Stop The Fill banner in front of retaining wall holding back landfill on a subdivision site in Carrs Drive, Yamba....
 |
| IMAGE: NBN News, 18 September 2022 Examples of STOP THE FILL: Don't Down Our Town corflutes out the front of homes on Yamba Rd, The Halyard & Golding Street.... |
.jpg)
 |
| Photographs supplied. |
Below is a fairly typical description of Yamba and environs during high rainfall and flooding events.
Even though it appears text and images have been produced between 2015-2021 it seems to be considered by the NSW Government as a contemporary description rather than an historical one.
Read it carefully if you live in Yamba or have been a holidaymaker in the town when the Lower Clarence River has been in flood in recent years.
NSW State Emergency Services (SES), Flood Awareness NSW, retrieved 13 September 2022:
Clarence Valley LGA
Yamba and Palmers Island – Are you at risk?
Yes you are!
Yamba is located on the southern bank of the mouth of the Clarence River. The main impact of floods in the area is isolation, however several residents and commercial properties can be inundated in severe floods. Even in minor floods, Yamba may become isolated when Yamba Road closes. Another consideration during local floods is the influx of tourists during holidays and summer season, who may be unaware of the local effects of flooding.
Palmers Islands is located directly west of Yamba on the southern bank of the Clarence River. Most of the land on the island is prone to flooding. In a minor flood, Palmers Island becomes isolated and surrounded by flood water. In a major flood some properties may experience over-floor flooding and some residents may need to evacuate.
Rural land along the Clarence River around Wooloweyah Lagoon can also be inundated and substantial numbers of rural properties can become isolated.
The period of isolation for these areas can vary depending on the size and duration of the flood, as well as high tides preventing drainage to the sea. Any residents wanting to leave the area would need to do so before flooding causes Yamba Road to close.
 |
| Palmers Island Yamba Road Store and School Flooding |
Do those five short paragraphs and that one image match your experience of floodwater and stormwater inundation in Yamba over the last 30 years?
Is it still mostly the inconvenience of isolation that the Yamba community suffers? Is it an accurate description to say that only “several residents and commercial properties can be inundated in severe floods”?
Is anyone else in Yamba asking themselves why that first paragraph quoted here is still accepted uncritically by state authorities, when the lived experience is that the inundation situation has been gradually becoming more pronounced over decades. That the amount of water entering town commercial and residential precincts is long past just nuisance value.
The natural flood storage areas and flood ways within the town, which carry water overland to the river estuary and out to sea, no longer function. In large measure due to the degree of draining, infilling and building over of these these features which has occurred over time and the fact that: (i) the town’s stormwater system can no longer adequately cope with the amount of rain falling from the sky and subsequent rainwater runoff from sloping ground/hard surfaces; and (ii) the river water arriving as flood carried down from higher up the river system whose swirl through town streets is often exacerbated by a tidal pull.
There are residents whose homes have been inundated at floor level in both 2021 and 2022 and residential lots which experienced stormwater/floodwater intrusion onto the property for the first time or at a deeper level that previous flood periods according to homeowners.
A better description of the changing Yamba experience of flooding can be found in an Inside Local Government article of 26 May 2022:
Clarence Valley Mayor, Ian Tiley, has demanded the Clarence be included in any 2022 flood studies and assessments, saying the region had been ignored in initial assessments by the NSW Department of Planning and Environment.
Mayor Tiley put forward a Minute at the June Council meeting following advice from the Department of Planning and Environment that post flood data behaviour assessments already undertaken had focused on the Richmond, Wilson, Brunswick and Tweed rivers – local government areas to the north of the Clarence Valley.
“The flood level at Grafton was not a predictor for the flood behaviour downstream,” the Mayor said.
“It is clear the Clarence flood increased in volume as it moved downstream and staff consider it likely the extreme localised rainfall events in the tributaries of the lower catchment impacted Clarence River levels downstream of Grafton, and that post flood data behaviour assessments may inform these assumptions.”
CVC previously reported in April that Yamba experienced its biggest rainfall event on record, with 1267mm in February and March. This included 274.4mm on 28 February – the highest 24-hour February total on record – and 258.2mm on 1 March for a total of 532mm.
