisions. That’s quite a complex thing to get right at the end of the day in politics, I think.
The third thing is that the – and I would absolutely agree with what Joe just said, I think that goes to the problems maybe in the report and the problems with the codes of conduct at the moment, is this focus on public versus private. They have to more actively and explicitly deal with what we’re talking about here, that it’s not a contest between public duty and private personal gain, that it’s something more complicated than that and that the guidance on that in codes of conduct that are then properly enforced is as crucial as anything else, because it’s one of the few ways that we’ve got to actually support good decision-making culture amongst politicians and actually influence their understanding of what they’re doing. Otherwise it just turns into Whac-A-Mole, you know, what they’re currently getting away with over here they will just try and get away with over there because they believe that they’re doing the right thing. We’ve got to create a framework where it’s more clearly understood why this is not the right thing. So that’s number three. Number four is, I would go back to the electoral bribery offence and actually recast the electoral bribery offences to make it clear that pork barrelling can be electoral bribery, which is currently not, it’s currently written in the other direction so that it’s actually a clear warning in criminal law where it needs to be. You don’t need to be an expert in public trust and misconduct in public office to say giving people money to influence how they vote, or how that immediate community votes, is actually problematic in criminal law directly.
At Page 173:
Allegations of pork-barrelling have also occurred at the State level. In recent times, they have been directed at sports grants, arts grants and bushfire relief funds, amongst other funding programs.
In November 2020, the then Premier, Gladys Berejiklian, admitted that the payment of grants to local councils from the Stronger Communities Fund in the period prior to the previous election amounted to pork-barrelling, but claimed it was ‘not an illegal practice’. The Premier also later justified ‘throwing money at seats to keep them’, arguing that this was part of ‘democracy’. In response to questions about why grants were made contrary to the advice of public servants she observed that Departments were not expert at ‘winning byelections’.
It seems, however, politicians are not expert at it either and that pork-barrelling is not terribly effective, despite the strong, but misguided, belief of politicians that they can use public money to buy electoral success.
 |
| Via @talkingkoala |
A message from the New South Wales Legislative Assembly
9 August 2022
The ePetition "End Public Native Forest Logging" has closed for signatures and has been presented in the Legislative Assembly by Mrs Shelley Hancock.
The ePetition text in full is:
To the Speaker and Members of the Legislative Assembly,
Public native forest logging is pushing iconic species like the koala, swift parrot and greater glider towards extinction.
The 2019/20 Black Summer bushfires burnt over 5 million hectares of forest and have left them more vulnerable to the impacts of logging. The Natural Resources Commission (NRC) and the Environmental Protection Agency have recommended that in bushfire affected areas logging should cease entirely or face tighter restrictions, as current logging practices may cause irreversible damage to ecosystems and wildlife.
Logging of public native forests is tax-payer subsidised. Forestry Corporation’s Hardwood Division has been operating at a significant loss for the past decade. In 2020/21 it ran at a loss of $20 million, with predictions that it will face losses of $15 million until 2024.
Reports also show our state forests can generate far more income through their protection than from logging, through recreation, tourism and carbon abatement.
The Western Australian and Victorian Governments have already committed to ending this industry and have developed transition plans to support affected workers and businesses.
The petitioners ask the Legislative Assembly to:
1. Develop a plan to transition the native forestry industry to 100% sustainable plantations by 2024.
2. In the interim, place a moratorium on public native forest logging until the regulatory framework reflects the recommendations of the leaked NRC report.
3. Immediately protect high-conservation value forests through gazettal in the National Parks estate.
4. Ban use of native forest materials as biomass fuel.
The ePetition received 21046 signatures and has been sent to the NSW Government for a response.
You will receive an email with a link to the response when it is received.
As the ePetition received more than 20,000 signatures, it will also be debated in the Legislative Assembly at 4pm on 15/09/2022.
You can watch the debate on the webcast at https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/pages/la-webcast-page.aspx
Ms. Taneska Frank’s e-petition was signed by a total of 21,046 NSW residents by the end of the petition period on 2 August 2022.
 |
| Via @talkingkoala |
In February-March 2022 and again in April the seven local government areas in the Northern Rivers region experienced heavy rainfall events, with some local rainfall exceeding historical records that had been kept since the late 1800s. These rainfall events were exacerbated by at least one large East-Coast Low stormfront.
The flood which occurred while often expected, was at times unpredictable in its behaviour, record breaking in its spread, highly destructive and, in the case of Lismore City local government area calamitous.
The 100 kilometre wide coastal zone of New South Wales experienced natural disaster on a scale that would have been hard to imagine before climate change began to widen our experience.