“There has been no event or combination of events since records began that comes close to the rainfall totals recorded at Yamba in February and March,” Clarence Valley Council Director Works and Civil, Jamie Fleeting said at the time.
Getty Images has a collection of photographs which clearly demonstrate the growing dissonance between what is written by government agencies about flood behaviour and the lived experience of the Yamba community in March 2022.
YAMBA, AUSTRALIA - MARCH 02: An aerial view of a flooded street and properties in the town of Yamba, in northern New South Wales, on March 1-2, 2022 in Yamba, Australia.
(Photo by Elise Hassey/Getty Images)
Note: Hover mouse over upper righthand corner of images to reveal "Share" and "Full Screen" buttons.
Yamba's only flood evacuation route in early March 2022.... pic.twitter.com/9FLn2VY1A7
— no_filter_Yamba (@no_filter_Yamba) September 13, 2022
BACKGROUND
Australian Bureau of Meteorology, Special Climate Statement 76 – Extreme rainfall and flooding in south-eastern Queensland and eastern New South Wales, 25 May 2022, excerpt:
Summary
Extreme multi-day rainfall and significant flooding affected south-eastern Queensland and eastern New South Wales from 22 February to 9 March 2022. The heavy rainfall began in south-east Queensland and north-east New South Wales during the last week of February, and continued further south into eastern New South Wales in March (Figure 1).
Multi-day rainfall records were broken across south-eastern Queensland and north-east New South Wales, with multiple sites recording over 1 metre of rainfall (Figure 2). For the last week of February, rainfalls across parts of the region were at least 2.5 times the February average (based on the 1961–1990 period), with some parts more than 5 times the average. For north-east New South Wales and large areas of south-eastern Queensland, this was the wettest week since at least 1900. The intense and sustained rainfall across the region led to flash flooding and riverine flooding extending from Maryborough in Queensland to Grafton in New South Wales. Some areas of south-eastern Queensland, such as the Mary River at Gympie, recorded their highest flood peaks since 1893.
Widespread major riverine flooding also occurred in the Sunshine Coast region, and in the Brisbane, Logan and Albert River catchments. In parts of north-east New South Wales, peak flood levels broke previous observed records (reliable since at least 1974 and for some locations dating back more than 100 years) by considerable margins. Devastating flooding occurred through Lismore (Wilsons River) and other nearby towns, including Coraki and Woodburn (Richmond River) and Murwillumbah and Tumbulgum (Tweed River).
In the first week of March, the rainfall system shifted south along the New South Wales coast, bringing further heavy rainfall to eastern parts of the state (Figure 3). As a result, the Hawkesbury-Nepean catchment recorded its wettest 9-day period on record (since 1900) to 9 March (Table 11). With rain falling on already saturated soils and swollen rivers, flood levels in the Hawkesbury-Nepean river system exceeded those reached in March 2021 and were comparable to those of 1978 (Table 12).
*
This is a story about a small coastal town in New South Wales that is in the second stage of drowning.
It realised it was caught in a strong tide decades ago, started to tread water while looking about to see how far it was to the safety of a solid 'in good faith' urban planning riverbank, found it was in trouble and raised a hand high in the air hoping someone would notice its growing distress.
All that happened was that that successive federal, state and local governments waved at it from the shore and turned away to continue their discussions with property speculators and developers.
 |
| Click on images to enlarge |
For decades this town has been told by federal and state governments that it needed to expand to grow their respective economies. Local government has said it needs to contribute to the local economy (and by implication grow Council's rate base) as well as the regional economy.
Time and again developers have told the town that clear felling more and more land, as well as draining the marshes, natural flood ways and flood storage land then covering these areas with landfill, will benefit local communities by increasing the supply of housing in the town - that they are in fact 'good neighbours' to have in the community. If the community pushed back these same developers more often than not quickly fell back on their 'rights' as owners of portions of the hundreds of hectares in question and, not infrequently pointed to barely activated development consents they had hoarded as nest eggs until a more favourable political or economic climate developed.
And because all three tiers of government frequently talk in terms of legal ownership of land and its cash value as rateable land, regardless of its aesthetic, environmental, cultural and social value to the community, towns like Yamba at the mouth of the Clarence River often get sucked into responding in terms of the degree to which overdevelopment within long established urban precincts impacts on property ie., loss, damage and/or reduced amenity.
It's understandable. Like many other coastal towns, a good many Yamba residents are home and/or business property owners themselves.
However, this conversation needs to be firmly turned away from an almost bloodless actuarial view of potential property losses and a new thread has to enter the argument - risk to the life, health and wellbeing of the town population on a individual and collective level.
Because is not just property or lifestyle that will be affected as the climate change risks increase.
Therefore, all three tiers of government as well as property developers and those contracted to assist the progress of their development applications, need to be forced to face the potential for loss of life, injury and chronic illness if they proceed with political agendas and commercial aspirations on a 'business as usual basis'.
Yamba, along with the entire east coast of Australia, is facing a rising level of risk because:
Australia's climate is now on average 1.44°C(± 0.24°C) hotter than it was in 1910 with 1.0°C of this rise occurring since 1960;
the surface waters of the ocean which forms the eastern border of the town are becoming warmer;
the East Australia Current has increased in speed moving further down the NSW coast;
wave patterns have changed and waves breaking on local beaches and estuary soft shorelines are more erosive;
sea-level rise has commenced;
season of the year patterns are changing;
adverse weather events are becoming a fact of life;
and Yamba can no longer boast that it has one of the best climate systems in the world.
Floods now move through the Lower Clarence River estuary on average once every three years with some intervals between floods being much shorter than that and, out of control bushfires driven by high winds have proven that the town is not immune to the threat of fire. East-Coast Lows batter the town during adverse weather events.
During such events - especially flood events - Yamba can be cut off from the wider Clarence Valley for days to weeks and experience disruptions to its food and medicine supply chains.
To date there is not one piece of state legislation, regulation or instrument which guarantees that ALL these risks are taken into consideration whenever a development application is lodged and progressed to the point of denial or consent.
Every battle against inappropriate development in coastal towns like Yamba has to be fought on a case by case basis and, again like Yamba, fought in towns whose topographies are being reshaped time and time again with no overarching understanding on the part of decisionmakers of potential consequences of their actions.
When Yamba asks local government about safety in times of natural disaster it holds aloft a leaflet with a cry of "Nothing to worry about!" or words to that effect. Then tells residents that they should either 'self evacuate' (leave town ahead of its one road to the outside world being cut), 'shelter in place' (stay at home), go to stay with unspecified family or friends on the only high ground in the town - Pilot Hill with its mix of approx. 200 private and holiday rental dwellings clustered either side of three streets. Alternatively residents are told they could make their way to the ‘evacuation centre’, a low-lying local bowling club where an unspecified person/s will record their details but seemingly do little else.
So knowing that Yamba is vulnerable to almost the full suite of climate change risks - risks being exacerbated right now by inappropriate large scale development consents - who in this small town surrounded on all sides by bodies of water might be the most vulnerable?
How does Yamba bring this range of personal vulnerability to the notice of those overly complacent federal, state and local government decision makers?
A Brief Outline of Demographic Characteristics Which Potentially Indicate Vulnerable Persons within the town boundaries of Yamba, NSW, during an Adverse Weather Event caused by Bushfire or Riverine Flooding which may be intensified by Ocean Storm Surge or Stormwater Inundation.
Based on data collected by Australian Bureau of Statistics on CENSUS NIGHT, 10 August 2021, spatial information from id.com.au and Yamba Floodplain Risk Management Study 2008.
Yamba township is approx. 16.92 sq. kilometres in area with a current population density of 376.9 persons per sq. kilometre.
At all times there is one road acting as access and egress for the Yamba resident population and it is a designated evacuation route in times of bushfire or flood. This road along its length is at its lowest point 1.4mAHD and highest point 2mAHD. Note: Australian Height Datum (AHD) expressed as mAHD indicates height in metres above mean sea level.
There are recognised difficulties to safe evacuation in and from Yamba in times of Lower Clarence River flooding:
“These are likely to be high on account of:
• the distance to high ground,
• Yamba Road will be cut early making access difficult,
• the roads will quickly be inundated by up to 1 m depth or
greater,
• the emergency services (SES, Police) will be “stretched”
answering calls throughout the area.”