Post-flooding, a state parliamentary select committee was established to inquire into and report on the response to major flooding across New South Wales in 2022. Terms of reference were referred to the committee by the NSW Legislative Council on 23 March 2022 and Report No.1 was published on 9 August 2022.
Set out below is the full report in scrollable form.
However, right now I would note eight of the twenty-one findings of the report. I am sure that many Northern Rivers residents will recognise concerns which local communities have raised repeatedly across the years in times of flood.
Especially once state government decided emergency service headquarters, coordination functions and staff/volunteer numbers were to be either downsized or moved further south and away from north-east New South Wales.
Finding 1
That the NSW State Emergency Service and Resilience NSW failed as lead agencies to provide adequate leadership and effective coordination during the major flooding of February-March 2022.
Finding 2
That NSW Government agencies lacked coordination, created confusion and responded poorly in the February-March 2022 floods, resulting in the North Coast community being let down in their greatest time of need.
Finding 3
That demarcation disputes and a lack of integration between NSW Government agencies slowed the roll-out of support and assistance to those affected by the February-March 2022 floods.
Finding 4
That NSW Government agencies and the Bureau of Meteorology were not prepared for, nor did they comprehend the scale of the February-March 2022 floods, and some agencies were criticised for treating it as a nine to five business operation.
Finding 5
That the centralisation of the NSW State Emergency Service and a shortage of volunteers significantly hindered the ability of the agency to lead the response to the major flooding of February-March 2022.
.......
Finding 7
That the NSW State Emergency Service failed in its public communication of flood warnings and evacuation information during the February-March 2022 floods, by issuing out of date, inaccurate and confusing messages.
Finding 8
That NSW Government agencies and telecommunications providers failed to ensure that communities affected by the February-March 2022 floods had adequate emergency communications capabilities.
Finding 9
That, notwithstanding the role of the NSW State Emergency Service to perform rescues, individual members of the community had no other option but to ignore government advice and save lives, which was only possible due to local and historical knowledge and local communication, given information from the NSW State Emergency Service and the Bureau of Meteorology was incorrect and out of date.
NSW Parliament, Legislative Council, Inquiry Report No 1 - Response to Major Flooding Across New South Wale... by clarencegirl on Scribd
Chair's Foreword
Major flooding in NSW in February-March 2022 was a catastrophic disaster, causing widespread devastation and damage – particularly in the Northern Rivers and Hawkesbury regions. Tragically, lives were lost, thousands of homes were damaged or destroyed, and significant local infrastructure was damaged.
Five months later, families are homeless with some still living in tents, businesses are still waiting for long-promised assistance, and there are still unresolved policy matters involving buy-backs and land swaps – to name just a few of the myriad remaining pressing problems.
This inquiry was set up to consider the NSW Government's preparedness, coordination, and response to the flooding events. While this report outlines many of the failures of the NSW Government, it also seeks to ensure that the Government is better prepared and coordinated when the next natural disaster of this nature inevitably occurs.
A considerable focus of this inquiry was on the performance of the NSW State Emergency Service (SES), as the leading agency for emergency response, and Resilience NSW as the leading agency in recovery.
Ultimately, the committee found that these two organisations failed to provide leadership and effective coordination in the community’s greatest time of need. Demarcation disputes and a lack of integration slowed the roll-out of support and assistance to flood-affected communities.
The State Government’s failure to implement a streamlined grants process also meant that applicants were repeatedly interviewed, and had to re-live their experiences, leading to further frustration and trauma as part of the support process.
With respect to the NSW SES, it is clear that the centralisation of this organisation, and a shortage of volunteers, significantly hindered the ability of the agency to lead the emergency response. In many cases, flood warnings and evacuation information were out of date, inaccurate and confusing. Further still, many community members felt that they had no choice but to conduct their own rescues in dangerous conditions as many calls for assistance to 000 and the NSW SES went unanswered.
Put simply, the community was forced to save themselves; neighbour saving neighbour. While this is an admirable testament to these communities, it is both unreasonable and undesirable as a matter of public policy. For these reasons, the NSW Government should consider restructuring the SES to ensure that it better harnesses local knowledge and networks, coordinates more closely with other rescue agencies, and increases resources, including by driving volunteer recruitment.
Resilience NSW demonstrated some of the biggest failures of the NSW Government's response to the floods. Witnesses repeatedly expressed frustration and were confused about the role of Resilience NSW, particularly in the recovery phase following the floods. The committee found that the NSW Government failed to comprehend the scale of the floods and treated the disaster response as a “nine to five” business operation – when it was one of the greatest natural disasters in generations.