[Webb, McKeown & Associates, October 2008]
Three significant flood ways taking water from the southern sections of the town to the Clarence River are now either partially built upon, impeded by poorly designed infrastructure or in the process of being blocked by hectares of new land fill.
There are within Yamba:
est. 2,747 occupied residential dwellings housing 6,405 men, women & children;
est. 875 lone person households in Yamba & another 1,191 two-person family households;
est. 273 lone parent households;
at least 136 residential dwellings with no car;
est. 625 households without an internet connection at the dwelling. Note: Based on 2016 Census data as this question was not asked in Census 2021.
est. 758 private dwellings being rented, excluding holiday rentals;
est. 49 social housing properties being rented – 17 freestanding houses, 32 townhouses/duplex units;
On the basis of vulnerable age groupings:
(i) 830 children aged between 0-14 years of age
(ii) 2,414 adults aged between 65-100+ years of age;
On the basis of self-reported chronic health conditions:
2,482 persons with between 1 and 3 or more chronic conditions, including
(i) est. 71 children between 0-14 years of age with one or two health conditions
(ii) est. 200 adults aged between 65-85+ years of age with between one and three or more chronic health conditions:
Note: the range of long-term health conditions include but are not restricted to arthritis, asthma, cancer, dementia, diabetes, heart disease, kidney disease, lung conditions, stroke and mental health.
On basis of possible inability to finance their own self-evacuation:
402 households with weekly family incomes of $0-$499 dollars, including
(i) est. 105 family households
(ii) est. 302 lone person & group households;
the est. 300-1,000+ visitors staying in the town's hotel, motels, caravan parks, holiday rental accommodation who may be unfamiliar with the topography or road network in Yamba if/when required to seek safe shelter.
A word Premier Perrottet.....
Mr. Perrott, when heavy rainfall and major to extreme flooding events occurred earlier this year in the Northern Rivers region from Clarence Valley to the Qld-NSW border, members of your government - including yourself - called much of what happened "an unprecedented event, an unprecedented situation".
But that is not really an accurate description is it?
It was a predictable event and a predicted situation.
Time and time again the United Nations has warned Australia that it was going to be the first continent to face the full force of climate change impacts. Successive NSW state governments have been aware of the rising level of risk since the 1990s.
You have been a member of the NSW Division of the Liberal Party since 2002, a member of the NSW Parliament and a member of the NSW Coalition Government since March 2011 and, a minister in that government since April 2014. You were NSW Treasurer for 4 years, 8 months, 6 days and went on to be state premier these last eleven months.
I have never heard anyone suggest that you were someone of limited intelligence. So there is no way you had not noted the increased risk of coastal erosion, bushfire and flood along the 1,973km long and 100km wide NSW mainland coastal zone, particularly in the last two decades.
However, like many in positions of power before you Mr. Perrottet, you have ignored the situation and refused to face the issue of what that meant in terms of physical protection of the population. Or confronted the need to instigate reforms to land use as well as to planning legislation, regulations and instruments, in order to better reflect the circumstances of a society living in a changing climate.
As premier your electorate is the entire state. It's long past time you started to genuinely represent all those most vulnerable to climate change induced fire, storm and flood in that very large electorate - not just the NSW Liberal Party, foreign investors, big business, land speculators, property developers, political donors and your deeply suspect coalition partner, the NSW Nationals.
BRIEF BACKGROUND
A handful of not so fun facts for Yamba residents
Matters that state government, local government and regional planning panels should consider (but more often barely notice in passing) before granting consent for large scale residential developments along the NSW coastal zone.
Take Yamba for instance, bounded by the Clarence River estuary and Pacific Ocean...
Probable Maximum Flood (PMF). The largest flood that could conceivably be expected to occur at a particular location, usually estimated from probable maximum precipitation. The PMF defines the maximum extent of flood prone land, that is, the floodplain.
[NEW SOUTH WALES STATE FLOOD PLAN GLOSSARY , February 2018]
“Evacuation
1. Reliable access for pedestrians or vehicles required during a 100 year flood to a publicly accessible location above the PMF”
[RESIDENTIAL ZONES DEVELOPMENT CONTROL PLAN, effective from 23 Dec 2011 , FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT CONTROLS, LOWER CLARENCE RIVER FLOODPLAIN, YAMBA FLOODPLAIN & OTHER FLOODPLAINS]......