The agency failed to engage or coordinate with community groups leading flood recovery efforts in their communities. This was despite Resilience NSW having been established almost two years ago.
Accordingly, the NSW Government must consider the viability of Resilience NSW unless it can ensure that the agency's role is clear after reviewing policies, objectives, and funding; and that the organisation and its policies are apt to actually meet community disaster response needs.
It is this chair’s view that the NSW Government should abolish Resilience NSW.
Our focus is now on the enormous task of clean-up, restoration and reconstruction. Many flood affected individuals, families and businesses still need assistance. The NSW Government must work with much greater urgency to secure temporary housing options as many continue to live in tents and cars near their homes.
The committee also calls on the government to finalise its long term housing options and ensure that it considers investing in supporting relocations, land swaps, and providing fair compensation for landowners who wish to relocate from severely flood-impacted areas.The committee also made practical recommendations such as providing satellite phones and satellite terminals to community hubs in flood-prone areas.
The committee has noted evidence that – following the appointment of NSW Police Force Deputy Commissioner, Mal Lanyon, to the role of Northern NSW Recovery Coordinator – recovery efforts significantly improved, and that he provided much-needed leadership. The Committee has accordingly recommended a senior police officer with 'combat' experience should lead recovery efforts in future natural disasters as a matter of policy.
On behalf of the committee, I would like to thank the flood-affected communities and individuals who took the time to share their stories with us. It is the committee’s wish that this report will help to improve the NSW Government's response to future natural disasters to minimise adverse effects on local communities.
In total, the committee made 21 findings and 37 recommendations. The committee received almost 90 submissions and almost 120 responses to its online questionnaire. It held six public hearings. This included ones in Ballina; Lismore; Murwillumbah; Windsor; and two at Parliament House.
Significantly, the Committee held four public forums. We hope they were regarded as valuable by flood-stricken communities, given that they allowed 75 flood-affected individuals to speak directly under parliamentary privilege to the committee.
Furthermore, I wish to acknowledge the political leaders – at all three levels of government – who put aside their differences to support their communities. They all cooperated with this inquiry, providing forthright and honest views. This was appreciated.
Finally, I would like to thank my committee colleagues for their collaboration, and the secretariat — particularly Tina Higgins, Shaza Barbar, Stephen Fujiwara and Andrew Ratchford, as well as Hansard staff for their professional assistance on this important Inquiry.
The Hon Walt Secord MLC
Committee Chair
According to the 2021 Census, around half the people aged 15 years of age and older living in the seven local government areas of north east New South Wales have personal incomes averaging from $0 to $645 a week - which is way below the state average of $813 a week and the national average of $805 a week. Included in these figures would be the individual weekly incomes of those local residents who receive full aged pensions.
One sometimes sees media coverage that describes this part of the state as a low income region. Indeed, the region made NCOSS mapping of economic disadvantage - coming in at between est. 8.7% to 21.3% of the population experiencing economic disadvantage across the region in 2016. By the same token, in 2016 the NSW Government rated the region's local government areas on the "Index of Relative Socio-economic Advantage and Disadvantage" (IRSAD) as between only 1 to 8 points where "1" represents most disadvantaged and "129" least disadvantaged relative to other state local government areas.
We live in a beautiful region but are not unaware that life can be a quiet struggle for many in our communities. Sometimes it is even ourselves, our own families and friends who struggle.
It should come as no surprise that when poverty in Australia is officially defined, none of those doing the defining are classed as poor or living in poverty.
Sometimes it seems the voices of those with no incomes or low incomes are confined to short quotes in submissions made to governments by registered charities and lobby groups.
So how, by way of example, are those living below a current poverty line doing financially in 2022, according to the professors, researchers and statisticians in one self-styled “pre-eminent economic and social policy research centre”?
Melbourne Institute: Applied Economic & Social Research,
POVERTY LINES: AUSTRALIA, MARCH QUARTER 2022, July 2022, p. 4 of 4:
 |
| Click on image to enlarge |
Although this March Quarter comparison table gives an indication of disposable income it is uncertain if it takes account of rising inflation in 2022, given the only table included in the report which factors in Cost Price Index ends its calculations in 2020-21.
What it does calculate is that total maximum weekly disposable income in all but one of the pension and allowance categories is well below an Australian poverty line established in 1964.
However, in doing so the report attempts to minimise the lived experience of others by, in the first instance by broadly assuming that all cats are black in the dark and differences in individual circumstances don't matter and long as final percentage totals reach 100.
As one example. Not every single lone aged or disability pensioner who rents and is eligible for rent assistance actually receives rent assistance as disposable income or that such rent assistance amount is credited to their actual real life cash rent payments. In New South Wales alone it is likely that somewhere in the vicinity of 58,924 lone pensioners who rent are affected. That number of NSW aged and disability pensioners are likely receiving a total weekly disposable income derived solely from welfare payments which is not as the report suggests $59.49 above a poverty line in 2022 but in fact is an est. $11.91 below that same poverty line.
In the second instance the report minimises the lived experience of others by choosing to define all those receiving federal government cash transfers through Centrelink as being better off in March Quarter 2022 than they were in the last 49 years up to 30 June 2021.
The sources referred to, the many qualifications applied in compiling this data or even the contents of the four tables, will not be what media commentators, political advisors and public servants take away with them after reading.
No, what will be remembered is the impression given that all pensioners live above the poverty line instead of that most live in deeper poverty than that benchmark and the statement; “Put another way, the real purchasing power of the income at the poverty line rose by 60.7 percent between 1973/74 and 2020/21.”
BACKGROUND
Melbourne Institute: Applied Economic & Social Research,
POVERTY LINES: AUSTRALIA, MARCH QUARTER 2022:
What are the Poverty Lines?
Poverty lines are income levels designated for various types of income units. If the income of an income unit is less than the poverty line applicable to it, then the unit is considered to be in poverty. An income unit is the family group normally supported by the income of the unit.
How the Poverty Lines are Calculated
The poverty lines are based on a benchmark income of $62.70 per week for the December quarter 1973 established by the Henderson poverty inquiry. The benchmark income was the disposable income required to support the basic needs of a family of two adults and two dependent children. Poverty lines for other types of family are derived from the benchmark using a set of equivalence scales. The poverty lines are updated to periods subsequent to the benchmark date using an index of per capita household disposable income. A detailed description of the calculation and use of poverty lines is published in the Australian Economic Review, 4th Quarter 1987 and a discussion of their limitations is published in the Australian Economic Review, 1st Quarter 1996.
The Poverty Lines for the March Quarter 2022
The Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research has updated the poverty line for Australia to the March quarter 2022. Inclusive of housing costs, the poverty line is $1,148.15 per week for a family comprising two adults, one of whom is working, and two dependent children. This is an increase of $5.16 from the poverty line for the previous quarter (December 2021). Poverty lines for the benchmark household and other household types are shown in Table 1.
The Poverty Lines are Estimates
As has been stated in paragraph 2, the poverty lines are based on an index of per capita household disposable income. The index is calculated from estimates of household disposable income and population provided by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). Because the index is based on estimates, the poverty lines themselves will be estimates. As more information becomes available, the ABS may update population and household disposable income estimates for previous quarters. Whenever these estimates are changed, it is necessary to re-estimate the poverty lines. Accordingly, in addition to providing estimates of current poverty lines, we provide sufficient information for readers to calculate poverty lines for all quarters dating back to December 1973.
 |
| Click to enlarge |
How to calculate poverty lines for other
quarters
Table 2 shows the estimated per capita household disposable income for all quarters between September 1973 and March 2022. This table may
be used to calculate poverty lines for any quarter within this period. For instance, to find the poverty line for the June quarter 1996 for any household type, multiply the current value of its poverty line by the ratio of per capita household disposable income in the June quarter 1996 to that in the current quarter; that is, the poverty line for a benchmark household in June 1996 would be 1,148.15 × 346.11 / 977.25 = $406.64.
 |
| Click to enlarge |
Relative poverty and the cost of living Updating poverty lines according to changes in per capita household disposable income means that the poverty lines are relative measures of poverty. As real incomes in the community rise, so too will the poverty lines. The value of the poverty lines will therefore be reasonably stable relative to general standards of living, but may change relative to the cost of living. An alternative method for updating poverty lines is to use a cost-of-living index, such as the ABS Consumer Price Index (CPI). Poverty lines generated in this way are absolute measures of poverty. The real purchasing power of the income at the poverty line is maintained, but it may change in comparison to general standards of living. Table 3 compares annual movements in the poverty line for the benchmark income unit between 1973/74 and 2020/21 updated in these two ways. The table shows that, by 2020/21, an income unit whose income was adjusted to match movements in average household disposable income would have 60.7 per cent more income than one whose income was adjusted to match movements in consumer prices. Put another way, the real purchasing power of the income at the poverty line rose by 60.7 per cent between 1973/74 and 2020/21.....
Full PDF document online here.