Approach to Yamba Bowling Club for most of Yamba population will be blocked by 1-in-100yr Flood at 2.09-2.2m & Extreme Flood at 3.56-3.68m. [https://maps.clarence.nsw.gov.au/intramaps97/]
In both flood types Yamba will be isolated from the wider Clarence Valley by floodwaters for a matter of days or weeks....
*
 | ||
Lot 245 / 22 Carrs Drive, West Yamba, multiple lot subdivision. Just one section of the total landfill which will be required across est. 127ha of a natural flood storage area . IMAGE: The Daily Telegraph, 31 May 2021.
|
In February-March 2022 and again in April the seven local government areas in the Northern Rivers region experienced heavy rainfall events, with some local rainfall exceeding historical records that had been kept since the late 1800s. These rainfall events were exacerbated by at least one large East-Coast Low stormfront.
The flood which occurred while often expected, was at times unpredictable in its behaviour, record breaking in its spread, highly destructive and, in the case of Lismore City local government area calamitous.
The 100 kilometre wide coastal zone of New South Wales experienced natural disaster on a scale that would have been hard to imagine before climate change began to widen our experience.
Post-flooding, a state parliamentary select committee was established to inquire into and report on the response to major flooding across New South Wales in 2022. Terms of reference were referred to the committee by the NSW Legislative Council on 23 March 2022 and Report No.1 was published on 9 August 2022.
Set out below is the full report in scrollable form.
However, right now I would note eight of the twenty-one findings of the report. I am sure that many Northern Rivers residents will recognise concerns which local communities have raised repeatedly across the years in times of flood.
Especially once state government decided emergency service headquarters, coordination functions and staff/volunteer numbers were to be either downsized or moved further south and away from north-east New South Wales.
Finding 1
That the NSW State Emergency Service and Resilience NSW failed as lead agencies to provide adequate leadership and effective coordination during the major flooding of February-March 2022.
Finding 2
That NSW Government agencies lacked coordination, created confusion and responded poorly in the February-March 2022 floods, resulting in the North Coast community being let down in their greatest time of need.
Finding 3
That demarcation disputes and a lack of integration between NSW Government agencies slowed the roll-out of support and assistance to those affected by the February-March 2022 floods.
Finding 4
That NSW Government agencies and the Bureau of Meteorology were not prepared for, nor did they comprehend the scale of the February-March 2022 floods, and some agencies were criticised for treating it as a nine to five business operation.
Finding 5
That the centralisation of the NSW State Emergency Service and a shortage of volunteers significantly hindered the ability of the agency to lead the response to the major flooding of February-March 2022.
.......
Finding 7
That the NSW State Emergency Service failed in its public communication of flood warnings and evacuation information during the February-March 2022 floods, by issuing out of date, inaccurate and confusing messages.
Finding 8
That NSW Government agencies and telecommunications providers failed to ensure that communities affected by the February-March 2022 floods had adequate emergency communications capabilities.
Finding 9
That, notwithstanding the role of the NSW State Emergency Service to perform rescues, individual members of the community had no other option but to ignore government advice and save lives, which was only possible due to local and historical knowledge and local communication, given information from the NSW State Emergency Service and the Bureau of Meteorology was incorrect and out of date.
NSW Parliament, Legislative Council, Inquiry Report No 1 - Response to Major Flooding Across New South Wale... by clarencegirl on Scribd
Chair's Foreword
Major flooding in NSW in February-March 2022 was a catastrophic disaster, causing widespread devastation and damage – particularly in the Northern Rivers and Hawkesbury regions. Tragically, lives were lost, thousands of homes were damaged or destroyed, and significant local infrastructure was damaged.
Five months later, families are homeless with some still living in tents, businesses are still waiting for long-promised assistance, and there are still unresolved policy matters involving buy-backs and land swaps – to name just a few of the myriad remaining pressing problems.
This inquiry was set up to consider the NSW Government's preparedness, coordination, and response to the flooding events. While this report outlines many of the failures of the NSW Government, it also seeks to ensure that the Government is better prepared and coordinated when the next natural disaster of this nature inevitably occurs.
A considerable focus of this inquiry was on the performance of the NSW State Emergency Service (SES), as the leading agency for emergency response, and Resilience NSW as the leading agency in recovery.
Ultimately, the committee found that these two organisations failed to provide leadership and effective coordination in the community’s greatest time of need. Demarcation disputes and a lack of integration slowed the roll-out of support and assistance to flood-affected communities.
The State Government’s failure to implement a streamlined grants process also meant that applicants were repeatedly interviewed, and had to re-live their experiences, leading to further frustration and trauma as part of the support process.
With respect to the NSW SES, it is clear that the centralisation of this organisation, and a shortage of volunteers, significantly hindered the ability of the agency to lead the emergency response. In many cases, flood warnings and evacuation information were out of date, inaccurate and confusing. Further still, many community members felt that they had no choice but to conduct their own rescues in dangerous conditions as many calls for assistance to 000 and the NSW SES went unanswered.
Put simply, the community was forced to save themselves; neighbour saving neighbour. While this is an admirable testament to these communities, it is both unreasonable and undesirable as a matter of public policy. For these reasons, the NSW Government should consider restructuring the SES to ensure that it better harnesses local knowledge and networks, coordinates more closely with other rescue agencies, and increases resources, including by driving volunteer recruitment.
Resilience NSW demonstrated some of the biggest failures of the NSW Government's response to the floods. Witnesses repeatedly expressed frustration and were confused about the role of Resilience NSW, particularly in the recovery phase following the floods. The committee found that the NSW Government failed to comprehend the scale of the floods and treated the disaster response as a “nine to five” business operation – when it was one of the greatest natural disasters in generations.
The agency failed to engage or coordinate with community groups leading flood recovery efforts in their communities. This was despite Resilience NSW having been established almost two years ago.
Accordingly, the NSW Government must consider the viability of Resilience NSW unless it can ensure that the agency's role is clear after reviewing policies, objectives, and funding; and that the organisation and its policies are apt to actually meet community disaster response needs.
It is this chair’s view that the NSW Government should abolish Resilience NSW.
Our focus is now on the enormous task of clean-up, restoration and reconstruction. Many flood affected individuals, families and businesses still need assistance. The NSW Government must work with much greater urgency to secure temporary housing options as many continue to live in tents and cars near their homes.
The committee also calls on the government to finalise its long term housing options and ensure that it considers investing in supporting relocations, land swaps, and providing fair compensation for landowners who wish to relocate from severely flood-impacted areas.The committee also made practical recommendations such as providing satellite phones and satellite terminals to community hubs in flood-prone areas.
The committee has noted evidence that – following the appointment of NSW Police Force Deputy Commissioner, Mal Lanyon, to the role of Northern NSW Recovery Coordinator – recovery efforts significantly improved, and that he provided much-needed leadership. The Committee has accordingly recommended a senior police officer with 'combat' experience should lead recovery efforts in future natural disasters as a matter of policy.
On behalf of the committee, I would like to thank the flood-affected communities and individuals who took the time to share their stories with us. It is the committee’s wish that this report will help to improve the NSW Government's response to future natural disasters to minimise adverse effects on local communities.
In total, the committee made 21 findings and 37 recommendations. The committee received almost 90 submissions and almost 120 responses to its online questionnaire. It held six public hearings. This included ones in Ballina; Lismore; Murwillumbah; Windsor; and two at Parliament House.
Significantly, the Committee held four public forums. We hope they were regarded as valuable by flood-stricken communities, given that they allowed 75 flood-affected individuals to speak directly under parliamentary privilege to the committee.
Furthermore, I wish to acknowledge the political leaders – at all three levels of government – who put aside their differences to support their communities. They all cooperated with this inquiry, providing forthright and honest views. This was appreciated.
Finally, I would like to thank my committee colleagues for their collaboration, and the secretariat — particularly Tina Higgins, Shaza Barbar, Stephen Fujiwara and Andrew Ratchford, as well as Hansard staff for their professional assistance on this important Inquiry.
The Hon Walt Secord MLC
Committee Chair
